Lessons Learned from Stabilization Initiatives in Afghanistan: A Systematic Review of Existing Research

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Lessons Learned from Stabilization Initiatives in Afghanistan: A Systematic Review of Existing Research

Radha Iyengar¹ Jacob N. Shapiro² Stephen Hegarty³

April 11, 2017

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Acronyms

ACSOR Afghan Center for Socio-Economic and Opinion Research

AGE Anti-Government Elements

AIMS Aid Information Management Systems

AISCS Afghanistan Infrastructure and Security Cartography System

ALLI Alternative Licit Livelihoods Initiatives
ANDP Afghanistan National Development Program

ANQAR Afghanistan Nationwide Quarterly Assessment Research

ANSO
Afghanistan NGO Safety Office
Name of survey (not an acronym)
ASI
Afghanistan Stability Initiative
BINNA
Name of survey (not an acronym)
CBSG
Community Based Stabilization Grants
CCI
Community Cohesion Initiative Project
CDP
Community Development Program

CERP Commander's Emergency Response Program
CIDA Canadian International Development Agency

CSO Central Statistics Organization

DFID Department for International Development

DHS Demographic and Health Surveys

DOD Department of Defense

DTEM Digital Terrain Elevation Map

ESOC Empirical Studies of Conflict Project FOB/COP Forward Operating Base/Combat Outpost

FOGHORN Name of survey (not an acronym)

GIRoA Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan

GIS Geographic Information Systems
ISAF International Security Assistance Force

ISVG Institute for the Study of Violent Groups

LGCD Local Governance and Community Development Project

MICS Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey

MISTI Measuring the Impact of Stabilization Initiatives Project
MRRD Ministry for Rural Rehabilitation and Development

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NGO Non-Governmental Organization

NOAA National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration

NRVA National Risk and Vulnerability Assessment

NSP National Solidarity Program

NTMA NATO Training Mission in Afghanistan

OAPA USAID Office of Afghanistan and Pakistan Affairs

OTI USAID Office of Transition Initiatives

PAP Pre-Analysis Plan

SIGACTS Significant Activities (e.g., violent events)

SIKA Stability in Key Areas Project STAY Skills Training for Afghan Youth

UNDSS United Nations Department for Safety and Security
USAID United States Agency for International Development

USG United States Government

USIP United States Institute for Peace

Executive Summary

This report summarizes findings from a review of 89 studies on development and stabilization programming in Afghanistan. These findings inform answers to the following six research questions that were identified before conducting the research review:⁴

R1: What did stabilization projects achieve in terms of key outcomes, including: security; popular support for the government; popular support for anti-government elements (AGE); community cohesion and resilience; health of the Afghan people; economic well-being of the Afghan people; and conflict events?

R2: Over what time horizon is these effects apparent and how quickly do any gains or losses fade?

R3: How does the presence of the military impact the outcomes of stabilization projects?

R4: What types of synergies and confounding factors exist between stabilization programs by different actors (other parts of the United States Government (USG), other countries, the Afghan government, international organizations like the World Bank, etc.)?

R5: Are impacts of stabilization programs amplified or reduced when considering specific aspects (size, contract type, etc.) or sectors (agriculture, infrastructure, skills, etc.) of projects?

R6: What commonalities exist when looking across a number of successful or unsuccessful stabilization projects between different actors and different sectors?

This report summarizes the high-level findings that cross-cut these six questions as well as the specific evidence related to each of the questions. For each of the 89 studies, we applied three criteria identified in a pre-analysis plan, which helped make the analysis systematic and reduced bias: internal validity of causal claims; scope of coverage; and stabilization indicators. We established these assessment criteria before beginning to review these studies in order to focus the analysis on the most relevant issues and findings using unbiased standards to compare sources. The motivations of our study are to identify the key factors that contributed to the success or failure of stabilization programs in Afghanistan and formulate recommendations for the design, implementation and evaluation of future efforts in Afghanistan and other conflict-

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⁴ These questions were modified slightly during the course of the project to address feasibility constraints from the existing data and literature. These changes were detailed in an addendum to the Pre-Analysis Plan (PAP).

affected areas.

Across the literature, we find some evidence of near-term gains in security, health access, and economic activity (R1). The small, short-term improvement in local security varied considerably across region and program and there are notable examples where security did not improve and even worsened. In all cases, the estimated effect was small, especially relative to the overall rates of violence. This variation is a common theme across a number of the outcomes. Support for the Afghan government and AGE varies substantially across different programs making it difficult to draw a unified conclusion across the literature. Much of the variation in those attitudes appears driven by perceptions of government corruption. There was no evidence to suggest universal belief that insurgents were better at governance or that support was zero-sum with Afghan Government. The evidence on community cohesion in the existing literature was too limited to draw a conclusion and in many studies was not even considered. There was some evidence of improved health services (both actual and perceived access) but few measures of actual health improvement to indicate whether this improved access translates into improved well-being. There was also evidence of consistent economic gains. Some of this may have been short-lived due to increased spending and activity during the project.

The evidence that any of these projects had a long-term impact is even more limited (R2). This is in part because few studies were designed with prospective or retrospective design to estimate sustainability. Some projects had unrealistic goals and mechanisms to facilitate sustainable outcomes (e.g., depended on continued spending or international support) and others suffered from institutional limitations (e.g., corruption, lack of capacity) and were unlikely to see sustained gains. There is also some evidence that military forces played a key role in facilitating basic operations (R3). However, military and civilian implementers had different timelines and objectives making coordination challenging. There was also a core set of scholars who worried that the presence of the military as an implementer, or even simply providing security, "militarized" aid provision; thus inhibiting it from achieving social welfare objectives. In contrast, there were few evaluations on how to achieve successful coordination between international donors. However, multiple studies noted the importance of coordination between different countries and the host nation in ensuring success (R4).

Overall, the most important program feature that could enable success was program size (R5). The literature consistently found that small-scale programs produced near-term impact on at least some of the key indicators. However, because of their limited size and scope, these programs could not address key drivers of instability and thus were often not associated with longer-term

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⁵ This includes a broad range of health care services measures from the literature. We note that this differs from the more limited measure of perceived access to health care discussed in detail in the Iyengar, Shapiro, Mao, and Singh (2017) paper.

changes. However, large-scale programs created unrealistic expectations and were more subject to corruption and targeting by insurgents, undermining their near-term effectiveness. The literature is also very informative on key enabling factors (R6). Key factors that enabled success include: host-nation coordination and commitment, limiting the extent of corrosive corruption, ensuring baseline levels of security to facilitate basic implementation and oversight, and ensuring appropriate staffing, both in terms of skills and in terms of longevity of deployment were all associated with programmatic success.

Looking across the 89 studies, there were four key themes that cross-cut the six analytic questions. First, most stabilization programs will have – at best – modest impact (less than 0.1 standard deviation when measured quantitatively and typically described as small in qualitative analysis). Based on the Afghanistan experience, policy makers and implementers should not expect to generate either large or persistent effects. From well-designed experimental and quasi-experimental approaches (e.g., Beath, Fontini and Enikolopov, 2013; MSI, 2014) to government-initiated qualitative reviews (Bohnke, Koehler and Zurcher, 2014; Bohnke and Zurcher, 2013 (1b); Norad, 2012) to historical accounts (Goodhand, 2002) the evidence consistently indicates stabilization programming has small, generally transitory, impacts (both positive or negative). Programs such as the Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP) (Chou, 2012; Sexton, 2015) or some of the Afghanistan Stabilization Initiative (ASI) programs (Altai, 2012 (1)) that have been "successful" may have short-term positive impacts, but they do not appear to generate large shifts in security, attitudes, or capacity. This is relevant for both managing expectations for what stabilization programs may accomplish and for considering how to design measurement and evaluation efforts to detect relatively small effects.

Second, smaller may be better. A number of studies (Altai, 2012 (7); Chou, 2012; Child, 2014; Goodhand, 2002; Gordon, 2011; Kapstein and Kathuria, 2012; Nagl, Exum and Humayun, 2009) highlight the intuition that smaller projects can be targeted at important, specific gaps and seem less likely to fuel instability. Small projects have a variety of beneficial features: they are often easier to manage by staff on the ground; they are less likely than large infrastructure projects to attract attention from corrupt officials or to become targets for enemy sabotage; and outputs are small and less likely to become a source of conflict. The literature does not provide evidence of increasing returns from a cost-effectiveness perspective: small projects do not appear to have a differential impact on outcomes such as violence or support for the government relative to larger-scale projects (see Child, 2014). Additionally, Afghans reacted positively to large-scale programs that are populated by small, community driven projects such as the Afghanistan National Solidarity Program (NSP) at least in part because the funding dispersed was too small to be siphoned off by powerful interests, though it still did provide meaningful benefits to communities (Gordon, 2011). This is also important for minimizing the risk of unintended negative outcomes. For instance, any corruption that affects community-driven, local projects is

by its nature smaller in scale and thus less likely to delegitimize the national government (Kapstein and Kathuria, 2012).

Third, stabilization efforts should be designed in ways that make it hard for destabilizing forces to target or claim credit for programs (Altai, 2012 (1-3); Carbonnier, 2014; IMU, 2015 (2)). This insight is particularly important for interpreting the variation in outcomes when small projects have both small, positive effects (Beath, Fontini and Enikolopov, 2013 (1a)) and some small, negative impacts (e.g., MSI, 2014). There are two important mechanisms that can generate negative impacts from otherwise potentially effective programs: one, programs can be deliberately targeted and de-legitimized by insurgents (e.g., Altai, 2012 (5); Lyall, 2016; Sexton, 2015); or, two, AGE may take credit for positive effects or seek bribes and revenue from the programs; this tends to raise perceptions of corruption, for which Afghans almost automatically blame the national government, thereby reducing its legitimacy and increasing support for AGE (e.g., MSI, 2014; ICG, 2011). Programs must therefore not only be able to effectively address short-term drivers of instability, but also must be properly credited to the government or local leaders without attracting violence or other negative attention from AGE. One effective strategy, successfully employed by the ASI program, is to ensure local government and local nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) are visibly central to project implementation (Altai, 2012(7)).

Fourth, and finally, while we have systematically compiled the evidence from the existing literature, almost none of the ideas presented in this review are new. Many of the studies included in this analysis noted findings based on the evidence available several years ago – but few of those recommendations have been implemented. Many of our findings regarding development impacts based on studies through 2016 are also highlighted in ICG (2011), which argued: "The impact of international assistance will remain limited unless donors, particularly the largest, the U.S., stop subordinating programming to counter-insurgency objectives, devise better mechanisms to monitor implementation, adequately address corruption and wastage of aid funds, and ensure that recipient communities identify needs and shape assistance policies." Of particular note is the repeated, widespread recommendation for improved monitoring and evaluation, which is succinctly summarized by Bohnke, Koehler and Zurcher (2014) as follows: "...if the international community is serious about rigorous impact evaluations, it must pressure donors and implementing actors for much higher standards for recording and sharing data!" Many of these recommendations could be achieved through adopting the improvements and changes suggested in Department of State (2011).

We must note here that it is unsurprising that many programs did not accomplish the desired outcomes; few were designed, implemented or modified to take into account existing recommendations that might have improved their chances for success. We acknowledge the

pervasive impact of environmental factors in Afghanistan (e.g., security, corruption) on program success. However, it is precisely because stabilization efforts in complex and difficult environments are inherently dynamic processes that future efforts should focus on not simply implementing projects but on ensuring a mechanism for effectively integrating evidence-based recommendations and, when appropriate, modifying policy and strategy to account for empirical findings.

1 INTRODUCTION

While there are multiple studies on the effects of specific stabilization programs in Afghanistan, there is no study that systematically reviews the full range of studies on stabilization and development programming in the country. Such a review is useful because while any individual study may have specific limitations, common themes identified across the range of studies are likely to be broadly accurate. In particular, since each study uses a slightly different methodology and is done by different organizations with varying views and methods, looking across studies effectively cancels out biases and should reveal more reliable patterns. This is the core logic behind meta-analysis in the sciences and it applies in this setting as well.

This document summarizes key findings from program evaluations, government documents, the academic literature, and policy studies, on the efficacy and impact of stabilization efforts in Afghanistan. Specifically, this review compiles and analyzes evidence on the following six research questions:

R1: What did stabilization projects achieve in terms of key outcomes: security; popular support for the government; popular support for anti-government elements (AGE); community cohesion and resilience; health of the Afghan people; economic well-being of the Afghan people; and conflict events?

R2: Over what time horizon is these effects apparent and how quickly do any gains or losses fade?

R3: How does the presence of the military impact the outcomes of stabilization projects?

R4: What types of synergies and confounding factors exist between stabilization programs by different actors (other parts of the USG, other countries, Afghan government, international organizations like the World Bank, etc.)?

R5: Are impacts of stabilization programs amplified or reduced when considering specific aspects (size, contract type, etc.) or sectors (agriculture, infrastructure, skills, etc.) of projects?

R6: What commonalities exist when looking across a number of successful or unsuccessful stabilization projects between different actors and different sectors?

The rest of this document summarizes the methodological approach and key findings for each of

these six questions. The final section summarizes key cross-cutting findings relevant for policy makers and provides some recommendations for future policy and research regarding stabilization programs in conflict-affected areas.

2 APPROACH

2.1 Study Selection

The literature reviewed for the study was identified through the research team's search of the academic and think tank literature on the impact of aid programs in Afghanistan, which was supplemented by government reports recommended by USAID and documents cited and referenced in the research reviewed. The research team prioritized studies with a specific focus on USAID stabilization efforts in Afghanistan in the last decade; a secondary priority was on literature assessing Afghanistan stabilization programming implemented by other USG agencies and international donors. Comparative studies of stabilization initiatives in countries other than Afghanistan were included if they addressed the main relevant themes of the research review.

In total, the research team examined 110 studies and selected a total of 89 for inclusion in the review. Of these studies, 36 focus explicitly on analyzing USAID or Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI) administered programs. Another 11 studies focus on other USG activities, such as US military stabilization programs under the Commander's Emergency Reconstruction Program (CERP) and operations of Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs). We then identified about 25 additional documents based on citations and references in the research reviewed. The team excluded several studies that were theoretical or "think pieces" and were not intended to serve an evaluation function. We also excluded pieces that only tangentially addressed Afghanistan (e.g., those with a focus on Iraq or the Philippines), but retained reports that included Afghanistan as a substantive case even if other countries were included in the analysis. 6

To structure our review, we organized the literature into four broad categories ⁷:

1. **Program Evaluation**. Comprehensive review of USAID-commissioned studies of the impact and effectiveness of its stabilization programs in Afghanistan (to include specialized thematic evaluations of these programs, specific to gender, ethnicity, region etc.). Examples include:

⁶ The findings and analysis are based on the review presented in Appendix A, which provides a detailed summary of each study included. Each study is assigned a unique ID for cross-reference between the Summary Report and Reference Table. This report uses these unique IDs to reference any findings and conclusions.

⁷ These categories were included in June 2016 pre-analysis plan provided to and approved by USAID OAPA.

- a. Social Impact. February, 2016. Final Performance Evaluation of the USAID/OTI Community Cohesion Initiative.
- b. Management Systems International. February, 2015. *Afghan Civilian Assistance Program II: Final Performance Evaluation*.
- c. The Measuring the Impact of Stabilization Initiatives Project (MISTI) Stabilization Trends and Impact Evaluation Survey.
- 2. **Government Documents**. Official USG and foreign government reviews or assessments of the efficacy of stabilization assistance programs in Afghanistan. Examples include:
 - a. Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR). March, 2011. Afghanistan's National Solidarity Program Has Reached Thousands of Afghan Communities, but Faces Challenges that Could Limit Outcomes.
 - b. UKAID Stabilisation Unit. November, 2010. Stabilisation Case Study: Infrastructure in Helmand, Afghanistan.
- 3. **Academic Literature**. Review of social science scholarship (books and peer-reviewed journal articles) on aid and stabilization in Afghanistan published in the last decade. Examples include:
 - a. Gordon, Stuart. 2014. "Afghanistan's Stabilization Program: Hope in a Dystopian Sea?" in Robert Muggah, ed. *Stabilization Operations, Security and Development: States of Fragility*. New York: Routledge.
 - b. Sexton, Renard. 2015. "Aid as a Tool against Insurgency: Evidence from Contested and Controlled Territory in Afghanistan." *American Political Science Review*.
- 4. **Policy/Think Tank**. Independent studies of aid and stabilization in Afghanistan with a policy-centered orientation. Examples include:
 - a. Viehe, Ariella, Jasmine Afshar and Tamana Heela. December, 2015. *Rethinking the Civilian Surge: Lessons from the Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan*. Washington, DC: Center for American Progress.
 - b. Kapstein, Ethan and Kamna Kathuria. December, 2012. *Economic Assistance in Conflict Zones: Lessons from Afghanistan*. Washington, DC: Center for Global Development.

These categories served two key functions. First, they enabled the research team to compare studies that were similar in purpose and design. For instance, we could compare program evaluations to other evaluations rather than to more qualitative think tank reports. This comparison allowed us to assess and evaluate both methods and findings in the broader context of the purpose and audience of the report. Second, this allowed us to collate and integrate information within and across study types to provide a more holistic review of the findings. These categories are not intended to provide any ranking or normative weight on the relative value of any specific type of study. Our subsequent analysis found studies that were classified as

carefully designed and effective evaluations in each of the four categories of studies.

2.2 Defining Stabilization

The study explicitly posits no normative definition of stabilization. This is because there is a substantial degree of variation in this definition and we did not want to inadvertently exclude certain research or analysis through the initial definitional choice. Thus, the research team instead allowed the definition to emerge from an analysis of stabilization indicators in policy documents, program evaluations and academic literature. Some of the most common types of aid labelled "stabilization programming" that we encountered in our review include:

- Efforts to improve local government capacity for service delivery to increase legitimacy and strengthen ties with local communities
- Community-led small infrastructure projects to improve community cohesion and resilience to conflict
- Youth training and education to increase positive engagement with the community and reduce susceptibility to violent extremism
- Agricultural development to provide alternatives to poppy cultivation
- Short-term employment generation efforts often called "cash for work" programs.

Across these studies, we found nearly 200 different indicators used in various combinations to measure and track implicit or explicit definitions of stabilization. Based on these indicators, we developed a classification system of eight broad factors associated with stabilization. These were the key factors and associated indicators that occurred regularly throughout the literature and analyzing along these dimensions allowed us to compare findings between studies with common themes but different specific measures or metrics. The factors are: attitudes towards the Afghan government (including government at any level and civil society attitudes broadly such as support for voting, government-run institutions, and views on national identity); attitudes towards anti-government elements (AGE), including criminal and insurgent groups; attitudes towards foreign actors (e.g., military forces, development implementers); economic well-being; government capacity; health and social well-being; infrastructure improvement; and social cohesion. The most common indicators were security, government capacity, and attitudes towards the Afghan government. Less common indicators were infrastructure improvements and attitudes towards AGE. Rarely were either economic well-being or health and social well-being included as indicators.

Table 1. Number of Studies with Key Indicators

Categories	Count of Studies
Government Capacity	57
Attitudes Towards Afghan Government	41
Security	41
Social Cohesion	26
Attitudes Towards AGE	11
Economic Well-Being	10
Attitude Towards Foreign Actors	9
Infrastructure Improvements	9
Health and Social Well-Being	5

A compilation of stabilization indicators included in the Reference Table (attached as an appendix) highlights an underlying theme of this review: in the complex and fraught environment aid implementers encountered in Afghanistan, defining stabilization - much like designing and implementing stabilization programs - was a variable, sometimes vague, and highly dynamic process. As such, the research team coded the nature of indicators used in each of the studies and then assessed studies across these measures without judgement as to whether one definition of stabilization (and associated combination of indicators) was preferable to another.

2.3 Assessment Criteria

Every study included for analysis was assigned a classification for three assessment criteria: the internal validity of the causal claims made; the scope of coverage (both temporal and geographic) offered; and the framework of stabilization indicators employed. The categories for these criteria can be found in Table 2, below.

⁸ These categories were included in June 2016 pre-analysis plan provided to and approved by USAID OAPA.

Table 2. Research Review Assessment Criteria

Evaluation Criteria	Effective	Potentially Effective	Insufficient Evidence
Internal Validity of Causal Claims	Experimental: random selection of treatment and control groups; robust estimates of causal effects; defensible and scope for generalizability clearly discernible	Systematic: purposive or random sampling or observations; data collection is systematic; plausible attribution of causal effects based on research design; thorough exploration of correlations	Anecdotal: no strong methodology; data collection is opportunistic; unreliable or idiosyncratic impressions; unable to establish causal effects
Scope of Coverage	Complete geographic coverage of program area; multiple waves of data collection; baseline data employed and outcomes in control areas measured	Complete or nearly complete geographic coverage of program area; examines a single time period and/or is quantitative or qualitative only (not mixed method); no baseline data	Partial geographic coverage of program area; examines a single, relatively short time period
Stabilization Indicators	Rigorous framework of stability indicators	Plausible definition of stability indicators	Missing or vague definition of stability indicators

It is important to note that these assessment criteria do not exclude or negatively code qualitative studies. Qualitative studies with well-defined research questions, defined indicators or measures, and a careful interview or document review design were coded as high quality. Ultimately, our review includes both quantitative studies that lack the rigorous and systematic approach needed to provide credible estimates, as well as well-designed qualitative studies that provide credible evidence on the effects of programs and critical insights that could not be collected through quantitative measures.

We utilize these criteria to enable a more nuanced assessment of each study's utility. For example, a study found to be "Effective" in terms of analytical rigor, but with "Insufficient

Evidence" related to its scope of coverage may provide a highly credible, but potentially highly localized assessment of stabilization programming impact, with findings that are not readily generalizable to broader environments or contexts.

In addition to the pre-specified criteria, we developed a coding for "classification of practical findings or recommendations" to highlight some of the studies' more practical suggestions on the design and implementation of stabilization programs. This category has three broad dimensions: information can be characterized as having limited value for current planning or insufficient practical application; some useful findings or recommendations; or useful findings or recommendations. For each of these categories, we separated the findings into four areas: program design, program implementation and oversight, measurement and evaluation, and civil-military coordination.

3 KEY FINDINGS

Many of the 89 studies reviewed relied wholly or in part on quantitative data. Many studies also included interviews with government officials in Afghanistan, civilian personnel from ISAF nations, military personnel from ISAF nations, and Afghan civilians. The studies were largely conducted independently from each other, often without reference to each other in different fields and for different audiences.

The rest of this chapter details the findings from the reports on six specific research questions:

R1: What did stabilization projects achieve in terms of key outcomes: security; popular support for the government; popular support for anti-government elements (AGE); community cohesion and resilience; health of the Afghan people; economic well-being of the Afghan people; and conflict events?

R2: Over what time horizon is these effects apparent and how quickly do any gains or losses fade?

R3: How does the presence of the military impact the outcomes of stabilization projects?

R4: What types of synergies and confounding factors exist between stabilization programs by different actors (other parts of the USG, other countries, Afghan government, international organizations like the World Bank, etc.)?

R5: Are impacts of stabilization programs amplified or reduced when considering specific aspects (size, contract type, etc.) or sectors (agriculture, infrastructure, skills, etc.) of projects?

R6: What commonalities exist when looking across a number of successful or unsuccessful stabilization projects between different actors and different sectors?

The evidence presented in each section highlights areas where there is broad consensus based on effective evidence ("current knowns"); widely held ideas that are not supported by effective evidence ("current assumptions"); research questions or topics raised in the literature for which empirical evidence does not exist ("current gaps"); and issues for which the literature offers competing or contradictory findings due to differences in, for example, research approach, methods, or data sources ("current conflicts").

3.1 Stabilization Programs Impact on Key Outcomes

The first research question (R1) focused on whether USAID stabilization projects, specifically, and stabilization projects more generally, achieved improvements in the key outcomes of security and conflict events; popular support for the government and for anti-government elements (AGE); community cohesion and resilience; health of the Afghan people; and, economic well-being of the Afghan people. Overall, we found consistent evidence of a small, short-term reduction of violence in some areas and limited evidence for any other effect. We also found some gaps in the existing research regarding the importance of addressing underlying economic conditions when seeking to increase stability in conflict-affected areas and almost no evidence on the types of activities that are needed to ensure the sustainability of key outcomes.

3.1.1 Security

There is substantial evidence in the literature that USAID stabilization programming in Afghanistan had a small, but positive, short-term impact on local security (that is, violence was reduced and/or a higher proportion of the population reported that they felt secure), with considerable regional variation. Evaluations of specific programs provide evidence of microlevel impacts, largely in terms of changes in popular perceptions of their local security environment. The robustness of this evidence is mixed, ranging from the fully representative random probability surveys of the Measuring Impact of Stabilization Initiatives (MISTI) program to qualitative case studies to more anecdotal reviews of existing programs.

However, as is the case in assessing nearly all outcomes of stabilization programming, there are significant gaps in our understanding of how sustainable these impacts are in the medium- to long-term. The academic literature on stabilization aid highlights the ambiguity in the effects of development assistance – which is typically more long-term both in execution and in impact – on conflict and security. Recent empirical analyses suggest development assistance may exacerbate or prolong civil conflict, either by incentivizing insurgent groups to employ greater violence to derail projects that may weaken their position or by increasing all combatants' uncertainty about the other side's relative strength (Narang, 2015).

The literature indicates the impact of aid on security is highly dependent on levels of government control and insurgent presence in the districts where projects are implemented: stabilization aid only reduces violence when administered in districts already controlled by pro-government forces (Fishstein and Wilder, 2012; Sexton, 2015). The fact that physical security itself is a key *determinant* to successful program implementation and sustainability makes it difficult to assess the impact of development aid on security as an *outcome*. (Derleth and Alexander, 2010; GIRoA, 2010; MSI, 2013 (2)). This is further complicated by the integration of potential insurgents in local communities. Indeed, broader studies on programs with scope beyond stabilization (e.g., development programs, long-term capacity building initiatives) find that humanitarian assistance

in conflict settings does not have uniform effects and the impact of violence on changes in civilian attitudes depends on whether the perpetrator is viewed as part of their in-group (Lyall, 2016; Lyall, Blair and Imai, 2013).

3.1.2 Support for Government and Anti-Government Elements

We find largely inconsistent evidence on the relationship between stabilization programs and support for either government or anti-government elements. In many cases, the degree to which these programs influenced attitudes was driven by activities outside of the programs' control (see, for example, Altai, 2012 (2) or Altai, 2012 (3)). A key factor in how programs related to attitudinal changes was the degree to which projects were implicated in government corruption. This evidence feeds the broader set of assumptions that the fundamental conflict drivers in Afghanistan are inherently political in nature (e.g., ethnic grievances, inter- and intra-tribal disputes). It is clear that a considerable proportion of Afghan citizens believe the main cause of insecurity to be their own government, which is perceived to be massively corrupt, predatory and unjust. Stabilization programs that rely on using aid to win the population over to such a negatively perceived government face an uphill struggle (Carter, 2013; Fishstein, 2012). There is not sufficient evidence to justify the claim that the Taliban or other AGE were perceived as more effective in addressing the people's highest priority needs of security and access to justice. The evidence is conflicting as to whether individuals viewed support for the Afghan government or the Taliban as zero sum and the extent to which such support can be won through the actions of external actors (Wilton Park Conference, 2010).

3.1.3 Community Cohesion and Resilience

The literature was surprisingly sparse in explicitly defining or assessing social cohesion. Some studies explore this topic by defining impact of conflict on social cohesion through measuring disrupting social engagements and activities (e.g., AIR, 2013; Counterpart, 2005). The degree to which social and community cohesion is important for well-being and stability remains an important gap in the existing research.

Based largely on a handful of project evaluations (e.g., MISTI, ASI), the literature highlights the degree to which there is regional variation in the impact of stabilization programs on community cohesion and resilience. Social capital and local leader satisfaction indices from the final wave of the MISTI evaluation survey indicate perceptions of resilience are strongest in southern districts targeted by the Stability in Key Areas-South (SIKA-S) project, where respondents are most likely to say their community is able to work together to solve problems that come from outside their village. Respondents in SIKA-S districts are also most likely to believe the interests of ordinary people and the interests of women are considered when local leaders make decisions that affect their village/neighborhood. Although Kandahar Food Zone (KFZ) districts are also in the south, those living in KFZ districts perceive the lowest levels of community resilience and

cohesion. Since KFZ districts were selected for inclusion in USAID stabilization programming because of high rates of poppy cultivation, the corrosive effects of the drug trade may explain some of the lack of community resilience and cohesion (MISTI, 2015 (3)). The analyses do not explicitly rule out, however, that differences in reported cohesion could be due to differences in specific aspects of the projects themselves rather than geographic or other sources of variation in the people responding to the surveys.

3.1.4 Health and Economic Well-Being

The very limited evidence on the effect of stabilization programs on health and economic outcomes remains a significant gap in the literature. In part, this is because there were few studies which included economic and/or health indicators explicitly, as shown in Table 2. A handful of other studies, listed below, discuss health outcomes but did not include explicit indicators to evaluate health improvements. A number of studies focused on improvement in health services (AIR, 2013; Beath, Fontini and Enikolopov, 2013 (1a); Child, 2014; MSI, 2013 (2)), but contained limited evidence on whether improvements in access were sustained and on the extent to which such access improved actual health outcomes.

Regarding economic outcomes, there is limited evidence of slight improvements in economic conditions during the implementation of stabilization programs (Altai, 2012 (4), Beath, Fontini and Enikolopov, 2013 (1a); MSI, 2013 (2)). In most cases, this appears to be driven by the direct creation of jobs (Felbab-Brown, 2012; Altai, 2012 (2)), but in some cases job-training programs also had a positive impact (IMU, 2015 (1)). The literature remains conflicted on whether this focus on economic outcomes is desirable. While some research suggests that lack of economic opportunity is a source of some frustration among the general population and ensuring stable economic conditions for Afghans is a critical prerequisite for stabilization (MFA Denmark, 2012; Social Impact, 2016; MSI, 2013 (2)), others argue that focusing on economic conditions distracts attention from the political and social issues that are fundamental to generating grievances and driving conflict (Ellwood, 2013; Gordon, 2011). Absent empirical evidence linking economic conditions to instability and conflict in these settings, it remains ambiguous whether addressing economic conditions should be a necessary element of stabilization programs.

3.2 Time Horizon of Effects

The second research question (R2) was focused on the time horizon over which any effects were apparent. In many cases, programs focused on generating rapid effects within a very short window (3-6 months). Other programs were focused on the medium-term (6-18 months) or long-term (18+ months). Some stabilization programs also considered the impact on key indicators

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⁹ We note that these time horizons are only medium and long term in the context of "stabilization" programs.

over an even longer timeframe--3-5 years from implementation. Very few impacts were seen over this longer time horizon for two reasons. First, and unavoidably in conflict-affected settings, the dynamic nature of the environment makes it hard to find any effects from programming after more than a year. Too many other inhibiting and amplifying factors are changing along with independent but confounding drivers of instability. In such conditions, the signal to noise ratio is typically quite low after more than six months. Second, program outcomes are not typically designed to be measured years after implementation is complete; programs do not often include this in their budgets. We also did not find retrospective studies on the effects of major programs after program implementation had concluded.

3.2.1 Limited Evidence of Short-Term Impact

Nearly all well-designed studies, including experimental and quasi-experimental quantitative approaches (e.g., Beath, Fontini and Enikolopov, 2013 (1b); MSI, 2014 (7)), government-initiated evaluations (Bohnke, Koehler and Zurcher, 2014; Bohnke and Zurcher, 2013; Norad, 2012), qualitative reviews (Fishstein, 2012), and historical accounts (Goodhand, 2002) consistently indicated that any stabilization program effects (whether positive or negative) were short-term at best. This appears to be true of both US and international civilian-led programs, such as the ASI programs (Altai, 2012 (1)) or NSP (Beath, Fontini and Enikolopov, 2013 (1b)), and military-led programs, such as CERP (Chou, 2012). It also applies to the stabilization efforts of non-USG foreign donors, such as Norway (Norad, 2012), Germany (BMZ, 2010), and the UK (DFID, 2009). While several of these programs generated shifts in the security environment, government capacity or reported attitudes, there is no evidence that these shifts were sustained after the programs concluded.

The literature is divided on the desirability of short-term or long-term stabilization aid. On the one hand, some reports emphasize that a focus on short-term objectives is essential to help the host nation get off life support and on a sustainable path to recovery (Cole and Hsu, 2009; Narang, 2015; SFRC, 2011). Proponents of a short-term focus argue that quick-impact gains address specific, pressing needs and build the foundation for other, longer-term activities (by either the Afghan government or other international actors). The critique of a short-term focus centers on the assertion that rapid gains or "quick wins" result in outcomes that are unsustainable without continued foreign support, ultimately breeding dependency and resentment among the Afghan population (Brown, 2014; Felbab-Brown, 2012; ICG, 2011; Miakhel, 2010). Specifically, Felbab-Brown (2012) notes that the focus on short-term gains does not address structural drivers of instability (especially in rural Afghanistan) and, as a result, quick-impact

Development programs, for example, would operate and expect impact over much longer time horizons.

¹⁰ In impact evaluations in conflict zones, this is a general problem for most any outcome other than basic demographics among geographically stable populations.

oriented programs, such as CERP-funded projects, have tended to replace government capacity rather than grow it. Taylor (2010), in particular, argues that the donor community should shift its focus from "quick wins" to sustainability. While logically appealing, there is limited evidence that empirically validates this assertion.

3.2.2 Gaps in Understanding Long-Term Impact

While the short-term and transitory nature of stabilization program impacts appears to be well-documented, at least for some key indicators, their longer-term impacts are less understood. The research on lack of long-term outcomes largely focuses on the reasons for lack of sustainability. These reasons include: projects were explicitly designed to achieve short-term stability, rather than long-term sustainability (Carter, 2013; Cole and Hsu, 2009); many projects had unrealistic goals and mechanisms to facilitate sustainable outcomes (DFID, 2009; Felbab-Brown, 2012); some projects were not focused on key drivers or issues relevant for change (Brown, 2014); and specific factors that had pervasive effects on program implementation (e.g., corruption, personnel turnover) created barriers for sustainable outcomes (DFID, 2009; Gordon, 2014; ICG, 2011; Miakhel, 2010; MSI, 2015 (1)).

In addition to the programmatic reasons for lack of longer-term and sustainable impact, most efforts for monitoring and evaluation were focused on oversight and implementation and did not continue to assess outcome changes after program completion. This was especially true for the experimental and quasi-experimental evaluations of stabilization programming in our review. In large part, this is because assessing outcome changes after program completion is costly and it risks the inclusion of other confounding factors, which could make any results difficult to interpret. The environment in Afghanistan specifically, and many conflict-affected areas generally, is dynamic given the social turmoil and many government and international activities that may affect measurable indicators. When evaluating an individual program many years after its completion, other programs and sources of turmoil can confound and bias estimates of the impact of the specific program in question. This lack of measurement also impacted the design and evaluation of longer-term programs conducted with more traditional development objectives (UNDP, 2014).

3.3 Impact of Military Presence

Given the prominence of the military and its expanded role in stabilization program operation and execution, it is critical to consider the interactive effects between the military and civilian activities. In particular, we focused on how the presence of the military impacted the outcomes of stabilization projects (R3). On the whole, the literature suggests that the military played an important role in providing baseline levels of security to facilitate program operation and that some of the military's programs—namely CERP—were important stabilization programs in their

own right. However, the differences in objectives, timelines, and cultures resulted in inefficiencies and sometimes limited the effectiveness of operations. At a more strategic level, there remains an active, ongoing debate on the degree to which assistance programs should be supported or executed by the military.

3.3.1 International Military Forces have a Role in the Basic Execution of Stabilization Programs

At a purely tactical level, much of the literature recognizes the importance of military presence during program execution to assist in providing the basic level of security needed for program execution (DoD JCOA, 2006; Felbab-Brown, 2012; ICG, 2011; Kapstein and Kathuria, 2012; Sexton, 2015; Taylor, 2010). Absent this support (and sometimes even with it), the security situation inhibited even basic tasks needed for program operation (see, for example, Altai, 2012 (5)). This vital function was acknowledged even among those critical of the military's role in the stabilization context. As noted by Taylor (2010): "security is still the major issue inhibiting project implementation in stabilization contexts. Donors need to find more innovative, effective and varied ways to deal with security issues in aid delivery." Thus while the military may have been instrumentally useful in allowing basic operations, that support did not negate the potential inhibiting effect of poor security.

3.3.2 Civilian and Military Implementers Have Conflicting Objectives

Although the military played an important and well-recognized role in supporting stabilization efforts, the differences between civilian and military objectives (Gordon, 2014), timeframes (Davids, Rietjens and Soeters, 2010), and culture (Altai, 2012 (4)) resulted in a range of inefficiencies and conflicting activities. While the empirical evidence of problems resulting from a lack of civil-military cooperation is largely qualitative, it is robust, widespread, and consistent.

A range of studies consistently identified these issues and noted the military's role in affecting successful outcomes. In particular, ICG (2011) noted that "in their haste to demonstrate progress, donors have pegged much aid to short-term military objectives and timeframes. As the drawdown begins, donor funding and civilian personnel presence, mirroring the military's withdrawal schedule, may rapidly decline, undermining oversight and the sustainability of whatever reconstruction and development achievements there have been." Moreover, many strategic plans and policy documents did not fully recognize different objectives pursued by civilian representatives and the military leadership, resulting in uncoordinated and sometimes conflicting efforts (Viehe, Afshar and Heela, 2015).

3.3.3 The Securitization of Development Aid is a Controversial Concept

An important and ongoing conflict in the literature is the degree to which the impact of the military on stabilization outcomes should be analyzed in the context of a wider debate over the

securitization of development aid. While much of the evidence related to this controversy stems from papers that lack rigorous research designs, their anecdotal and experience-informed insights do center on a common theme. According to one of the first academic studies of the role of international aid in Afghanistan, "maximalists" argue aid should be consciously used as an instrument of peace building, while "humanitarian minimalists" contend the implementation of aid to support military objectives leads to a distortion of traditional mandates, especially neutrality and impartiality (Goodhand, 2002). The implementation of the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) framework highlighted both the potential benefits and implicit tensions in civilian-military development collaboration (McNerney, 2006; Waldman, 2008).

More broadly, Howell and Lind (2009) note that "the convergence of military and development objectives and the subordination of the latter to the former has co-opted civil society into stabilization and state-building strategies in Afghanistan as a way of strengthening the state and has undermined the legitimacy of civil society and contributed to negative popular attitudes toward NGOs." While these concerns directly contradict the stated need for the military to serve a security function for program execution, there is limited evidence to either support or reject the notion that securitizing development assistance is problematic.

3.4 Synergies and Confounding Factors with Other Donors

Motivated in part by the degree to which the military presence affected stabilization programs. we next reviewed the evidence on the synergies and confounding factors that may exist between stabilization programs by different actors (other parts of the USG, other countries, Afghan government, international organizations like the World Bank, etc.) (R4). There is very limited evidence in the literature on what types of synergies beyond the civil-military partnership were effective. However, several articles highlighted the importance of coordination between different countries and the host nation (e.g., Afghanistan) in ensuring success (Ellwood, 2013; MSI, 2014 (2); Altai, 2012 (7); Goodhand, 2002; Gordon, 2012; Taylor, 2010; Viehe, Afshar and Heela, 2015; Waldman, 2008). Ellwood (2013) summarized this by noting that "despite the scale of international aid that has been poured into the country (estimated to be some \$430 billion), conflicting agendas, poor coordination, lack of overall ownership, an absence of regional economic strategies, and an ignorance of local requirements have led to time, effort, and finances wasted on an industrial scale." Despite the repeated observations on these issues, there is limited evidence on the specific ways to design or ensure international donor and/or implementer coordination that would enable or inhibit success. As noted in greater detail in the recommendation section, this issue could be addressed by future monitoring and evaluation efforts, which would focus on identifying programmatic features as well as overall impact.

3.5 Impact of Specific Project Aspects

We next turn to the programmatic features that could amplify or inhibit the impact of stabilization programs, including the size and type of contract used to facilitate implementation, as well as the sectors (agriculture, infrastructure, skills, etc.) in which projects operate (R5).

3.5.1 Small-Scale Programs Produced Quick Impact Results, but Did Not Address Drivers of Instability

A number of studies (Altai, 2012 (7); Chou, 2012; Child, 2014; Goodhand, 2002; Gordon, 2011; Kapstein and Kathuria, 2012; Nagl, Exum and Humayun, 2009) highlight the intuition that smaller projects can be targeted at important, specific gaps and seem less likely to fuel instability. We note that these small projects are small in the scale of any individual project; the programs which fund such projects may be quite large including in many instances nationwide in scope. Small projects have a variety of beneficial features: they are easier to manage; they are less likely than large infrastructure projects to attract attention from corrupt officials or to become targets for enemy sabotage; and outputs are small and less likely to become a source of conflict. For each of three reconstruction programs included in our analysis (NSP, LGCD, CERP), project spending was not associated with statistically significant reductions in violence. The one exception was small-scale development aid that was conditional on information sharing by the community; this incentivized approach did appear to be somewhat effective in reducing violence (Chou, 2012). The literature does not provide evidence of increasing returns from a cost-effectiveness perspective; small projects do not have a different impact on outcomes, such as violence or support for the government, relative to larger-scale projects (see Child, 2014). Additionally, Afghans reacted positively to large-scale programs that are populated by small, community driven projects such as NSP because the funding dispersed was too small to be siphoned off by powerful interests while still providing meaningful benefits to communities (Gordon, 2011). This is important for minimizing the risk of unintended negative outcomes as well. For instance, any corruption that affects community-driven, local projects is by its nature smaller in scale and thus less likely to delegitimize the national government (Kapstein and Kathuria, 2012).

However, Felbab-Brown (2012) noted an important caveat: small-scale stabilization programs do not address the structural deficiencies of the rural economy in Afghanistan, such as inadequate infrastructure, lack of economic opportunities, and motivations for many lower-level grievances. Moreover, small-scale programs tended mostly to replace government capacity rather than to grow it, further exacerbating the periphery-center divide. As such, while small-scale projects may be effective at impacting short-term outcomes, they are unlikely to have more permanent, sustainable impacts.

3.5.2 Large-Scale Programs Created Unrealistic Expectations and Experienced Higher Levels of Corruption and Targeting

Larger programs – often related to construction – were problematic for several reasons and were less likely to have significant impacts. Based on the Afghanistan experience, stabilization programming is unlikely to generate large or persistent effects. From well-designed experimental and quasi-experimental approaches (e.g. Beath, Fontini and Enikolopov, 2013 (1b); MSI, 2014 (7)) to government-initiated qualitative reviews (Bohnke, Koehler, Zurcher, 2014; Bohnke, Zurcher, 2013; Norad, 2012) to historical accounts (Goodhand, 2002), the evidence consistently indicates stabilization programming has small, generally transitory, impacts (either positive or negative). Programs such as CERP (Chou, 2012; Child, 2012; Sexton 2015) or some of the ASI programs (Altai, 2012 (1)) that have been "successful" do not generate large shifts in security, attitudes, or capacity, though they may have short-term, positive impacts. This is relevant for both managing the expectations of what stabilization programs may accomplish and for considering how to design measurement and evaluation efforts to detect relatively small effects. For example, expectations of positive program outcomes among the Afghan population, when unmet, resulted in disappointment and disillusionment when these programs, in their view, did not deliver on their promises (Gordon, 2012). That disappointment could underlie the continued dissatisfaction among Afghan people with international forces and/or the Afghan Government, making it increasingly difficult for future programs to gain local support.

Second, large programs appeared to be much more susceptible than their smaller counterparts to negative forces, such as corruption and violence. This was especially true in the construction sector, which Afghans tended to view as low quality, corrupt and highly criminalized (Gordon, 2012; Sud, 2013). Moreover, these large projects were subject to criminal and insurgent targeting for violence and other attacks (SIGAR, 2011 (1)). Many large contracts also involved subcontracting that most Afghan respondents regarded simply as a legalized form of corruption (Gordon, 2012).

3.6 Summary of Commonalities across Successful or Unsuccessful Projects

Based on the existing evidence, there were a number of commonalities that we identified when looking across a variety of successful or unsuccessful stabilization projects at different times, with different implementers, in a range of different sectors (R6). Many of these commonalities relate to external conditions or factors which influence success. Thus, rather than focusing on which underlying drivers of instability (e.g., ethnic tension, poverty) may have been most relevant for the specific setting, we find the literature is most instructive in identifying relevant enabling and inhibiting factors (e.g. political will), regardless of the specific driver or source of instability. These factors include: host nation coordination and commitment, limiting the extent of corrosive corruption, ensuring baseline levels of security to facilitate basic implementation

and oversight, and ensuring appropriate staffing, both in terms of skills and in terms of longevity of deployment.

We note an important caveat in this analysis: in many cases the absence of such key factors is itself what drives instability; but, of course, not in all cases. As noted by Mikulaschek and Shapiro (2016): "...there is no reason to expect the same correlation between a given cause (e.g., poverty) and both the onset of conflict and sub-national variation in its intensity." Thus the presence or absence of these factors can occur in areas with varying degrees of stabilization and may directly affect the programmatic success as well as the overall level of stabilization in a given area. This is relevant in the Afghan context – as well as when applying these findings to other conflict settings – in managing expectations on what may and may not work.

3.6.1 The Afghan National Government's Commitment to Reform is a Fundamental Prerequisite for Success

As noted above, coordination with the host-nation is critical for effective implementation. However, beyond simple coordination, a real commitment to building capacity and reforming ineffective processes is critical to building a responsive, legitimate government (Cole and Hsu, 2009). A regularly noted limiting factor was the lack of capacity and willingness to reform by the Afghan government at both local and national levels.

3.6.2 Impact of Corruption is Pervasive and Corrosive

Not surprisingly, a wide variety of studies noted that corruption was a key--if not the single most important--issue affecting support for the Afghan government, support for insurgents, and attitudes towards foreign forces (AIR, 2013; Altai, 2012 (1); Altai, 2012 (3); Ellwood, 2013; Felbab-Brown, 2012; Fishstein, 2012; Gordon, 2012; Miakhel, 2010; MSI, 2013 (2); Viehe, Afshar and Heela, 2015). As Fishstein (2012) summarized: "while respondents...did report some short-term benefits of aid projects, it appears that corruption, tribal politics, and the heavy-handed behavior of international forces neutralized whatever positive effects aid projects might have delivered." Gordon (2012) similarly noted that Afghans consistently described development projects negatively; not only were projects failing to build support for government among civilians but they were increasing perceptions of corruption and distrust in government.

3.6.3 Security is a Key Determinant of Program Success and Sustainability

As noted in Section 3.3, the military plays a key role in providing basic security for program implementation and execution. More broadly, security is an important factor in creating the preconditions for program success (AIR, 2013; Davids, Rietjens and Soeters, 2010; IMU, 2015 (2)). This is distinct from suggesting security itself is sufficient to produce programmatic success, as noted in a number of critiques on the securitization of development assistance.

Nevertheless, most Afghans, when surveyed, noted security as an important factor when considering the effectiveness of development projects in their communities (BMZ, 2010). However, in many cases, even though those surveyed had not themselves experienced violence, the perception of violence was an important determinant of attitudes towards the Afghan government (IMU, 2015 (4)). Thus, when planning for programs, attention must be paid to not only how to establish security in an area but also what factors affect public perceptions of security among the local population.

3.6.4 Employing Competent, Long-term, and, Ideally, Local Staff are Essential Elements of Successful Projects

Even the best designed programs cannot be effectively implemented and achieve the desired impact without appropriate staffing. A range of audits and evaluations found consistent, substantial negative effects on program effectiveness due to lack of adequate staff. This included understaffing for key programs (DFID, 2009), lack of appropriately trained staff (DoD JCOA, 2006), rapid turnover of staff (MSI, 2014 (2)), restrictions on the mobility of staff (OIG, 2015), and the underuse of capable local staff (Miakhel, 2010). As a result, programs were often not implemented as intended and could not be modified and adapted to meet requirements. Moreover, absent sufficient staff in the field, stabilization programs lacked the appropriate oversight and feedback to even identify when such modifications might be necessary. Programs in which staff were in the field and accessible, especially smaller programs such as OTI's CCI programs, were better able to achieve modest program goals (IMU, 2015 (3)).

4. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The overall findings of this report can be summarized as follows: manage expectations because big changes in any outcomes are unlikely, smaller programs are more likely to achieve modest outcomes, security and corruption must be addressed to enable success, and appropriate staffing is critical for implementation.

These findings are supported by a systematic compilation of evidence from the available literature through late-2016. We must highlight the fact that almost none of these key points are new. Although many of the studies included in this analysis noted key points from evidentiary base at the time that are reflected in our report as well—few of those points were heeded after publication. Many of our findings about the impact of development programming based on studies through 2016 were made in ICG (2011), which argued that: "The impact of international assistance will remain limited unless donors, particularly the largest, the U.S., stop subordinating programming to counter-insurgency objectives, devise better mechanisms to monitor implementation, adequately address corruption and wastage of aid funds, and ensure that recipient communities identify needs and shape assistance policies."

Of particular note is the repeated, widespread recommendation for improved monitoring and evaluation in order to improve future program performance. This recommendation is succinctly summarized by Bohnke, Koehler and Zurcher (2014) as follows: "...if the international community is serious about rigorous impact evaluations, it must pressure donors and implementing actors for much higher standards for recording and sharing data!" Improved monitoring, evaluation, and learning could be achieved through adopting the improvements and changes suggested in Department of State 2011, including addressing key gaps such as: "USAID does not follow a uniform approach to the conduct of evaluations;" "the number of evaluations conducted by USAID is very small;" "most interventions are not evaluated;" and "although USAID mandates that each major intervention should be evaluated at least once, the mandate appears not to have been followed." Key improvements that were recommended at that time include the need for more detailed statements of work to ensure appropriate, feasible data collection and evaluation plans; the importance of methodologically sound and clearly documented evaluation designs; and clear, explicit and publicly available presentation of data, findings, and recommendations from these evaluations. Should a future contingency entail a large, international, multi-year stabilization effort, programs and evaluations should be designed, implemented and modified to take into account these recommendations to improve the chances for success.

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ID Title Author Date MO Date YYYY Type	/pe Progr	am(s) Program Type(s) Coverage Time Coverage Loc Method Type Approach Findings/Output	Method Narrative	Includes review Stabilization Indicators of USG efforts		Key Findings	ESOC Review/Critiques	Classification of practical findings and Classification: Internal Validi	y of Classification: Scope of Coverage	Classification: Stabilization
	661			specifically				recommendations Causal Claims Limited value for current planning or Patentially effective		Indicators Determinable offerting
	CCI	Community Not stated District 6, 7, and 8 Baseline Assessment Qualitative Baseline Assessment building of Kandahar City Review Case (KC 6, 7, 8) Study	knowledge (agreement) within groups and estimates the "culturally correct" answers where an answer was previously	Improved effectiveness of the government by improving USAID legitimacy, inclusiveness, responsiveness, capacity, or reach Strengthened civil society	definitions of terms and phrases used in the language and description of CCI's goals and	assets	Useful discussion of approach and insights appear consistent with some more systematically designed studies. However, claims on findings appear stronger than the evidence provided to support these assertions so findings should be	Limited value for current planning or insufficient practical application	Potentially effective	Potentially effective
Assessment Methodology and Pilot Baseline AIR Consulting		District 9 of Kandahar City (KC 9)	unknown. Free-form interviews with up to 16 samples from each geographical	Strengthened customary leadership Improved overall economic situation and opportunities Improved and strengthening civil society and GIRoA's role	are the most relevant indicators/variables that have to be measured in the course of CCI's	patrols; Presence of foreign forces which usually triggers a fight; Prevalence of crimes and other illegal activities including theft and stealing	corroborated with other studies.			
AIR 2013 Studies for Four CCI Feb 2013	ogram valuation	Zhari District of Kandahar province Muqur District of	location to determine mostly accepted or expressed definitions of stability in a given location.	in media Improved opportunities for youth Improved linkages between disconnected/disenfranchised	of cognitive thinking of target communities, but	(3) Governance challenges: Huge demand for provision of better public services, particularly, education, health, municipal, judicial services, and roads; corruption and bribery in the government offices; ;lack of peace with Taliban;(4) Social life challenges: Unavailability of recreational and entertaining venues like parks, picnic areas, sports clubs, other social				
Muqur		Ghazni province.		communities Improved dispute resolution mechanisms and/or bodies within the community		gathering areas; Huge barriers to youth for getting married; gender segregation; labor migration of youth to the neighboring countries (Iran, Pakistan, UAE, etc.) (5) Psychological challenges: Tangible amount of aid dependency; Lack of motivation to do things by themselves; Considerable				
	ASI	Infrastructure December 2011 Barmal-Shkin Impact Evaluation Qualitative Effectiveness	Qualitative interviews in Barmal - Shkin	Improve District Government legitimacy and community USAID	Use qualitative interviews to compare the	amount of distrust and suspicion in the society; Huge signs of loss of self-efficacy amongst youth	study design was not well defined but information provided suggests some	Limited value for current planning or Insufficient evidence	Potentially effective	Potentially effective
		Community Review Case Lessons Learned building Study		recognition; Strengthen customary leadership; Mitigate youth vulnerability to Insurgent influence;	effectiveness of two different approaches to	opportunities for concrete application, as cited by the respondents; (2) local leaders did not appreciate the program administrators, who they perceive as corrupt. However, the training did provide an opportunity for important leaders of the	overall improvement in stability in the area. Notably, this improvement was not seen by the local population as due to the program activity. This appears consistent with some other findings about the memorability of programs	the contract of the contract o		, , , , , , ,
Afghanistan Stabilization Initiative (ASI)				Eliminate domination of district information landscape by malign actors	mitigation training and resolution jirgas	formal and customary authorities. changes to the choice of the participants prevented the trainers from focusing on specific issues and initiating an actual practice of conflict resolution. (2) Mitigating conflicts through a resolution jirga. The perceived impact of this project on stability remains low because the jirga				
	ogram valuation					could not achieve any firm resolution to solve the tensions in the Sur Dag area. The event served as a platform for tribal leaders to meet and to discuss but the outcome of these negotiations remains uncertain. Respondents did not express any particular improvement in their perception of the government or in the collaboration between the government and their village, as a result				
Shkin District Report						of the Jirga.				
	ASI	Infrastructure November 2011 Khas Uruzgan Impact Evaluation Qualitative Effectiveness	Key informant interviews (11 District-level; 5 Project-level)	Increased district government legitimacy among four tribes. USAID	Assess the impact of ASI program in key locations	The DSF could so far not be completed. While one broad source of instability was defined, it lacked precision.	The DDT is so far composed of three members, which may be insufficient to	Limited value for current planning or Potentially effective	Insufficient evidence	Insufficient evidence
Africania		Community Review Case Lessons Learned building Study	Perception survey (n=500);	Expected impact relates to improved irrigation, short income increase, dispute resolution and positive engagement with local government.	that were identified as strategic transit routes used by Pakistan-based insurgents to gain contro		ensure the oversight and the implementation of the activities while also gatherin information to further understand SOIs and local resiliencies. Additional investments for expanding and building the capacity of the team may enable ASI			
Afghanistan Stabilization Initiative (ASI)					though Zabul and Uruzgan. These locations have been. ASI has also delimited sub-district level	by ASI or Al Qaeda, and to a lesser extent, the coalition forces; (4) Low faith in the ability of the local government to help the population solve their issues but hopes for further assistance from GIRoA; (5) Perceived deterioration of the economic situation. The perception data suggests that most (91%) of respondents had not received the visit of a government official in their village.	to maximize its impact before close out. This may be critical to ensure the success			
and Strategic Attai Consulting Feb 2012 Evalu	ogram valuation				AUSAID and the Villages Stability Platform.	The programming seems to expand carefully. ASI is presented as a local NGO that aims at connecting the local government and the communities. For example, the Salizai - Sayedan Canal Rehabilitation represents a positive first step in the area: community members need employment and improved access to irrigation water in order to develop. It has a good potential to increase				
Uruzgan District Report					stage of development in Khas Uruzgan, this	stability as water disputes appear to create major disturbances across villages. Given the number of villages vulnerable to water shortages and water related disputes, our recommendation would be to engage with other leaders of the area during the				
	ASI	Infrastructure November 2011 Khogyani Impact Evaluation Qualitative Effectiveness	Key informant interviews (3 District-level; 2 Project-level)	Increased visibility, transparency, accountability, and USAID	of this pre-project investigation are nonetheless summarized hereafter.	Sources of instability identified in Khogyani mainly relate to the ineffectiveness of GIRoA, to the lack of legitimacy of traditional	Overall impact was positive but unclear how much it was influenced by external	Limited value for current planning or Potentially effective	Potentially effective	Potentially effective
		Community Review Case Lessons Learned building Study	Perception survey (n=600); no other methodological details available	capacity of the Khogyani district government through short- term community prioritized projects.	in Khogyani district.	leaders and to the economic difficulties throughout the district. Compared with the past cycles, the evolution of stability in Khogyani is rather positive though worrisome in the Southern Wazir. Several changes in perceptions: (1) Perceived capacity of GIRoA to address priority issues has improved	factors and concentrated in specific areas. The qualitative interviews suggest nonetheless that the suspicions of corruption are common across respondents, which undermines the effects of the visible involvement of the government in the	insufficient practical application		
Afghanistan Stabilization						(2) Perceptions of security across Khogyani district, is overall very positive and perceived safety is relatively high. Overall: the direct effects of ASI programming on the stability in Khogyani seems overall positive though limited.	area. While a certain degree of disgruntlement was reported, the study claimed respondents were not opposed to working with ASI or the government per se. Some of them expressed their dissatisfaction toward the district governor's			
and Strategic Attal Consulting Feb 2012 Evalu	ogram valuation					Enabling GIRoA to address resource-based conflicts.	brother more than with the district governor himself, others thought the elders were to blame, others that ASI model of operation was at fault The report cautioned that these conclusions should be considered carefully as the sample			
Support: Khogyani District Report						mentioned the involvement of the villagers in the decision making process. Three quarters of the respondents stated that the project had made life better for their household and their community, that it had improved their perception of the government	included community members who were closer to a malik than to another elder.			
						security and governance. Kharote Irrigation Intake had mixed appreciation of the implementation where several people believed that the project had suffered from corruption. Most interviewees felt that the project had a positive outcome on employment and irrigation and	more grass root level community engagement should be explored to disrupt the effort of the elders. The limited methodological details prevent broader evaluation of generalizability.			
Afghanistan	ASI	Infrastructure November 2011 Sar Hawza Impact Evaluation Qualitative Effectiveness Community Review Case Lessons Learned building Study	Key informant interviews (20 direct beneficiaries: 5 elders; 5 community members; 5 tribal leaders; 5 shura members)	Improved profile of the GIRoA in an expansion district USAID		Projects were all aimed at building relations between the DG and the local community through Eid Celebrations. Key issues	Results were undermined by external circumstances beyond the control of implementing teams but the number of respondents citing the implementation of development projects in their area, and the positive impact these projects had or		Potentially effective	Insufficient evidence
Stabilization Initiative (ASI) Altai 2012 4 Third Party M&F Altai Consulting Feb 2012 Progr	rogram					Despite the many challenges reported by ASI teams, implementers report that the projects achieved its main objectives of initiating lines of communication between governmental and customary leaders in the area. This illustrates a potential way to	their economic situation, suggests that the dialogue initiated for the occasion, if not directly fruitful, has not been negatively affected by the consequent changes in the district government. The discussion of impact was largely anecdotal and			
and Strategic Support: Sar Hawza District Report	valuation					beyond initial mistrusts, which is in line with the SOIs identified.	not wil suppored by evidence. The limited methodological details prevent broade evaluation of generalizability.	r		
	ASI	Infrastructure November 2011 Sarkani Impact Evaluation Qualitative Effectiveness	Key informant interviews (6 District-level; 4 Project-level)	Increased visibility, transparency, accountability, and USAID	Qualitative assessment of two water-related	Overall people found the process was fair for their community. Most respondents appreciated that local elders and tribal leaders		Limited value for current planning or Potentially effective	Potentially effective	Potentially effective
Afghanistan Stabilization Initiative (ASI) Progr	rogram	Community Review Case Lessons Learned building Study	Perception survey (n=500); no other methodological details available	capacity of the Sarkani district government through short- term community prioritized projects.	projects in Sarkani district	had been involved in the decision-making process and half also mentioned that the government had been included as well. Most believed that the level of cooperation between their community and the district government had increased but respondents also	issues (infiltration of Pakistani insurgents in the Ganjgal valley during summer and			
and Strategic Support: Sarkani	valuation					continue to collaborate with their community in the future. They also did not know if other entities would invest in the village, if residents of the area would work together for developing the project further, or if their lives would be better or worse on the future.	Sarkano Markazy and its vicinity had more faith in the government than the			
District Report Afghanistan Stabilization	ASI	Infrastructure November 2011 Sayedabad Impact Evaluation Qualitative Effectiveness Community Review Case Lessons Learned	Key informant interviews. Research in Sayedabad was designed to focus on case studies an	Increased visibility, transparency, accountability, and USAID d capacity of the Sayedabad district government through	Qualitative assessment of community development programs in Sayedabad	Findings for this cluster tend to support the current effort to push for direct implementation in the district and reduce the use of sub-contractors. The two directly implemented activities assessed show a high level of local buy-in, justified by the relevance of		Limited value for current planning or Insufficient evidence insufficient practical application	Potentially effective	Potentially effective
Initiative (ASI) Altai 2012 6 Third Party M&E Altai Consulting Feb 2012 Progr	ogram valuation	building Study	did not use the full spectrum of tools developed as parts of the 360 methodology. Such a limited sample of case studies does no allow for providing systematic answers to the research question	short-term community prioritized projects.	, , ,		well as an assessment on the generalizability for findings.			
Support: Sayedabad District	ASI	Infrastructure November 2011 Urgun Impact Evaluation Qualitative Effectiveness	at the district level. Key informant interviews.	Increased visibility, transparency, accountability, and USAID	Qualitative assessment of community	ASI activity may have effectively mobilized the community around a small infrastructure project of common interest during a	ASI optic was compromised in this area (field research suggests that people are	Limited value for current planning or Insufficient evidence	Potentially effective	Potentially effective
Afghanistan Stabilization Initiative (ASI)		Community Review Case Lessons Learned building Study	Research in Urgun was designed to focus on case studies and did not use the full spectrum of tools developed as parts of the 360 methodology. Such a limited samp	term community prioritized projects.	development programs in Urgun	relatively stable, relatively secure window in an AGE influenced area. This may be associated with a positive perception of the government and to have increased local willingness to engage with GIRoA. Findings suggest that ASI has managed a foothold for government officials to step in and follow upon with the community. As such the dialogue with the elders should be maintained	widely aware the local NGO works as a cover for ASI), suggests that the use of a subcontractor was not necessary to ensure the security of the activity and to			
Altai_2012_7 Third Party M&E Altai Consulting Feb 2012 Evalu	ogram valuation		of case studies does not allow for providing systematic answers to the research questions at the district level.			closely. The proximity of the ALP checkpoint seems to have yielded positive results and to have ensured community members of their possibility to travel and to develop. In light of stability, an important dimension of their success seems to lie in the close coordination they maintain with the villagers. In terms of capable implementers, sub-contracting this activity increased the risk				
Support: Urgun District Report						of misuse of money but did not negatively impact the implementation of the project.				
	Nation Solida Progra		Baseline, midline, and endline surveys administered between August 2007 and October 2011 in 500 villages. Total 25,000 household interviews, and 2,600 focus groups. Matched-pair	Access to Utilities, Services and Infrastructure. Economic N Welfare. Improved local governance. State-Building. Change in Political Attitudes. Shift in Social Norms.	evaluation of community-driven program called	Access to Public Goods: This was the primary aim of many projects. Water projects increased access to clean drinking water, with the program resulting in a higher usage of protected sources. NSP electricity projects boosted electricity usage. NSP increased access to education, health care, and counseling services for women (indirect impact) including girls' school	Overall impact was mixed with some short-term gains but little evidence of longe term improvement. Additionally, some evidence that CDCs can degrade governance quality unless the relationship between CDCs and established	r NA Effective	Effective	Potentially effective
	create baland Comm	,	cluster randomization procedure used to select 250 of 500 to receive NSP, with the remainder used as control group. Addition Village Benefit Distribution Analysis conducted. On average,	al,	by the World Bank.	attendance and child doctor and prenatal visits. But, village-level irrigation and transportation have no noticeable impact at the endline. Weak evidence that project fulfill the development needs of male villagers. Economic Welfare: Few impacts are observed on objective measures of economic activity including diversity of household	customary institutions is clearly defined.			
	Cound throu	opment funded by World ils (CDCs) Bank and gh secret bilateral . 8	background characteristics between two groups are the same. Sample districts according to 3 criteria: no villages had received NSP prior to spring 2007, minimal security risks, and an addition	al		income sources, income levels, income regularity, consumption levels, assets or food insecurity. No evidence of impact on general production and marketing outcomes. Some increases sales revenue at midline, but impacts are not durable. Overall, impacts on economic welfare driven more by block grant resources than by broader impacts of completed projects on economic				
Randomized Impact Evaluation Beath, Fontini,	suffra	universal national and 21 ge election international sburses NGOS help with	15 villages chosen per district for non-evaluation to minimize adverse political or humanitarian consequences of randomizatio Sample covers all major regions of the country, representing			activity. Governance: Some improvement in perceptions but limited, non-durable affects overall. NSP increased the proportion of local assemblies that contain at least one woman member. No evidence that NSP introduces new leaders into the core group of village				
Enikolopov_2013	terature fund v projec		Afghanistan's ethno-linguistic diversity. The households included in the sample are on average 4 percent poorer, have worse acce to medical services and slightly better access to electricity.	SS		decision-makers. Temporary increase in the provision of local governance services, but does not persist following NSP activities. Male villagers are less likely to be satisfied with work of local leaders after project completion. Temporary increase in villager participation and demands for the involvement of representative assemblies in local governance, does not have durable impact.				
Report		ed, ged and mented by	Treatment assignment: Village clusters (villages located within o kilometer were grouped in clusters), matched pairs (25 groups o two using an optimal greedy matching algorithm based on same	f		Political attitudes: NSP raised appreciation of the use of democratic processes in local governance and associated increases in participation in 2010 parliamentary elections. Strong evidence that NSP improves perceptions of government at midline, weak evidence at endline.				
	CDC		characteristics), assignment of treatment (random number generator employed to decide which village received NSP), clustering violations (minimized through a simulation approach).			Security: NSP does not impact likelihood of villages suffering attack. No evidence that NSP reduces the ability of insurgent groups to expropriate harvests. Improves perceptions of security situation. Social Norms: NSP reduces intra-village disputes post-project completion. Increases incidence of disputes and feuds, reduces				
			Survey Instruments: Male Household Questionnaire, Male Focus Group Questionnaire, Female Household/Individual Questionnaire, Female Focus Group Questionnaire. Total of 198			resolution rates. Weak evidence that NSP improves basic literacy and computational skills of males and females. Some evidence that NSP increased men's acceptance of female participation in political activity and local governance. Village Benefit Distribution Analysis (VBDA): observed worsening of governance quality is most likely due to the weakening of				
	Natio	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	•	Access to Utilities, Services and Infrastructure. Economic N			High specialized program and randomized trial with some positive but generally	NA Effective	Effective	Potentially effective
	_	amme - development Daykundi, Ghor, Study ad gender program. Herat, Nangarhar	August 2007 and October 2011 in 500 villages. Total 25,000 household interviews, and 2,600 focus groups. Matched-pair cluster randomization procedure used to select 250 of 500 to	Welfare. Improved local governance. State-Building. Change in Political Attitudes. Shift in Social Norms.		increase engagement and participation. But impacts on: (1) objective measures of economic activity were limited	small impact on key indicators.			
Winning Hearts Beath, Fontini, and Minds? Beath, Fontini, Acad Enikolopov 2013 Evidence from a Fig. 1, Jul 2013	Jaucinic	opment funded by World	receive NSP, with the remainder used as control group. Addition Village Benefit Distribution Analysis conducted. On average, background characteristics between two groups are the same.	aı,		 (2) no conclusive evidence to indicate that small increases in diversity of household income sources and caloric intake persist beyond project completion (3) No impact on income levels, income regularity, consumption levels, assets or food insecurity. 				
_1b Field Experiment in Afghanistan	throu ballot	ils (CDCs) Bank and gh secret bilateral . 8 universal national and 21	Sample districts according to 3 criteria: no villages had received NSP prior to spring 2007, minimal security risks, and an addition 15 villages chosen per district for non-evaluation to minimize			(4) No evidence of impact on general production and marketing outcomes. Does not affect agricultural yields, productivity, harvest sales, and whether household sell animals or animal products (5) Although NSP improves perceptions of security situation, NSP does not impact likelihood of villages suffering attack.				
	and d block	ge election international sburses NGOS help with grants to implementation.	adverse political or humanitarian consequences of randomizatio Sample covers all major regions of the country, representing Afghanistan's ethno-linguistic diversity. The households included			 (6) No evidence that NSP reduces the ability of insurgent groups to expropriate harvests. (7) Increased incidence of disputes and feuds, reduces resolution rates. (8) Village Benefit Distribution Analysis (VBDA) is optimal when CDCs manage distribution. In the absence of a mandate for CDCs 				
	Vario	redominantly sillages in four Impact Evaluation Quantitative Effectiveness predominantly districts (Imam, Review Case Lessons Learned	in the sample are on average 4 percent poorer, have worse acces to modical conjugate and clightly botton access to electricity. Micro-level longitudinal study of 79 communities in north-east Afghanistan between 2007-2009. Data collected by two surveys	Aid measurements: number of projects the community N	and Free University Berlin based on two surveys	to manage distribution, CDC presence increases embezzlement and degrades decision-making quality. (Cf. Bohnke, Zurcher_2013 and Bohnke, Kohler, Zurcher_2014) Attitudes towards the government/international community only experience small changes. Development aid does reach	Extremely well done and thoughtful evaluation with detailed methodology (published separately), well constructed research design, and carefully alid out	NA Effective	Effective	Effective
Associated the		on humanitarian Sahib, Aliabad, Study and emergency Warsaj and aid and small Taloqan) in North	April 2007 and March 2009. Survey had 66 questions on development cooperation, attitudes toward international civilian and military actors, perceptions of state legitimacy and	households indicated direct benefit from development	and extensive field work to to develop a method	communities and contributes to quality of roads, access to drinking water, access to schooling, and electricity. The Afghan state is seen as contributing to the provision of these basic goods. International development actors are met with caution by most Afghans (40% think that foreign development organizations are a threat to local and Islamic values). Similarly, foreign forces are				
Assessing the Impact of Ministry for Development Economic Mar 2010 Gove	overnment	infrastructural East Afghanistan projects (including	perceptions of security/threats. 77 villages in 2007, 80 in 2009. Four districts: Imam Sahib, Aliabad, Warsaj, and Taloqan (Kundu and Takhar provinces). Half of surveyed communities selected by	estimate different classes of aid (schooling & irrigation, medium coverage across all sectors, infrastructure with		met with more caution over time (comparing 2009 to 2007, foreign forces are seen as considerably less helpful for increasing security)				
BMZ 2010 Cooperation in Mar 2010	ocuments	roads), because such projects are supposed to	random sampling. The remaining were chosen on the basis of diversity using size, remoteness, natural resource base, vulnerability to natural disasters, ethnic/religious composition.	don't know). Attitude measurements: Towards foreign forces (index based), attitudes toward development actors (normed score), state legitimacy (ability to provide basic		Security: Although an overwhelming majority of respondents reported that physical security for households and communities remains intact, threat perceptions increased over times in the communities studied and largely focus on criminal groups, external militias, and the Taliban. The increased perception of threats nullified positive attitudes by Afghans towards				
2003		have a relatively quick and visible impact, so their		public resources), threat perception (latent class analysis/criminal groups, armed militias, Taliban, foreign forces, district police, Afghan security forces). Control variables:		peacekeeping operations.				
	Vario	effects should be measurable s "Focused 2007-2009 79 villages in four Impact Evaluation Quantitative Effectiveness	Micro-level longitudinal study of 79 communities in north-east	household security, household resources, ethnicity of respondents, village level variables. Aid measurements: number of projects the community N	Book chapter in Evaluation Methodologies for Aid	(Cf. Bohnke, Zurcher_2013 and BMZ_2010)	useful reference for considering how to design studies in conflict areas but relies	useful findings or recommendations Effective	Effective	Effective
		predominantly districts (Imam, Review Case Lessons Learned on humanitarian Sahib, Aliabad, Study and emergency Warsaj and	Afghanistan between 2007-2009. Data collected by two surveys April 2007 and March 2009. Survey had 66 questions on development cooperation, attitudes toward international civilian	in received in the two preceding years, whether individual households indicated direct benefit from development	in Conflict discussing step-by-step approach,	Key insights based on difficulty in using existing data and lessons learned from implementing a longitudinal multi-method approach to assessing the impact of development interventions on peace and security in northeast Afghanistan. Importance of impact evaluation: "if the international community is serious about rigorous impact evaluations, it must pressure	on a well-resourced evaluation with a willing and capable partner (the German government). Detailed information on best practices but unclear external			
Assessing		aid and small Taloqan) in North infrastructural East Afghanistan projects	and military actors, perceptions of state legitimacy and perceptions of security/threats. 77 villages in 2007, 80 in 2009. Four districts: Imam Sahib, Aliabad, Warsaj, and Taloqan (Kundu	aid to the community. Conducted latent class analysis to estimate different classes of aid (schooling & irrigation, medium coverage across all sectors, infrastructure with		donors and implementing actors for much higher standards for recording and sharing data!" Must establish an explicit theory of change: For northeast Afghanistan the theory was that development can facilitate the pacification of conflict zones by improving general attitudes toward the peacebuilding mission and because it strengthens the				
development Jan Böhnke Bohnke, Koehler, northeast Jay Koehler 2014 Acad	cademic	(including roads), because such projects are	remoteness, natural resource base, vulnerability to natural	don't know). Attitude measurements: Towards foreign forces (index based), attitudes toward development actors		legitimacy of the Afghan state, both of which can reduce the local perception of security threats. Data quality is generally suspect: The study team found that many organizations dramatically overestimated the quality of data that are available on development aid projects. "Dataprovided by various state and non-state agencies was of poor quality,				
Zurcher_2014		supposed to have a relatively quick and visible	disasters, and ethnic/religious composition.	(normed score), state legitimacy (ability to provide basic public resources), threat perception (latent class analysis/ criminal groups, armed militias, Taliban, foreign forces,		and not all organizations seem to record data or were willing to share it." most do not collect geo-located data on projects and keep only aggregated information. Difficulty developing good measures: In particular, the team highlights the conceptual problems in defining measurements for				
· -r:		impact, so their effects should be measurable		district police, Afghan security forces). Control variables: household security, household resources, ethnicity of respondents, village level variables.		"aid," "security," and other key variables. Cross correlation of variables: Most measures of attitudes toward Western actors, both military and civilian, were predominantly correlated with threat perceptions of Afghans. Those who felt more secure had more positive attitudes toward				
		shortly after implementation. In addition, this				international actors. Addressing the immediate security concerns of Afghans is the single most effective way of winning acceptance of the local population. Limited evidence of impact: No evidence that small infrastructure projects increased the acceptance of foreign troops. In volatile				
	Vario	predominantly districts (Imam, Evaluation Review Case Lessons Learned	Micro-level longitudinal study of 79 communities in north-east Afghanistan between 2007-2009. Data collected by two surveys	in received in the two preceding years, whether individual	minds" i.e. more cooperative behavior toward	insecure conflict zones, acceptance is not cumulative, but needs to be earned constantly. High levels of acceptance in 2007 did (Cf. Bohnke, Kohler, Zurcher_2014 and BMZ_2010) Significant and positive relation between attitudes toward foreign forces and perceived community aid in 2007. Attitude toward foreign forces not associated with personnel community aid in 2009, and household aid is possiblely associated with attitudes.		NA Effective	Effective	Effective
		on humanitarian Sahib, Aliabad, Study and emergency Warsaj and aid and small Taloqan) in North	April 2007 and March 2009. Survey had 66 questions on development cooperation, attitudes toward international civilian and military actors, perceptions of state legitimacy and	aid to the community. Conducted latent class analysis to	and legitimacy of the state and increases acceptance of international military forces and	associated with perceived community aid. Adding control variables lends more support to the idea that aid has no impact on	impact on attitudes towards the government. In particular, study highlights the importance of how "memorable" a project is in having any even short-term impact on attitudes.			
		infrastructural East Afghanistan projects (including	perceptions of security/threats. 77 villages in 2007, 80 in 2009. Four districts: Imam Sahib, Aliabad, Warsaj, and Taloqan (Kundu and Takhar provinces). Half of surveyed communities selected by	medium coverage across all sectors, infrastructure with electricity, low coverage, infrastructure with irrigation,	threats and increase efficiency. Authors hypothesized that communities that receive	attitudes toward international actors, but positive impact on state reach. Attitudes toward foreign military actors are driven by security concerns and household resources. Ethnic Pashtu hold more negative attitudes. Respondents who reveal more positive attitudes toward development actors also feel more positively toward military actors. Poorer households feel more positively				
		roads), because such projects are supposed to	random sampling other half choosed based on balancing size, remoteness, natural resource base, vulnerability to natural disasters, and ethnic/religious composition.	forces (index based), attitudes toward development actors (normed score), state legitimacy (ability to provide basic	because they fear that cooperation with international actors makes them targets for	towards development actors. Respondents with positive attitudes toward development actors also had more positive attitudes toward foreign forces. Attitudes in 2007 did not predict attitudes in 2009. Positive relationship between state legitimacy and perceived community aid. Respondents with a higher degree of threat viewed state as less legitimate. Aid is correlated with				
Zurcher_2013 of aid in conflict Bohnke, Zurcher Nov 2013 Litera	cademic terature	have a relatively quick and visible impact, so their		public resources), threat perception (latent class analysis/ criminal groups, armed militias, Taliban, foreign forces, district police, Afghan security forces). Control variables:	Taliban reprisal.	higher threat perceptions. No positive relationship between aid and attitudes, but aid may be able to extend the reach of the state. Communities that profited from aid viewed the state as more legitimate. Aid does not lower threat perceptions. No positive systemic impact on attitudes toward international civilian and military actors. Water and sanitation projects are more				
zones		effects should be measurable shortly after		household security, household resources, ethnicity of respondents, village level variables.		memorable than projects in other sectors.				
		implementation. In addition, this type of aid clearly forms the								
		clearly forms the bulk of all aid which has reached the								
		reached the communities so								

						<u> </u>				
Rethinking Afghan Brown_2014 Local Governance (USIP) Aid After Transition	Policy/Think tank	na na na na Historical Review Meta-Analysis Lessons Learned Policy Proposal na na Post-Cold War, Global, with Historical Review Meta-Analysis Effectiveness	Qualitative review na Historical analysis of the evolving interaction between na	USAID To examine key principles of of aid strategy a assess the effectiveness of this approach.	Service Providers: Move from maximal inputs in fragmented approach to a more restrained delivery focused on predictability and reliability that acknowledges the interlinked nature of politics, justice, and sectoral services in the eyes of the local population. Previous approaches limited because bureaucratic and chain-of-command issues worked to create an environment where the priority was "just MSH (make stuff happen) as quickly as possible on the ground. Too often providers confused the ambition to create recurring services (as a means of improving state-society relations) with the reality of launching a "constellation of discrete, unsystematic, and often unsustainable projects." Projects were also often launched without a comprehensive underlying assessment of the services most needed: "the pressure to deliver defined the services." Evaluators and Donors: Revise the way they define, discuss, and measure local governance progress toward capturing longer-term changes on the ground. International community needs to recalibrate the way it measures "progress" by capturing changes to structures and incentives on the ground, and avoid "over privileging fleeting perceptions or outputs that are wholly-enabled by short-term foreign inputs." Implementers and Donors: Watch out for gaming. Afghan communities understood this dynamic and basically began to game th system, framing their desire for projects in international community buzzwords. "Communities learned to explain that all SOI could be addressed by a culvert repair, boundary wall construction, or irrigation canal repair." [Source: Afghan implementer of The emphasis on stabilization may be shortsighted and result in a backlash in the long run. Recipient countries and host	insights. In particular, focused on key issues of implementation from fragmented, overly ambitious approaches.		Insufficient evidence	Insufficient evidence	Insufficient evidence
Humanitarian and Development Aid in the Context of Stabilization: Carbonnier 2014 Blurring the Lines and Broadening the Gap	Academic Literature	with primary primary focus on Lessons Learned focus on post- Afghanistan and 9/11 Iraq	humanitarian assistance, development aid, and stabilization/COIN operations		communities are, or risk, rejecting the liberal-peace and development enterprise altogether when turning against the military dimension of stabilization.	which are active conflicts that are neither humanitarian nor counterinsurgency purely. The piece seems to argue humanitarian and development aid is more effective when implementing agences refuse to participate in stabilization and statebuilding efforts (citing the example of Mercy Corps' agricultural livelihoods program in five districts in KHelmand and Kandahar.) However, there is limited evidence to support the claims of success.	insufficient practical application			
War, Peace and Stabilization: Critically Carter_2013 Conceptualizing Stability in Southern Afghanistan (UK PROGRAM)		UK Post Conflict na na na Impact Evaluation Qualitative Effectiveness Reconstruction Unit (PCRU) - Provincial Reconstruction Teams na na Impact Evaluation Qualitative Effectiveness Performance/Process Review Case Lessons Learned Evaluation Study Guidelines Provincial Reconstruction	Primary data collected through unstructured interviews with 15 stabilization practitioners in the UK and Afghanistan with experience in the Helmand Province. Identification of the narratives and meta-narratives in the stabilization paradigm of Helmand through discourse analysis. 1. Reconstruction and tempor Reduction or cessation of viol local population 4. Repairing 5. Enhancement of the citizer indicators were provided by Fauthor views these as ineffective indicators.	procession of practitioners operating in Helmand Province of the war-torn fabric of society (where the British forces operated predominantly) y PRT team members, but the	emphasis on the role of economic development in improving security and resolving the insecurities of failed states through governance reforms and service deliveries. Aid is viewed as important in winning the support of the local population. Instability	too much on their assertions on impact rather than either independent evidence of impact or details on process and implementation. As such, there is limited evidence to support claims and no way to contextualize the Helmand experience in the broader Afghan context	NA	Ineffective	Potentially effective	Effective
Hearts and minds cannot be bought: Child_2014 Ineffective Child May 2014 reconstruction in Afghanistan		Commander's Grants 2005 - Aug 2009 227 districts in Impact Evaluation Quantitative Effectiveness Emergency Afghanistan Review Case Response Study Program (CERP)	Econometric testing. Analysis of violent incidents, measured using geocoded data from Worldwide Incidents Tracking System (WITS) Article also discusses communiand district-located using ESRI World Gazeteer and digital stability used by US forces, but mapping software, composed of noncivilian casualties. A total of support in response to CERP. 3,599 incidents of violence. Analysis of CERP spending, measured by data from NATO C3 Agency's Afghanistan Country Stability Picture (ACSP). A total of 8,533 projects totaling USD 2.2billion from 2002 to 2009, consistent with USD 2.64 billion appropriated to CERP between 2004 - 2010. Unit of observation is district—month. Reconstruction spending is calculated for a district—month by summing all daily totals, calculated as the sum of mean daily expenditure over existing projects. Violence levels are obtained by summing all incidents over respective period, violence is computed as incidents per 1 million inhabitants. CERP spending is on per capita basis.	nunity support as a criterion for program (CERP) on violence levels. but does not test changes in	The article reviewed the impact of grants provided by Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP) in reducing instances of violence. Other empirical evidence of the effectiveness of reconstruction spending in reducing violence is extremely limited. The effect of CERP in Afghanistan in reducing violence was statistically indistinguishable from zero. Spending on small projects does not appear to affect violence differently than spending on large projects. Study suggests that either reconstruction work is unrelated to violence or that programming impacts insurgency in ways not accounted for in the "hearts and minds" approach tested. It remains possible that CERP produced other benefits for Afghans, outside of reducing violence, such as improved access to health services or to public infrastructure.	stabilization outcomes are used and there is a limited extent to which the study deals with the coincidence of violence and areas where CERP was applied. Given this, the findings suggest a limited impact on violence but with little discussion on how best to interpret this. No other stabilization indicators are considered but	NA	Potentially effective	Potentially effective	Potentially effective
Does development Chou_2012 assistance reduce Chou Aug 2012 violence? Evidence from Afghanistan	Academic Literature	NSP, LGCD, CERP Humanitarian assistance 2010 Afghanistan's 398 Review Case Governance districts Study LGCD: data limited to projects in the South and East regions CERP: nationwide (usable data for four months in 2009-2010 only) na na na Global Historical Review Meta-Analysis Guidelines	Panel analysis of 60,075 SIGACTS from the Combined Information Data Network and NSP, LGCD and CERP project expenditures at the district-month level. Implicitly assumes that spending is a viable measure of service provision. Comprehensive review of major strategic policy documents from Purpose-based end states	USAID Assess the impact of development assistance from both civilian and military providers on conflict related outcomes N Document review of strategic appraoch to	conditional on information-sharing does appear to be somewhat effective in reducing rebel violence.	assistance with particular focus on aid-conditionality. They claim that conditionality is an essential, but underutilized, prerequisite for stability-enhancing development. So when they discuss why CERP spending not appear to	NA Limited value for current planning or	Effective	Effective	Potentially effective
Guiding Principles Cole, Hsu_2009 for Stabilization Cole, Hsu 2009 and Reconstruction	Policy/Think tank		state ministries of defense, foreign affairs, and development, along with major intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations (NGO) that work in warshattered landscapes around the globe. A safe and secure environment violence; public order; legitim means of violence; physical set. The rule of law: just legal fram accountability to the law; accountability to the law; accountability; civic participat A sustainable economy: macrountability; civic participat A sustainable economy: macrountability: accountability is accountability; civic participat and sustainable economy: macrountability is accountability; accountability; civic participat and sustainable economy: macrountability is accountability; accountability; civic participated and secure environment violence; public order; legitim means of violence; public order; legitim means of violence; physical set accountability to the law; accountability to the law; accountability; civic participated and secure environment violence; public order; legitim means of violence; public order; legitim mean	nent: cessation of large-scale timate state monopoly over the I security; territorial security rameworks; public order; ccess to justice; culture of on of essential services; rces; political moderation and pation and empowerment acroeconomic stabilization; omy and economic-based conomy sustainability; and delivery of basic needs very of education; return and	international actors are trying to achieve, not how they are trying to achieve it at the tactical level. It is not about how to conduct an election or disarm warring parties—it is about the outcomes that these activities support. This manual deals with missions that involve helping a country move from violent conflict to peace. The principles apply from the moment the need for an intervention is first recognized through the time when the host nation can sustainably provide security and basic services to its population. Due to these deliberate boundaries, the manual does not attempt to address the development challenges that take generations to overcome. The focus They note that there is on that unique, perilous stage where everything must be viewed through the lens of conflict. A focus on short-term objectives is essential to help the host nation get off life support and on a sustainable path to recovery. But to ensure coherence, these objectives must be nested within longer-term development goals.		insufficient practical application			
Afghanistan Civil Society Assessment: Counterpart_200 5	Program Evaluation	I-PACS Civil society January-April Nationwide Baseline Assessment Qualitative Baseline Assessment capacity building 2005 Review Case Study Quantitative Review Case Study Study Study Review Case Study Review Case Study	Literature review; na More than 50 key-informant interviews; A survey of 678 CSOs;	N An examination of CSOs' work and its impact eight provinces through a series of 24 focus groups with a total of 260 participants drawn from 73 shuras, 65 registered organizations and 69 beneficiary groups/communities.	project implementation purposes;The relatively low level of institutional maturity of the civil society sector;The large sums of money and responsibility that very immature organizations have available;The relatively higher credibility that traditional groups enjoy compared with the newer entitiesCSOs play a vital role in the reconstruction of Afghanistan, implementing infrastructure development projects and providing social services to communities throughout the country. While institutional capacity is clearly low, there is only a limited recognition by the CSO sector of their capacity building needs, with the exception of the need to develop fund-raising skills. The CSO sector's development is hindered by the legal enabling environment in which it operates. This enabling environment is still weak with many areas of confusion and lack of clarity, exaggerated by the speed with which new organizations are being created by donors in	Insights on civil society useful for future programming but very limited discussion on the specific impact or mechanisms by CSOs may affect stabilization.	Limited value for current planning or insufficient practical application	Potentially effective	Potentially effective	Insufficient evidence
Measuring Progress in Reconstructing Afghanistan Christiaan Davids, Rietjens, Soeters_2010 Christiaan Davids, Sebastian Rietjens, Joseph Soeters	Academic Literature	na na 2002-2008 Nationwide Impact Evaluation Qualitative Effectiveness Review Case Lessons Learned Study	Review Afghanistan Country Stability Picture database which contains 85,000 projects complete in Afghanistan between 2002-2008. The research also consisted of interviews, briefings and participation in meeting with NATO officials in Kandahar from July - Nov 2007. Secondary interviews conducted with different NATO officials in Kabul and Kandahar in January 2009. Final dataset was composed of 61223 projects from 2002 - 2007. They were compared according to 8 variables: start date, end date, region, cost, status, sector, implementing partner, days completed per project, turnover per project per day. Additional information was conducted on the security of each region (capital, north, east, west, south), using 8 polls from 2006 -2008 (N=5650). Regions coded according to 3 security classes: unsecure (south), medium secure (east, west), and relative secure (north and capital). ACSP variable were validated with graphs and descriptive statistics to identify outliers and erroneous data.	information of 42 countries and various		does provide detailed summaries of project information in Afghanistan. Of particular note is what factors are missing in the tracking and management database used to measure these programs	some useful findings or recommendations (M&E)	Potentially effective	Potentially effective	Insufficient evidence
Dennys_2012 For Stabilization Dennys 2012	Academic Literature	na na na na Historical Review Meta-Analysis Policy Proposal	stabilization must focus prima threats that can only be amel processes. The threats that w stabilization will primarily be there are already international inter-state political issues. The programming is on local deversome from the way in which local per the manner in which they covice versa) and the way in who over the medium term. Stabilitying to help states address the when properly conceived of its stability in the states address the stability is a stability on the states address the stability is a stability on the states address the stability is a stability on the states address the stability is a stability of the states address the stability of the stability of the states address the	determine what the concept of stabilization should be of concern to should and should not entail should not entail should and should not entail should no	Stabilization is a new term that has been applied to many old practices, but it has been inconsistently used suggesting that it is both a practice for national level interventions and those directed at a sub-national level. This has been unhelpful as it confuses stabilization activity with other forms of intervention. Stabilization interventions can address political threats at a sub-state leve in a manner which preserves or maintains a situation to provide the opportunity for longer term social, economic and political evolution. The current tools and conceptions of stabilization mostly do not provide clarity in the aims and objectives of interventions. Current interventions are not coherently monitored, many projects are incorrectly labelled as stabilization. Subnational stabilization intervention which is aimed at addressing a political threat might involve both military and development actors; the intervention must be led by a civilian with executive authority who is able to use the interventions to promote stability rather than undermine it. It should not be used to maintain an unjust status quo.			NA	NA	NA
Office of the A Meta-Evaluation Director of Department of of Foreign Foreign Jun 2011 State_2011 Assistance Assistance, Evaluations Department of State	Government Documents	na na na na Methods Review Meta-Analysis Effectiveness Lessons Learned Guidelines	Analysis of the reports of 56 evaluations of USAID projects issued in 2009. These evaluations came from the FY2009 Performance Plan and Reports submitted to the Office of Director of U.S. Foreign Assistance. Focus: 1) the quality of the Statement of Work (SOW), 2) the size and composition of evaluation teams, 3) evaluation methodology, 4) presentations of findings, conclusions, recommendations and lessons as reflected in the reports. Checklist of 46 items composed the core of the evaluation, coded or assessed with narrative comments. Two categories of evaluations: formative (process) - undertaken during an intervention, or summative - conducted at or near the end. 30 formative and 26 summative were reviewed.	USAID Review how foreign assistance programs are designed and executed	small. Most interventions are not evaluated. Although USAID mandates that each major intervention should be evaluated at least once, the mandate appears not to have been followed. Key improvement include: Need improvement in SOW requirements: Only 22 out of 56 evaluations included SOWs. Only 19 were judged to have budgeted	conducted. Evaluations fell under 5 program objectives: Peace and Security, Democracy and Governance, Investing in People, Economic Growth, Humanitarian Assistance. The majority of evaluations discussed were in Africa. This could in theory limit applicability to Afghanistan but findings are likely to be relevant.	useful findings or recommendations (M&E)	na	na	na
Derleth, Stability James Derleth, Operations: From Alexander_2010 Policy to Practice Jason Alexander	Policy/Think tank	na na na Historical Review Meta-Analysis Effectiveness Lessons Learned Guidelines	practitioners to identify local sources of instability, create activities to mitigate them, and measure the effectiveness of the activities in stabilizing the area." A standardized methodology sources of instability. Local population perceptions identifying causes of instabilit Measures of effect (impact) a success. District Stability Framework (I in Afghanistan:civilian night road movemer government legitimacypopulation citing security aspopulation movement from	refactors fostering it overwhelm operations and how that can and was applied practice practice gy is necessary to identify the ms must be included when willity. are the only true indicators of k (DSF) stability indicators in use ment as an issue om insecurity n government security forces	Many of the problems with stabilization programming in Afghanistan stem from the fact that traditional strategies and practices deemed effective in stable environments were applied in an unstable environment. The District Stabilization Framework was designed by practitioners to help practitioners mitigate challenges to conducting effective stability operations. Consequently, the use of the DSF is intended to improve the ability of practitioners to conduct stability operations by enabling them to distinguish among needs, priority grievances, and sources of instability, fostering unity of effort, improving programming to prioritize activities based on their relevance to stabilizing an area, measuring stability, improving continuity, empowering field personnel, reducing staff time and resources devoted to planning, and improving strategic communications. Cites the Wilton Park Conference findings which looked at the effectiveness of development aid in Afghanistan, practitioners from numerous development agencies concluded that aid seems to be losing, rather than winning, hearts and minds in Afghanistan. Of particular importance is that less is more—too much aid can be destabilizing. And, donors should differentiate between stabilization and development objectives. [cf. Wilton Park Conference_2010]	support its effectiveness. Nevertheless, discussion of how and why to focus on	some useful findings or recommendations (program design)	na	na	na
Evaluation of Bennett, DFID's Country Alexander, DFID_2009 Programmes: Saltmarshe, May 2009 Afghanistan 2002- Phillipson, 2007 Marsden (DFID)	Government	Transitional Humanitarian 2002-2007 Nationwide with Impact Evaluation Qualitative Effectiveness Country relief increasing Review Case Lessons Learned Assistance State building emphasis on Study Program (2003- Economic Helmand Province 1 management Interim Strategy and aid offectiveness (2005-2006) Livelihoods Development assistance Partnership Arrangement	the NDF and enable governm coordinate development activ	ctivities	DFID placed a strong emphasis from the outset on management of the economy. The aim was to create a strong public finance system to implement the National Development Framework and enable the government of Afghanistan to lead the coordination of development activities. The quality of technical assistance (TA) has been high, but there are drawbacks in terms of scope and sustainable results. Focus on TA: DFID's statebuilding strategy has had a strong focus on TA and capacity development of formal institutions. DFID has given little attention to accountability issues and the demand side of governance, including the monitoring and advocacy rol of civil society and other accountability mechanisms. Understaffing limited effectiveness: Within the state building portfolio, the consequences of understaffing have been apparent. Only 25% of projects achieved high score rates (scores of 1 or 2 in output to purpose reviews) from 2002 to 2006. This was drive by the Afghanistan Stabilisation Programme (ASP) and Strengthening Counter Narcotics in Afghanistan Project (SCNIAP), the two largest but also worst performing programs. Insufficient focus on local government: The state building portfolio may have focused too much on building technical capacity, primarily in Kabul, while downplaying issues of political legitimacy, especially at the local level. DFID has not fully explored the	has been difficult, partly due to the weaknesses in project level results frameworks, but also due to the inherent difficulties of measuring impact in an insecure environment." "DFID is keenly aware of the difficulties of assessing and demonstrating impact in the Afghan context. The lack of good national or provincial data and security constraints on access to beneficiaries (for DFID staff and partners) impedes the measurement of progress or decision making. DFID's practice of putting its aid funds through common systems adds to the usual problems of attribution in development aid."	NA	Insufficient evidence	Potentially effective	Potentially effective
Provincial Reconstruction DoD JCOA Teams in Afghanistan: An Interagency Assessment	Government Documents	PRTS October 2005 Kabul, Gardez, Performance/Process Qualitative Effectiveness Ghazni, Kandahar, Evaluation Review Case Lessons Learned and Mazar-e-Sharif Study Guidelines Ghazni, Kandahar, Evaluation Review Case Lessons Learned and Mazar-e-Sharif Study Guidelines	Interviews with key officials and others with recent experience in Afghanistan. Three-week, in-country assessment, interviews with over 100 officials at the U.S. Embassy, USAID, USDA, CFC-A, CJTF-76, ISAF, UN Assistance Mission to Afghanistan (UNAMA), GOA, international donors, and NGOs. Visits to PRTs in Gardez, Ghazni, Kandahar, and Mazar-e-Sharif, as well as Regional Command South and battalion task forces in Ghazni and Paktika.	MIL Assess PRTs effectiveness from the DoD perspective	Provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs) have been an effective tool for stabilization in Afghanistan, strengthening provincial and district-level institutions and empowering local leaders who support the central government. In many locations, PRTs have helped create conditions that make increased political, social, and economic development possible. The U.S. interagency community should develop guidance that clearly outlines the mission, roles, responsibilities, and authority of each participating department or agency within the PRT. The U.S. Embassy and Combined Forces Command Afghanistan (CFC-A) need to reinvigorate an in-country interagency coordinating body that articulates how national programs and PRT efforts fit into broader U.S. foreign policy objectives. Guidance must be strengthened to direct U.S. PRT commanders to incorporate non-Department of Defense (DOD) representatives into PRT strategy development and decision making; otherwise, PRTs will fall short of their goals. To fill key U.S. PRT positions and better achieve assignment objectives, civilian agencies need to further develop policies and incentive structures. In the short term, funding should be provided USAID for more direct-hire staff. Military and civilian personnel tour lengths should be aligned to ensure team development, and personnel must have appropriate experience and training for PRT duties. U.S. PRT management and information systems that support civilian representatives need to be strengthened. U.S. PRT access to funds and capabilities needs to be improved to support the operational center-of-gravity movement to the provinces. USAID needs to recompete the Quick Impact Project (QIP) funding mechanism to draw in implementing partners that can operate more effectively in unstable provinces. USDA representatives need access to dedicated funding, as should representatives of any civilian agency who serve on PRTs. The USG needs to develop team training for all PRT personnel. PRTs are most appropriate where there is a mid-range of	integrating USAID/civilian personnel in military context. Most of the evidence is anecdotal but well sourced and detailed.	some useful findings or recommendations (civil-military coordination)	Potentially effective	Potentially effective	Insufficient evidence

Enhancing Security DoD_2015 and Stability in DoD Dec 2015 Governme Afghanistan	US-led Government Jan-Dec 2015 Nationwide Congressional Qualitative Effectiveness Operation capacity building Reporting Review Case Lessons Learned Freedom Sentinel (OFS) and NATO-led Resolute Support (RS) na na na na Methods Review na Guidelines	Congressionally-mandated reporting Annex A provides extensive list of "Indicators of MIL Effectiveness for Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Interior" Outcome effectiveness is based on the "subjective assessment of the essential function lead." MPICE provides a system of metrics that can assist in formulating State 0 – Imposed Stability: Drivers of violent conflict N	Update to Congress one year into the US led Operation Freedom Sentinel (DFS) and the NATO- period such as meetings [btw Alghan and Pakstani military officials] to discuss border coordination are positive signs that both countries recognize the need to work together;" and, "The ability of the MoD to support (RS) missions. Both are repeatedly referred to as "annow, well-defined," effective leads resistant in the contribution of the circlique that previous DOD efforts were not. In the ability of the MoD to support (RS) missions, which is perhapts and principle and the mission is made and process in the previous DOD efforts were not. In the action (Task) is sooped and agreed to by the Afghan systems are in place, functioning, and being used effectively easing effectively easing on the mission activities in various sectors. An Annex provides a useful source of potential measures of impact and process recommendations (M&E) countries recognize the need to work together;" and, "The ability of the MoD to support the MSD remains dependent on effective leads remains an implicate invarious sectors. An Annex provides a detailed list of the mission's "indicators of the critique that previous DOD efforts were not. In the action (Task) is sooped and agreed to by the Afghan government. In the action (Task) is sooped and agreed to by the Afghan government intuitions the action (Task) is sooped and agreed to by the Afghan government intuitions is "fully effective." In the Afghan government outcome is "fully effective." In the action (Task) is sooped and agreed to by the Afghan government intuitions of "fully effective." In the action (Task) is sooped and agreed to by the Afghan government intuitions of "fully effective." In the action (Task) is copied and agreed to by the Afghan government intuitions of "fully effective." In the action (Task) is copied and agreed to by the Afghan government intuition is "fully effective." In the action (Task) is copied and agreed to by the Afghan government intuition is "fully effective
Measuring Progress in Conflict Environments Dziedzic, Sotirin, (MPICE): A Metrics Dziedzic, Sotirin, Agoglia _2010 Framework for Agoglia Assessing Conflict Transformation and Stabilization		policy and implementing strategic and operational plans to transform conflict and bring stability to war-torn societies. These metrics provide the content for baseline operational and strategic—military level assessments allowing policymakers to diagnose potential obstacles to stabilization prior to an intervention. State 0—miposed stability. Drivers of violent conflict and robust presence of external metrics provide the content for baseline operational and strategic—military forces, in partnership with a sizable international civilian presence, to perform vital functions such as imposing order, reducing violence, delivering essential services, moderating political conflict, and instituting an acceptable political framework pursuant to a peace accord. State I—Assisted Stability: Drivers of violent conflict have been reduced to the extent that they can be largely managed by local actors and indigenous institutions (formal and informal). This permits the reduction of outside military intervention and civilian assistance to minimal levels that can be sustained by the intervening parties over the long term. State II—Self-Sustaining Peace: Local institutions are able to cope effectively with residual drivers of violent conflict and resolve internal disputes peacefully without the need for an international military or civilian administrative presence.	Present a uniform set of metrics (MPICE) The principal purpose of this piece to explain how the index enables practicitioners to track pragregs from the point of intervention through stabilization and unitarity to be subtracted in a control stabilization of the intervention through stabilization and unitarity stabilization stabilization stabilization stabilization stabilization stabilization stabilization and instability and to gauge the expactive system is designed to identify potential institutions to average adequate resources and authorities to bear, focusing their efforts strategically, and enhancing prospects for attaining an enduring peace.
Stabilizing Afghanistan: Proposals for Ellwood_2013 Improving Security, Ellwood Apr 2013 tank Governance and Aid/Economic Development	na na na Nationwide Historical Review Meta-Analysis Effectiveness Lessons Learned Policy Proposal	Qualitative policy review and recommendations Improved security Improved governance Economic development and reconstruction	In seport assesses the progress in Alghanistan from three miturally deepnotenip fillars for a national stability, security, governance, and economic development[and reconstruction), and it extrapolates to predict the significance of where Alghanistan is nown in the leadup to ISAP's 204 operational withdrawal. - Is also provides the country enough stability or personal influences and the precedence of local development and in of legitimacy (meaning the West is fueling the problem). - It also provides the country enough stability to prevent liding and there is no feasible political strategy to encourage insurgents to the table. - Is also provides the country enough stability to prevent liding and stability to a more competent-looking and stable AMSP; but the surgent threat will not be removed by force alone, - Geographic, demographic and historic factors are working against this large coventional aid that has been poured into the country (estimated to be some \$430 billion), conflicting agendas, poor coordination, lack of overall ownership, an absence of regional electronic productions. The support of the provides the country sensitive does not entered to lead the country to eventual self-reliance. - Despite the scale of international aid that has been poured into the country (estimated to be some \$430 billion), conflicting agendas, poor coordination, lack of overall ownership, an absence of regional electronic productions. The report claims there is little progress but provides the country is surfaced as little progress but provides the country is surfaced as little progress but provides the country surface and included value for current planing or sufficient evidence insufficient evidence of pusitive outputs in sufficient evidence insufficient evidence of pusitive outputs in sufficient evidence insufficient evidence to justify the strong assertions. - The favored in the relati
Slip-Sliding on a Vanda Felbab- Felbab- Yellow Brick Road: Brown Nov 2012 Policy/Thir Brown_2012 Stabilization Efforts (Brookings)	CERP Economic na na Historical Review Qualitative Effectiveness stabilization Review Case Lessons Learned Study Policy Proposal	Qualitative review of stabilization efforts. Includes interviews with ISAF officials in Kabul. Interviews with "Afghans from all walks of life" in Kabul, Nangarhar, Herat, Balkh, and Baghlan. Interviews with US and Canadian government officials and representatives of the international development companies charged with economic stabilization programs in Kandahar and Helmand. Views "governance" issues (not specifically defined) as the key to stabilization efforts. Decreasing/eliminating corruption is fundamental to successful stabilization efforts.	Asses CERP and other stabilization in efforts in Afghanistan based on interviews with Afghanist and some US/Canadian officials Asses CERP and other stabilization in efforts in Afghanistan, embodies in different policies and strategies which, in turn, created different sets of expectations in Kabul and internationally (among governments and publics.) Focus on short-term, quick-impact programs does not address structural drivers of instability (especially in rural Afghanistan) and, as a result, CERP-Linded programs have tended to replace government capacity rather than grow it. Afghans have become disconnected and alienated from the national government and the country's other power arrangements. They are profoundly dissatisfied with Kabul's inability and unwillingness to provide basic public services and with the widespread corruption of the power eilles. They intensely resent the abuse of power, impunity, and lack of justice that have become entrenched over the past decade. Even while the effort in Afghanistan came to take on the trappings of a state-building effort, the policies adopted did not sufficiently focus on promotting good governance. Instead, the lack of US and international military resources, and the consequent reliance on warlords with a fablus. Against the programs does not address structural drivers of instability (especially in rural Afghanistan) and, as a result, CERP-Linded programs have become disconnected and alienated from the national government and the country's other power arrangements. They are profoundly dissatisfied with Kabul's inability and unwillingness to provide basic public services and with the widespread corruption of the power effective country of the power efforts in Afghanistan came to take on the trappings of a state-building effort, the policies and with the widespread corruption for the power efforts in Afghanistan came to take on the trapping of a state-building effort, the policies and with the widespread corruption for the power efforts in Afghanistan came to tak
Winning Hearts Paul Fishstein Aug 2012 Policy/Thir Fishstein_2012 and Minds in Aug 2012 tank Uruzgan Province	na na Jun 2008-Feb Helmand, Paktia, Impact Evaluation Historical Review Effectiveness 2010 Uruzgan Qualitative (considered Review Case insecure); Balkh, Study Faryab (considered secure)	Qualitative interviews and focus group discussions with a range of respondents in key institutions and in communities were used to elicit views on the drivers of insecurity, characteristics of aid projects and aid implementers (including the military), and effects of aid projects on the popularity of aid actors and on security. Excluding Helmand (where a slightly different methodology was used), 574 people were interviewed, including 340 Afghan and 234 international respondents. In Uruzgan, 120 people (54 Afghan and 66 international) were interviewed. In addition, secondary sources were drawn upon for historical information and background to aid projects. To reduce or eliminate the likelihood of respondent bias, the methodology used multiple visits, triangulation of responses, flexible interview guides that encouraged spontaneous responses within specific themes, and the fielding of teams with extensive local experience.	Research in Uruzgan suggests that inscurrity is Largely the result of the failure of governance, which has acceptated traditional relative of governance, which has acceptated traditional fival respondents within the international military did report some short-term benefits of ald projects in facilitating interaction with and collecting information from communities, it appears that curruption, tribal politics, and the heavy of international forces neutralized whatever positive effects aid projects might have delivered. Post-201. a, group of tribally affiliated strongmen was seen to have taken advantage of their networks to secure government positions, and then to have used those positions to further consolidate political common the nearcolics trade. As elsewhere, the Taliban have been adept at taking advantage of the openings provided by grievance and resentment. Similar to the four other provinces included in the study, respondents were highly critical of ald projects, mainly because aid was perceived evidence of the destabilizing effects of aid projects. Siwen the characterization of ald projects and projects and projects and projects and projects of the Dutch handover and the 2014 Transition, the research also raises the question of whether relying on individuals to deliver security is consistent with the professed objective of strengthening the state.
Winning Hearts and Minds? Examining the Relationship Fishstein, Wilder Jan 2012 between Aid and Security in Afghanistan	na na na Helmand, Paktia, Impact Evaluation Historical Review Effectiveness Uruzgan Qualitative (considered Review Case insecure); Balkh, Study Faryab (considered secure) sink	Interviews and focus groups with members of key institutions operating in three insecure provinces (Helmand, Paktia, Uruzgan), two secure provinces (Balkh and Faryab) and the city of Kabul. Consistent methodology was used in all provinces except Helmand due to the security situation. In the four provinces (except Helmand) and Kabul, there were 574 respondents (340 Afghans and 234 international), whose responses were recorded during individual interviews or focus groups. The respondents included former government officials, donors, diplomats, international military officials, PRT military and civilian staff, UN and aid agency staff, tribal and religious leaders, journalists, traders, businessmen and community members. This data collection took place from June 2008 - February 2010. In Helmand, the methodology mixed qualitative data from interviews conducted February - March 2008 and quantitative data from polling done in November 2008.	Focuses primarily on Uruzgan to understand the role of aid on stability and security monopolized by people who were cruel and unijust, there was skepticism about the extent to which aid projects could contribute to security. In the context of the Dutch handover and the 2014 Transition, the research also raises the question of whether relying on individuals to deliver security is consistent with the professed objective of strengthening the state.
Joint Evaluation of the Paris (Baawar 2010 Governme Consulting Group) Joint Evaluation of GIRoA (Baawar 2010 Governme Consulting Group)		Blend of evaluation synthesis and Meta evaluation, inclining more na towards evaluation synthesis. The study thus used information from literature reviews, field visits and interviews with a range of stakeholders. Due to time and financial resource constraints and insecure situations, however, the field visits and interviews were limited, which also resulted in limiting strengths of conclusions.	Assess implementation of Paris Declaration phase Affghaintian presents one of the most complex environments for Paris Declaration (Paris Declarati
Aiding violence or building peace? Goodhand_2002 The Role of Goodhand 2002 Academic international aid in Afghanistan	na na na Nationwide Historical Review Meta-Analysis Effectiveness Lessons Learned	Historical analysis of the role of international aid in Afghanistan Peace building defined as: Local or structural efforts that foster or support those social, political and institutional structures and processes which strengthen the prospects for peaceful co-existence and decrease the likelihood of the outbreak, reoccurrence or continuation of violence.	Fealuation of styles or eras of development/humanitarian assistance and maps program quality and implementation are important but essentially second understanding program quality and implementation are important but essentially second order. Pist of order sixes is political faculi files of the conflict and increased program and an approximate. Take of developmental approximate is altered and a sale of order in the conflict and an approximate is altered and a sale or order in the conflict and increased increased and approximate. Take the developmental approximate is altered and a sale or of change in relation to their resource flows withing a superior of the conflict and of conflicts and developmental approach in a collapsed state conflict. The complete substance of the conflict and developmental approach in a collapsed state conflict. The complete substance of the conflict and developmental approach in a collapsed state conflict. The complete substance of the conflict and developmental approach in a collapsed state conflict. The complete substance of the conflict and developmental approach in a collapsed state conflict. The complete substance of the conflict and developmental approach in a collapsed state conflict. The complete substance of the conflict and developmental approach in a collapsed state conflict. The complete substance is a conflict and developmental approach in a collapsed state conflict. The complete substance is a conflict and developmental approach in a collapsed state conflict. The conflict and developmental approach in a collapsed state conflict. The conflict and developmental approach in a collapsed state conflict. The conflict and developmental approach in a collapsed state conflict and developmental approach in a collapsed state conflict. The conflict and developmental proproach in a collapsed state conflict and increased in conflict and in conflict and increased in conflict and increas
Who owns the peace? Aid, Goodhand, reconstruction, and peacebuilding in Afghanistan Who owns the peace? Aid, Goodhand, Jan 2010 Academic Literature		Historical analysis of the role of international aid in Afghanistan Peace building defined as: Local or structural efforts that N foster or support those social, political and institutional structures and processes which strengthen the prospects for peaceful co-existence and decrease the likelihood of the outbreak, reoccurrence or continuation of violence.	Instructions and bottom up (e.g. livelihood support, education) strategies. They also highlight that the conflict is not universally This paper examines how aid policies and programmes have become part of a complex bargaining game involving international actors, domestic elites, and societal groups. Declaration may carry little meaning in such contexts and their application can have paradoxical effects that impede the emergence of broad-based ownership. The limitations of, and alternatives to, developmentalist approaches in fragile states, are explored here with reference to donor policies and practices in Afghanistan, focusing on the period following the 2001 Bonn Agreement. It argues that international donors' failure to appreciate or engage sensitively and strategically with these bargaining processes, when combined with contradictory intervention objectives, has contributed to the steady unravelling of a fragile war-
Winning Hearts and Minds? Examining the Relationship Gordon Apr 2011 Policy/Thir between Aid and Security in Afghanistan's Helmand Province	na na na Helmand Impact Evaluation Qualitative Effectiveness Review Case Lessons Learned Study	Interviews and focus groups with members of key institutions operating in three insecure provinces (Helmand, Paktia, Uruzgan), two secure provinces (Balkh and Faryab) and the city of Kabul. Consistent methodology was used in all provinces except Helmand due to the security situation. In the four provinces (except Helmand) and Kabul, there were 574 respondents (340 Afghans and 234 international), whose responses were recorded during individual interviews or focus groups. The respondents included former government officials, donors, diplomats, international military officials, PRT military and civilian staff, UN and aid agency staff, tribal and religious leaders, journalists, traders, businessmen and community members. This data collection took place from June 2008 - February 2010. In Helmand, the methodology mixed qualitative data from interviews conducted February - March 2008 and quantitative data from polling done in November 2008.	Review the overall experience with development and stabilization assistance across 5 provinces are assistance across 5 provinces as a stabilization assistance across 5 provinces are assistance across 5 provinces as a stabilization assistance across 5 provinces as stabilization assistance across 5 provinces and stabilization assistance across 5 provinces as stabilization as stabilization assistance across 5 provinces as stabilization assistance across 5 provinces as stabilization assistance across 5 provinces and introduction such as a stabilization as stab
Afghanistan's Gordon_2014 Stabilization Gordon 2014 Academic Program: Hope in a Dystopian Sea?		Qualitative review of the evolution of stabilization strategies in Afghanistan Increased security Extension of accountable government services Increased government accountability Greater protection for civilians from predatory government practices	term orientation for projects. NBT received potally as because the amount dispersant was essentially a past of criticatine professing and community is positive as betains on the distribution of the community and the dispersant was sessionally a past of criticatine professing as well to support energiest generated the most support energies generated generated the most support energies generated gener
Manufacturing Civil Society and the Limits of Legitimacy: Aid, Security and Civil Society after 9/11 in Afghanistan Manufacturing Civil Society and the Limits of Legitimacy: Aid, Jude Howell Jeremy Lind 2009 Academic	na na 2001-2009 Nationwide Historical Review Qualitative Effectiveness NSP is briefly discussed Study	Qualitative review of the impact of the securitization of aid on civil na Society development in Afghanistan.	Review some of the issues that limited the effectiveness of civil society programs in Afghanistan Afghanistan Afghanistan The securitization of aid, in the form of stabilization initiatives, has nurtured a "renter" civil society, comprised of an assortment of donor-funded MCOS, and promoted a particular model of state-civil relations that prioritizes service delivery over the deliberative role of civil society. The convergence of military and development objectives and the subordination of the latter to the former has co-opted civil society into stabilization and state-building strategies in a say of strengthening the state and has undermined the legitimacy of civil society and contributed to negative popular attitudes toward MCOS. Increasing military-civilian cooperation in aid delivery has created political and moral dilemnas for NGOs acting on a humanitarian mandate as to how to act impartially, independently and neutrally and be perceived by the general public as doing so. NSP implementation problems: ensuring women's participation in decision making; relating the new structures to already existing village leadership institutions; resolving intercommunity tensions around the allocation of CDC funds; and, perhaps most significantly, ensuring the timely disbursement of funds to CDCs.

na ICG_2011 Aid and Conflict in International Aug 2011 Policy/Think Afghanistan Crisis Group Aug 2011 tank	na 2001-2010 Nationwide Historical Review Meta-Analysis Lessons Learned Policy Proposal	Historical review of aid efforts in Afghanistan na USAID	Alter a decade of major security, development and humanistrian assistance, the international community has falled to achieve a policitally stable ade ale acconnically while Adjanistance, and is state intertutions remain fragile and unable to provide good governance, deliver basis services to the majority of the population or guarantee human security. Key limitations: The impact of international assistance will remain limited adores, particularly the largest, the U.S. stop subordinating programming to counter-insurgency objectives, devise better mechanisms to monitor implementation, adequately address corruption and wastage of air funds, and ensure that recipient controls and shape assistance policies. Civilian urge without oversight risks further problems during drawdow: The 2009 U.S. troop surge, aimed at urgently countering an expanding insurgency, was accompanied by a similar increase in U.S. divilian presonnel – attempting to deliver quick-results in the same arease as the military surge, bust without agroons undest bedue, many radio decline, are promised accountability of whatever reconstruction and development achievements there have been. Immedic apport yet specific advanced in the military surge, bust between the presonance introls and advanced in the surgest produced in the about the surgest produced in the surgest produced in the about the surgest	Potentially effective Insufficient evidence
IMU Case Study: Youth Independent Programming in Monitoring Unit South, East, North (Rahman Safi and West Consulting) Afghanistan IMU Case Study: Youth Independent Programming in Monitoring Unit Jan 2015 Program Evaluation	Small-scale 2012-2015 Ghazni, Khost, Impact Evaluation Qualitative Effectiveness development Samangan, Kunar, Review Case Lessons Learned projects (skills- Kandahar, Herat, Study based training in Badghis tailoring, embroidery, carpentry, computers and cooking; educational classes in English-language, journalism, music, drawing and poetry; athletic training in football and cricket; and additional classes in livestock training, maternity/childb irth workshops and disaster	Focus groups with project participants in 10 provinces where the selected projects were implemented (total of 24), with 11 youth associations (half of whom had worked with CCI), five additional focus groups with elders and religious scholars in the communities and 11 interviews with district government officials who had knowledge of CCI programming across the ten provinces. Of the 39 focus groups with youth, 12 were with women.	provinces, particularly through provincial development plans, to enable local authorities to implement development projects	Effective Potentially effective
IMU Case Study: The Effectiveness of Infrastructure Independent Projects in Monitoring Unit Increasing Linkages (Rahman Safi Between Local Consulting) Populations and Government CCI Mar 2015 Program Evaluation Evaluation	Infrastructure Not stated Two districts each Impact Evaluation Qualitative Effectiveness were studied in Review Case Lessons Learned Herat, Kunar, Kandahar, and Khost; one district each was studied in Balkh, Ghazni, Helmand, Jowzjan, and Samangan for a total of 13 districts targeted	Focus groups with Project Oversight Committee (POC) members (or the local equivalent where official POCs were not formed) Semi-structured interviews with designated District or Provincial Government Officials Surveys of twenty-five (25) individual community members living nearby the infrastructure projects Desk review of implementing partner (IP) documents, IMU reports, IMU Scoring Matrix classifications of project success	Assess impact of CCI programs on attitudes towards government and overall governance implementation has led to sustained contact between the local people and the government. The exception to this was in restricted areas where implementation was beset by serious security challenges. In districts of Kandahar and Helmand, projects were brought by one or two individuals to the community and people had no interaction with the government either before or after the project, and did not credit the government with implementation. Despite these failings, in both Kandahar and Helmand, CCI projects still brought communities together around a common cause and appeared to have strengthened internal community ties and visible infrastructure improvements, even if the stated goal of improved community-government ties was not achieved. Successful projects shared some key attributes: very active POC with members who felt invested from the project planning stage; an active and earnest role played by the government on the POC; government presence lent legitimacy and perceived power to the POC, which enabled the POC to direct work and see their grievances addressed on projects. Poor projects were characterized by disaffected POCs and low project quality. When POCs seported being empowered to provide real oversight and direction on projects, the quality was always higher.	Effective Potentially effective
IMU Case Study: Independent IMU_2015_3 GRoA Perspectives Monitoring Unit on OTI/CCI (Rahman Safi Nov 2015 Evaluation Programming Consulting)	Infrastructure 2003-2015 Badghis, Balkh, Impact Evaluation Qualitative Effectiveness Faryab, Herat, Review Case Lessons Learned Jawzjan, Kabul, Study Samangan	Interviews with 90 government officials at provincial and district levels across six provinces in the North and West where CCI worked from 2013-2015. In total, it spoke to representatives from 11 Line Directorates that would presumably have had some oversight of CCI projects and activities (this represented between 75% and 90% of Line Directorates in these districts). In addition, it spoke to four Kabul-level Ministry officials with general oversight of key Ministry activities in these provinces. Limitations: Hawthorne Effect. A threat to the validity of qualitative data collection was the risk that interviewer wanted to hear. No Provincial Governors were interviewed. When Provincial Governors were solicited for interviewed. When Provincial Governors were solicited for interviewed the interview to someone on their staff with knowledge of CCI. However, no Provincial Governors' perspectives are included in this case study. Government officials are political representatives and it is therefore in their interest to represent GIROA in the best possible light. Their bias towards government programs and ability to implement programs similar to CCI may be a result of their positions as government officials. USAID Peaceful and legitimate governance processes and outcomes; and counter violent extremism; Strengthened community capacities to mitigate conflict; Increased cohesion within and between communities outcomes; and counter violent extremism; Strengthened community capacities to mitigate conflict; Increased citizens' trust and confidence in their government; Strengthened community apacities to mitigate conflict; Increased citizens' trust and confidence in their someone outcomes; and Counter violent extremism; Strengthened community apacities to mitigate conflict; Increased citizens' trust and confidence in their sovernment; Strengthened community apacities to mitigate conflict; Increased citizens' trust and confidence in their sovernment; Strengthened community apacities to mitigate conflict;	Assess impact of CCI on attitudes towards Afghan Officials had a good understanding of CCI, its goals, and specific, granular knowledge of many CCI activities. This was true both of direct CCI grantees and non-grantees. The vast majority (85%) of government officials believed CCI programming to be organized well, transparent, and successful in achieving its objectives. Most officials (90%) agreed that CCI programming contributed positively to community security and stability, and to improving relationships between general public and the GiRoA. The majority of officials surveyed (85%) reported of operation. Twenty-five percent of officials said that there could have been better collaboration with government during activity identification and design. Nearly all officials expressed a strong desire for increased transparency and information regarding activities and budgets, regardless of overall precipition of quality of program. Activities at the intersection of CCI objectives and community priorities were consistently popular and cited as impactful (e.g. conflict resolution trainings, farmer's days, youth councils). Infrastructure was consistently mentioned as the most preferred and beneficial project type, but officials agreed that a mixture of implemental activity types was successful. Most officials (90%) believe the GiRoA is capable of providing comparable services. There are significant concerns, however, that the government will be able to secure adequate funding for this program platform.	Potentially effective Potentially effective
IMU Case Study: Independent IMU_2015_4 Winter Monitoring Unit Dec 2015 Program Preparedness (Rahman Safi Evaluation Packages Consulting)	Infrastructure 2013-2015 Balkh, Faryab, Impact Evaluation Qualitative Effectiveness Herat, Jawjan, Review Case Lessons Learned Samangan Study	Semi-structured interviews and focus groups with a total of 468 people across 17 districts. At least one focus group discussion (FGD) was conducted per district where WPP distributions took place. Two focus groups were conducted exclusively with women. Focus groups were complemented by individual interviews from 75 separate WPP distributions. The 75 WPP distributions were chosen randomly, stratified by district. A total of 20% of the individual respondents were female (54) while the remaining were male (234). In addition, the IMU spoke to 11 of the 17 government members of Project Oversight Committees by phone for the case study to solicit their perspectives. In a difficult of the 17 government members of Project Oversight Committees by phone for the case study to solicit their perspectives. In a difficult of the 17 government members of Project Oversight Committees by phone for the case study to solicit their perspectives. In a difficult of the 17 government members of Project Oversight Committees by phone for the case study to solicit their perspectives.	Asses the impact of a total of 48 findingistal are decided mistratives. The execution of the Winter Proparations Package program was determined to be effective and well-winter package recipients from 75 communities in 17 districts were interviewed by CCFS independent Monitoring (Int. An additional LA. Program and the service of the Winter Program appears to have falled should be active in organizing support networks of 17 government nembers of Project Oversight. Committees (POCs) were also interviewed. Committees (POCs) were also interviewed. In the service of the service of the service of the service of the wild for Discission of the will for Discission Governments to help the people, as well as a helping hand from outside donors who supplied aid rapacity to Girox. In terms of achieving its direct objective, the outcomes were mided. The program appears to have fallen short in achieving the first part of its objective (improve precipions of inclusiveness by marginalized from government. Anothal fall (SMS) said their community and received services in the community, and personal perceptions of marginalization from government. Anothal fall (SMS) said their community and received services in the community, and personal perceptions of marginalization from governments. The second part of the objective ("joint government-community responsiveness to the winter preparadees needs of vulnerable families in folderities") was met. From a demographic perspective, the participants interviewed were very needs. Whintery percent of participants interviewed and were very needs. Whintery percent of participants interviewed and were very needs. Whintery percen	Potentially effective Potentially effective
Independent Commission for Aid Impact_2012 DFID: Programme Controls and Assurance in Afghanistan Independent Commission for Mar Aid Impact Government Commission for Mar Aid Impact Documents	na na na Impact Evaluation Qualitative Effectiveness Performance/Process Review Case Lessons Learned Evaluation Study	Methodological details not provided na N	Multiple community representatives, including men and women, should be part of drawing up lists of potential beneficiaries. It was mentioned that dispersing the decision-making power in this way contributed to a stronger, more transparent program. Review of DFID program oversight approaches PFID manages its programs in Afghanistan in exceptionally difficult circumstances. It has a highly committed, respected and experienced senior team and a professional reputation amongst other organizations working in Afghanistan. However, DFID's financial management processes are insufficiently volust and that DFID does not give sufficient its programs. The objectives for programs are clear and address the priorities for development in Afghanistan. In addition, DFID is a recognized leader in the donor community, providing technical support and influencing multi-donor programs. At the program design stage, however, DFID does not scrutinize sufficiently tis managing agents' ability to spend and to deliver to plan. DFID is not sufficiently clear about how it is balancing the risk of leakage will deliver gia and and achieving avalue and achieving avalue and achieving avalue of money. It does not perform thorough risk assessments at local and organizational levels. Even allowing for the considerable difficulties of operating in Afghanistan, DFID lacks visibility of financial management throughout its delivery chains. Also, DFID's financial and procurement support. DFID's program controls and assurance ought to minimize leakage. DFID has basic, mainly financial, controls in place with its partners and managing agents have estimated methodically the extent of leakage in the donor commonity by the aid is actually delivered. Nevertheless, neither DFID nor its partners and managing agents have estimated methodically the extent of leakage in	Potentially effective Insufficient evidence
Inder Sud_2013 Afghanistan: A Synthesis Paper of Lessons from Ten Years of Aid Synthesis Paper of Lessons from Ten Years of Aid Inder Sud (Independent Evaluation Feb 2013 Government Documents World Bank)	Performance/Process Evaluation Name of the process	Meta-analysis na N Literature Review This article does not explicitly state or review any stabilization indicators. It argues that development policies	Afghanistan, January 24, 2013 the government's plans and priorities. The government and civil society, on the other hand, give low to moderate scores to alignment based on the view that the development plan is by its nature all-encompassing and thus any donor initiative can be considered aligned to it. It concludes that "many donors continue to follow their own agendas while claiming they are aligned with Afghan government priorities" Several evaluations noted high costs, from both cost overruns and high administrative costs, and delays in implementation that lower efficiency. ADB rates the efficiency of its program low, primarily because of the large cost overruns. It considers the "emergency mode" of operation to have contributed to proceeding with projects that had not been well prepared and UNDP cites complex procedures and high security costs contributing to inefficiencies. Even for NSP, the IEG report notes "hidden costs" arising from procurement and payment delays (IEG 2012, 69). Others have noted high overhead costs of projects (NORAD 2012, 56). In education, donors express concerns about the poor quality of construction, lack Donors' communities deal with the competing incentives in establishing short-term and long-term impacts. The necessities of Key insight from the piece is that they authoris find no evidence that aid has some useful findings or Insufficient evidence	Insufficient evidence Potentially effective Insufficient evidence
Economic Kapstein, Kathuria_2012 Conflict Zones: Lessons from Afghanistan Economic Assistance in Kapstein, Oct 2012 Policy/Think Tank Afghanistan	Lessons Learned	are created using a "winning hearts and minds approach" which argues that civilian grievances can be overcome by providing foreign aid which in turn reduces support for insurgents thus supporting counterinsurgency strategy.	financing war ethorts prevent sustainable economic development. Donor governments develop policies under the assumption that budget gaps exist in recipient nations resulting from a lack of internal political/economic resources that would allow these nations to improve infrastructure or offer public goods; without donor aid, these nations would experience inflation, suffering and political instability that would give insurgents more power. Aid flows can prolong conflicts by reducing the incentive of warring parties to negotiate to again access to more resources. Donors can undermine institutional capacity by funneling aid through non-governmental channels. In Afghanistan, funding has mainly been provided to the Afghan military and to support government operations. The spending of aid has been more effective in certain sectors than in others. Corruption which occurs during small, local projects is less likely to delegitimize the national government. Large-scale projects are more efficient but also more susceptible to corruption. Small-scale projects can be more costly and difficult to monitor, but may have a more long-term impact in changing civilian attitudes in favor of formal government.	
Lyall, Blair, Imai_2013 Explaining Support for Combatants during Wartime: A Lyall, Blair, Imai Nov 2013 Academic Literature in Afghanistan	na na na Impact Evaluation Quantitative Effectiveness Review Case Study	Survey with indirect endorsement experiments to measure civilian attributes toward the Taliban and the International Security stabilization indicators. The focus is on how different actors in conflict might influence civilian perceptions and attributes statistical modeling. Sample of 2,754 male respondents in 204 villages within 21 districts of 5 predominantly Pashtun provinces (Urozgan, Logar, Kunar, Khost, Helmand). Survey administered from January 18 - February 3 2011. The survey was implemented by the Opinion Research Center of Afghanistan (ORCA). Experimental group contained respondents who expressed opinion toward a policy endorsed by a specific actor. Control group gave responses to same questions without the endorsement. Conducted two pretest surveys in sample districts, led to identification of four policies. These policies where in the same policy space, related to domestic reforms, well known by individuals, and actually endorsed by the actors. The population held a wide range of views about these chosen policies. 89% participation rate.	Harm caused by JSAF results in reduced support for SAF and increased support for Tailban. Harm caused by the Tailban does not powerment and AGE) as well as well supported discussion of the linkage between lead to increased support for ISAF, and there is a marginal decrease in support for the Tailban. Efforts to mitigate effects of harm programs and support attitudes on population are successful in reducing changes to civilian attitudes, however ISAF does not respond in a consistent manner to civilian cassiatises. Little evidence that historical violence in a region, the territorial control of combatants, or that providing economic assistance offers an explanation of civilian attitudes. Civilians are not unlit; maximizing agents, they are not indifferent as to which combatant provides material assistance. The success of aid programs in reducing violence is dependent on the ethnic composition of a region, with civilians responding asymmetrically to combatants. Interpreted by civilians depends on the identity of the perpetrator. Support for ISAF increases and support for Tailban hars more support among youth than does ISAF. Support for ISAF decreases and support for Tailban hars more support among youth than does ISAF. Support for ISAF decreases and support for Tailban hars more support as a positive view of both groups, with a slightly more negative perception of the ISAF. Respondents harmed by both groups had a positive view of both groups, with a slightly more negative perception of the ISAF. Respondents harmed by both groups had a positive view of both groups, with a slightly more negative perception of the ISAF. Respondents harmed by the group shall be viewed as a continuum, rather than just "pro-Tailban" or "ant-ISAF". Post-harm aid is more effective in shifting support away from rivial combatant rich than towards a page to change attitudes in examining the impact of Commander's Emergency Response Program (ICRP) and National Solidarity Program (ISAP). The similar difference in support for ether combatant in	Effective Insufficient evidence
Civilian Casualties and the Conditional Lyall_2006 Effects of Lyall May 2016 Literature Humanitarian Aid in Wartime	Humanitarian 2011-2013 Nationwide Impact Evaluation Quantitative Effectiveness assistance Review Case Study	As-if random assignment of villages and individuals to ACAP II Support for and participation in insurgent movements humanitarian aid eligibility to analyze village-level effects on insurgent violence. Qualitative interviews with ACAP II, ISAF and USAID personnel to validate as-if assumptions. Nationwide survey experiment (n=3,045) among both aid beneficiaries and non-recipients for analysis of mechanisms for aid impact on individual support for Taliban.	Assess and explain the impact of humanitarian assistance during conflict settings ACAP II assistance is associated with a 14-17% reduction in insurgent attacks after ISAF-inflicted in clinicidents (but not Taliban ones). ACAP II assistance is associated with a 14-17% reduction in insurgent attacks after ISAF-inflicted in clinicidents (but not Taliban ones). ACAP II assistance is associated with a 14-17% reduction in insurgent attacks are ISAF-inflicted in clinicidents (but not Taliban ones). ACAP II assistance is associated with a 14-17% reduction in insurgent attacks against counterinsurgent (orces is likely due to changes in Taliban test). It is reduction in insurgent attacks against counterinsurgent (orces is likely due to changes in Taliban test). It is reduction in insurgency or counterinsurgent, are difficult to tackle in these environments, sepecially with direct survey questions. And the potential politicization of humanitarian aid, including its use as a face-saving mechanism for "reputation or but humanitarian aid, including its use as a face-saving mechanism for "reputation or but humanitarian aid, including its use as a face-saving mechanism for "reputation or protection," likely only intensifies already severe selection biases, confounding estimates of aid's causal effects. In the intensifies already severe selection biases, confounding estimates of aid's causal effects.	Effective Potentially effective

Mac Ginty_2011 Against Mac Ginty 2011 Stabilization	na Academic Literature	na na	na Historical Review	Meta-Analysis Policy Proposal	Historical review	The term lacks definitional clarity and is often found alongside a broad range of security and peace-related terms. In relation to peace and conflict, the term truly 'arrived' with the establishment in January 1996 of the Stabilization Force (SFOR) for Bosnia and Herzegovina. In Its association with the military alliance NATO, it was inflected by a military paradigm of security rather than a more optimistic peace paradigm. Many of the definitions lack precision and resemble a hodge-podge of words around the general areas of peacebuilding, security and development. Broad definition: international endeavor to stop conflict, embed peace and routinize a functioning state that	Discuss the role of peace related initiatives ver stabilization in modern context	rsus The concept of peace has been side-lined in recent years and has been supplanted by 'stabilization', 'security' and other concept that are based on ideas of control. The term 'good enough governance' has crept into the governance lexicon, suggesting minimally acceptable standards rather than an exhaustive list of institutional standards fragile contexts are expected to meet. Policies are being linked more closely to the capability of international actors to deliver and expectations are being managed. There has been a significant retreat from the essential goals of international intervention and a refocusing on liberal internationalism-lite, or a stripped-down budget version of intervention. The terminological imprecision surrounding 'stabilization' creates a meta-category; full of buzzwords but empty of meaning. There is the danger that peace becomes subsumed by a range of other terms more closely associated with security. Most definitions mention the input of local actors in conferring legitimacy to a stabilized dispensation. These definitions fail to address the underlying ideological and power dynamics that underpin stabilization. Stabilization – as a concept and in practice – lowers the horizons of peace and peace interventions. The mainstreaming of stabilization has resulted in a hollowing out of peace in international approaches to intervention. Peace still plays a role, rhetorically at least, in the statements of international organizations. Yet, with stabilization	focuses on terminology and the potential for those terms to mask key concepts rather than the concepts or actions themselves.	NA II	nsufficient evidence	Insufficient evidence	Insufficient evidence
Stabilization and Reconstruction in McNerney_2006 Afghanistan: Are PRTs a Model or a Muddle? Stabilization and Michael McNerney 2006	PRTs Academic	Ts na 2002-2006	Nationwide Historical Review	Qualitative Effectiveness Review Case Lessons Learned Study Policy Proposal	"The assessments in this article are based only on broad observations and discussions."	operates according to strictures of good governance. PRTs success measured against three criteria: coordination, MIL relationship-building, and capacity-building. Enhancing local security is also a key measure of success but is achieved primarily through PRTs relationship and capacity building efforts.	Assess the value of PRTs	it has to share a billing with securitized and institutionalized order. The concept of stabilization further normalizes the role of the PRTs have achieved great success in building support for the US-led coalition and respect for the Afghan government. They have played important roles in everything from election support to school-building to disarmament to mediating factional conflicts. Despite their partial record of success, however, PRTs have not achieved their full potential. Inconsistent mission statements, unclear roles and responsibilities, ad hoc preparation, and, most important, limited resources have confused potential partners and prevented PRTs from having a greater effect on Afghanistan's future. Vague missions, vague goals, and insufficient resources created significant civil-military tensions at the PRTs, particularly over mission priorities. Military commanders and civilian officials were not always sure about the role civilians should play on the PRTs. The amount of OHDACA funds spent and the number of assistance projects completed (e.g. schools, clinics) were easily quantified, but they were a poor metric. These projects were effective only to the extent that they improved the ability of the PRTs to influence local events. Influence is extremely hard to quantify, but it must be assessed nevertheless. PRTs generally did a good job of engaging with local communities and meeting provincial and district officials. Unfortunately,	e Strong claims but study lacks a credible research design to support ideas presented. In particular, it is not clear in what contexts and along what metrics PRTs may have been effective in their local communities	Limited value for current planning or In insufficient practical application	nsufficient evidence	Insufficient evidence	Insufficient evidence
Evaluation of MFA Denmark_2012 Denmark_2012 Denmark_2012 Support to Afghanistan Devalopment Denmark Denmark Denmark Afghanistan		gions of Origin Statebuilding September 20: tiative (ROI) Livelihoods March 2012 Education	11- Nationwide Impact Evaluation Performance/Proc Evaluation	n Qualitative Effectiveness ocess Review Case Study	Largely documentary but also included interviews with informar at MoE, provincial and district education offices, schools, teache training colleges and key NGOs and DPs. The evaluation itself depended heavily on written records. Security and time did not permit direct observation or statistical sampling of programme results. Interviews and visits allowed only an impression of the Afghan education system, although fact-finding and field visits in 2011 and 2012 included a mix of urban and rural areas in different regions with experience of different ethnic groups.	n	Evaluate Danish development programs in Afghanistan	short tours of duty (often six months, but even as little as three months in a couple of cases) made it difficult for PRT members. The ROI program highlights a number of key lessons including the following: 1. The importance of partner choice in the original formulation of the ROI. While the evaluation raised question marks over son activities, all of the ROI partners in Phase II are leaders in their field, and this has led to an effective program. 2. Flexibility is critical to success in such a complex changing context. 3. Programs need to have an overarching strategic objective. The lack of a strategic objective for the ROI makes it harder to determine if it has done what was intended but also makes it easier to miss potential linkages to advocacy and the work of othe donors. 4. Unless there is a specific focus on the most vulnerable, the needs of these groups may be overlooked. Not all assistance need to be targeted at the most vulnerable, but any choices made to assist better-off groups rather than more vulnerable ones shoul be made knowingly after a consideration of the consequences. 5. All programs in Afghanistan need to maintain a continuous focus on gender. The gender gap in Afghanistan is very large and needs to be continually addressed by all development actors, despite the difficulties of doing so. 6. The ROI program could have been more effective if it had been linked to broader advocacy by the Embassy on returnee and IDP issues. 7. Providing opportunities for learning increases the quality of a program. The most impressive projects seen by the evaluation were those where there had been a significant investment in learning. 8. Funding cycles should match the likely project cycles. The ROI funding cycle is too short at two years for the type of developmental intervention that is needed in the transition phase. 9. Agencies implanting projects in violent or fragile environments need to assess their own impact on the conflict. While the project documents from the ROI partners generally referred	ne implementors or in other settings er ds dd	some useful findings or recommendations (program design)	nsufficient evidence	Potentially effective	Insufficient evidence
	na	na na	Nationwide Historical Review	Policy Proposal	Historical review of stabilization efforts in Afghanistan	na N	Policy proposals to address flaws in previous stabilization efforts in Afghanistan	there was no consideration of what impact those projects might have on the conflict. This is a significant oversight.	Provides an overview of previous stabilization efforts and proposals for future policy but does not account for empirical evidence	NA n	a	na	na
Miakhel_2010 A Plan to Stabilize Miakhel May 2010 Afghanistan	Policy/Think tank							Principles for new strategic plan: Afghan government and international community must agree on common agenda Make more effective use of capable local staff (especially in the civil service) "All politics is local." Local communities must be given stake in reconstruction process					
Lessons on political Mikulaschek, violence from Mikulaschek, Mar 2016 Shapiro_2016 America's post- Shapiro 9/11 Wars	na Academic Literature	na 2002-2015	Afghanistan Historical Review Iraq	Meta-analysis Effectiveness Lessons Learned	Summary of the lessons learned from political science literature both theoretical and practical along two dimensions of conflict: factors influencing whether states or sub-state groups enter into conflict in the first place; and variables affecting the intensity of fighting at particular times and places once war has started Discussion of the external validity issues entailed in learning abo contemporary wars and insurgencies from research focused on the Afghanistan and Iraq wars during the period of U.S. involvement.	o : put	Summarize lessons learned from political scien literature on wars in Afghanistan and Iraq Outline avenues for potential research	Progress is impossible until pervasive corruption is addressed Overall the evidence from Afghanistan and Iraq weighs heavily in favor of an extended rational choice bargaining model as the best explanation of conflict onset and of information flows from non-combatants being the key factor influencing local conflict intensity in such asymmetric settings. Most of what has been learned from the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq about conflict onset relates to reasons for bargaining failure. Recent research is mostly consistent with the rational choice bargaining model, but also highlights the limited explanatory power of models that characterize bargaining as a simple two-player game, ignore domestic politics, and adopt conventional representations of war costs. A key observation which emerges from reviewing this literature is that there is no reason to expect the same correlation between a given cause (e.g. poverty) and both the onset of conflict and sub-national variation in its intensity.		NA n	a	na	na
	na	na na	na Methods Review	Meta-Analysis Baseline Assessment	Summary of the qualitative and quantitative data on these wars (both publicly available and what likely exists but has not been released) and outline potential avenues for future research Desk review		Reference manual on resources	Rational choice bargaining theory is consistent with most analyses of the onset of the sectarian violence in Iraq, but has not been used to explain the start of the insurgency in Afghanistan and fails to account for the drop in violence in Iraq in 2008-10. Moreover, this approach has not been broadly applied to explain the failure of the Taliban and Afghan government to reach a Dynamic systems approach to analyzing stability and instability. Requires accurate diagnosis of conflict drivers and how drivers affect system dynamics. Aggregation generally dilutes or obscures local context, disguises or deletes outlier data and frames underlying microenvironments out of the analysis. Common for important information about highly unstable districts to be ignored in averaged stability scoresparticularly acute	establishes common set of information	useful findings or recommendations E (program design)	ffective	Effective	Effective
MISTI Desk Review of Stabilization Resources and References	Program Evaluation					governance institutions to return to normal functioning after a shock created by a violent incident, natural calamity, or other outside factors Security redundancy: presence and effectiveness of overlapping government and community security providers, degradation of the insurgency, and civilian freedom of movement Popular confidence: public perceptions of security, local leadership and government, quality of life and expectations about future improvements		in Afghanistan, which is best understood as a highly localized mosaic of micro-environments; pressure to provide summary analysis of overarching stability impacts across all levels (village to national) increases susceptibility to aggregation bias. Tension between the requirement to demonstrate quick impacts and the desire for analytically rigorous measurement approaches (require time-intensive design process in advance of the initiative being evaluated). If speed is the priority, a project's end state risks being reduced to the completion of the project itself, rather than a demonstrable effect.					
MISTI Stability Trends and Impact MSI_2012_2 Evaluation Survey: MSI Nov 2012 Design, Methods, Pilot and Indicators	ACAI CCI Program SIKA Evaluation	AP II Humanitarian na assistance A Community development Stabilization	Nationwide survey Impact Evaluation of Afghan citizens (18+) in 107 preselected districts throughout 21 provinces in	Review Case Study	Multi-stage RCT	Perceptions of governance USAID Service provision by district government Security Rule of law Support for GIROA Support for AGE	Lay out methodology for MISTI evaluation	MISTI draws on multiple evaluation strategies to assess the impact of Stability in Key Areas (SIKA), Community Cohesion Initiatives (CCI), and Afghan Civilian Assistance Program II (ACAP II) programs. In particular, MISTI draws on the methodology of randomized control trials (RCTs), which have now emerged as the "gold standard" for assessment of aid in settings as diverse as Africa, South America, and India.		NA E	ffective	Effective	Effective
MISTI Stabilization Trends and Impact Evaluation Survey Analytical Report, Wave 1 (Baseline): Sep - Dec 2012	ACAI CCI SIKA Program Evaluation	assistance December 201	Nationwide survey Impact Evaluation of Afghan citizens (18+) in 107 preselected districts throughout 21 provinces in Afghanistan.	n Quantitative Effectiveness Review Case Baseline Assessment Study	Multi-stage RCT	Institutionalized governance: ability of government institutions to withstand shocks, ability of local councils to make binding decisions, length of tenure of government officials and community leaders Community resilience: ability of local economies and governance institutions to return to normal functioning after a shock created by a violent incident, natural calamity, or other outside factors Security redundancy: presence and effectiveness of overlapping government and community security providers, degradation of the insurgency, and civilian freedom of movement Popular confidence: public perceptions of security, local leadership and government, quality of life and expectations about future improvements	Present baseline study of MISTI site evaluation	Stabilization results were analyzed using an index that accords districts a score on a scale of 1–5, with 1 representing "most unstable" and 5 representing "most stabile." The Stabilization Index is composed of several different sub-indices and indicators that explore different aspects of stabilization, including changes in local area security (in the last 12 months), the general direction in which the district is heading (right/wrong), confidence in local government, quality of life, local area resilience, loca government provision of public services, corruption in local government, and the presence of armed opposition groups. The average stability score across all districts is 3.41, while the variation in scores is between 2.40 and 4.33 (which is moderate). On regional basis, the greatest stability is found in RC–N (3.67), and the least in RC–S (3.27). Key findings by specific area include: Security and Crime. In general, respondents are positive about the security situation in their areas. The presence of armed opposition groups varies widely across program areas, with the strongest perceived presence across SIKA–E districts ("a lot," 42 percent; "some," 39 percent). Governance. Respondents were asked whether the Afghan government is well regarded in their area. Overall, just over two thirds of respondents (68 percent) report that the Afghan government is well regarded in their area. However, support levels vary widely across a program's districts. For example, across CCI districts, Zahri has an 85 percent support level, while Barmal h. only 15 percent. Service Provision and Development. While a plurality of respondents (47 percent) believe services from the government have improved over the past year, many are dissatisfied with the services provided to them by their district government. Rule of Law. Respondents prefer to work with tribal elders rather than government courts in disputes over land, water, and the Corruption. A majority of respondents (79 percent) as a problem in their area, but a pluralit	basic public services to economic activity which provides useful baseline info overall a ft.	NA E	ffective	Effective	Effective
SIKA-West Mid- MSI_2014_1 Term Performance MSI Mar 2014 Evaluation	Program	A-West Development Dec 2013-Jan Governance and 2014 democracy Training and mentoring	Baghdis, Farah, Impact Evaluation Herat	n Quantitative Effectiveness Review Case Study	Qualitative: Interviews with SIKA-West staff, programming and project beneficiaries, USAID staff, and other stakeholders MISTI Stability Survey data used to support some findings	Improved local governance USAID Strengthened community cohesion	Assess SIKA-W mid-term in the MISTI study	consider the interests of ordinary people when making decisions about their neighborhoods, so they tend not to participate in local decision-making activities. Findings suggest SIKA-West is NOT a stabilization program, but a local governance program with a stabilization component. Programming focus is on improving local governance, service delivery which has shown success at strengthening community cohesion, but does not match IDLG or MRRD expectations for alignment and sustainability. PMP limited to measuring indicators and outputs. No focus on outcomes as SIKA-West relies heavily on MISTI survey data to understand impact. Lack of a properly articulated theory of change prevents effective internal M&E and provides no lessons learned.	Provides mid-term critique that helpfully highlights design principles and other issues that limited impact	Some useful findings or recommendations (implementation and oversight)	nsufficient evidence	Potentially effective	Potentially effective
CCI Mid-Term MSI_2014_2 Performance MSI Apr 2014 Evaluation Report	CCI Program Evaluation	Community Mar 2012-Dec building 2013 Vocational training	Ghazni, Helmand, Impact Evaluation Herat, Kandahar, Khost, Kunar	n Quantitative Effectiveness Review Case Study	Qualitative: Interviews with stakeholders, beneficiaries, and community members and direct observation of project activities	Increased community cohesion USAID Strong ties between local actors, customary governance structures and GIRoA officials Increased resilience to insurgent exploitation	Assess CCCI mid-term in the MISTI study	Direct implementation of grants and programs preferable to use of local partner organizations. Lack of M&E systems prevents development of ways to benefit from lessons learned. Rapid turnover of GIROA staff (especially in less secure districts) makes it imperative for CCI staff to continuously communicate and coordinate with provincial and district government officials. Poor relationship/lack of trust between OTI and Creative (implementing partner) negatively affects project management. USAID restrictions on support for new construction and CCI limitations on size and composition of grants are frustrating to communities/stakeholders that prefer "hard" activities (infrastructure projects).	Highlights impact of vagueness in outcome measures (e.g. community cohesion) in trying to achieve objectives	Some useful findings or recommendations (implementation and oversight)	nsufficient evidence	Potentially effective	Effective
MISTI Stabilization Trends and Impact	ACAI CCI SIKA	assistance	Nationwide survey Impact Evaluation of Afghan citizens (18+) in 107 preselected districts throughout 21 provinces in Afghanistan.	n Quantitative Effectiveness Review Case Study	Multi-stage RCT	Perceptions of governance USAID Service provision by district government Security Rule of law Support for GIROA Support for AGE		The findings from this initial round of the MISTI impact evaluation suggest that USAID programming is, in most cases, not having a statistically significant impact on citizen perceptions of stability. In some instances the (limited) data indicate that USAID programming is associated with a decrease in perceived stability among respondents. The net difference for the Aggregate Stability Index is a -0.655 decrease in perceived stability, indicating that villages with USAID stabilization assistance witnessed a net decrease in perceived stability, compared with control villages, when comparing the values across the two MISTI survey waves. In spite of the overall results, two of nine stability indicators measured suggest a possible positive effect for USAID assistance.		NA E	ffective	Effective	Effective
MSI_2014_3 Evaluation Survey Analytical Report, Wave 2: May 18 - Aug 7, 2013	Program Evaluation ACAI	AP II Humanitarian Nov 2013-Jan	Nationwide survey Impact Evaluation	n Quantitative Effectiveness	Multi-stage RCT	Institutionalized governance: ability of government USAID		These are, "increased confidence in local government" and "improved GIROA-delivery of basic services." It is notable that of the stability measures, it is these two which are most directly associated with the objectives of USAID's stabilization programming. Although the presence of Armed Opposition Groups, another indicator, may have a significant impact on the perception of loca stability, it is clearly not something USAID has control over or can directly influence. Small sample size used in this initial impact evaluation. Due to the nascent stage of programming by the four SIKA projects at the time of the Wave 2 survey, MISTI was able to identify a relatively small number of 219 project activities in 76 treated villages to include in the impact analysis; approximately eighty-five percent of which were drawn from the CCI project areas. MISTI is unable as a result of the Wave 2 survey to break the results down by stabilization project. As a result of the small sample, treatments included in the Wave 2 survey may be unrepresentative of the broader array of (planned) project activities, as well as the impact they may have when they fully materialize. Another caveat is that the effects of stabilization project activities might develop Dynamic systems approach to analyzing stability and instability. Requires accurate diagnosis of conflict drivers and how drivers	l de ole ct	NA E	ffective	Effective	Effective
MISTI Stabilization Trends and Impact Evaluation Survey Analytical Report, Wave 3: Nov 16, 2013 - Jan 30, 2014	KFZ SIKA Program Evaluation	A Community development Economic development Stabilization	of Afghan citizens (18+) in 107 preselected districts throughout 21 provinces in Afghanistan.	Review Case Study		institutions to withstand shocks, ability of local councils to make binding decisions, length of tenure of government officials and community leaders Community resilience: ability of local economies and governance institutions to return to normal functioning after a shock created by a violent incident, natural calamity, or other outside factors Security redundancy: presence and effectiveness of overlapping government and community security providers, degradation of the insurgency, and civilian freedom of movement Popular confidence: public perceptions of security, local leadership and government, quality of life and expectations about future improvements		affect system dynamics. Aggregation generally dilutes or obscures local context, disguises or deletes outlier data and frames underlying microenvironments out of the analysis. Common for important information about highly unstable districts to be ignored in averaged stability scoresparticularly acute in Afghanistan, which is best understood as a highly localized mosaic of micro-environments; pressure to provide summary analysis of overarching stability impacts across all levels (village to national) increases susceptibility to aggregation bias. Tension between the requirement to demonstrate quick impacts and the desire for analytically rigorous measurement approaches (require time-intensive design process in advance of the initiative being evaluated). If speed is the priority, a project's end state risks being reduced to the completion of the project itself, rather than a demonstrable effect.					
ACAP II End-Line Report: Examining MSI Jul 2014 ACAP II's PMP Indicators	Program Evaluation	AP II Economic Mar 2013-Dec stabilization 2013 A-North Development Mar 2014-May	Faryab, Ghazni, Helmand, Herat, Kabul, Kandahar, Kapisa, Khost, Kunar, Laghman,	Review Case Study	Quantitative: D3/ACSOR four-wave survey [n=3,045] of randoml selected IA beneficiaries [n=1,314], TA beneficiaries [n=734], an non-beneficiaries [n=1,007] Qualitative: Interviews with SIKA-North staff, programming and	ly Effects of violent incidents mitigated USAID nd		TA associated with higher levels of beneficiary satisfaction across all indicators compared with IA recipients. Satisfaction with ACAP II effectiveness strongly affected by nature of violent incident experienced. Perceptions of unfairness in aid delivery negatively affect satisfaction (with regional variation). Reducing geographic exposure to provinces demonstrating most positive impact recommended. Lack of transparency in eligibility criteria likely contributes to perceptions of unfairness. Privileging responses to certain classes of violent events may increase effectiveness. Activities appear to be having a measurable long term stabilizing impact, based on relatively positive MISTI stability index score	(See separate discussion of this study) s (See separate discussion of this study)	NA P	otentially effective	Potentially effective Potentially effective	Potentially effective Potentially effective
SIKA-North Mid- MSI_2014_5 Term Performance MSI Aug 2014 Evaluation	Program Evaluation	Governance and 2014 democracy Training and mentoring		Review Case Study	project beneficiaries, USAID staff, and other stakeholders MISTI Stability Survey data used to characterize districts in term of overall stability and perceptions of local security	Extending the reach and legitimacy of the Afghan Government Building trust between citizens and local governments Build confidence in local government Increase provision of basic services	Accord CIVA 5 - 1 - 1 1	and relatively positive confidence in local government (Sep 2012-Jan 2014). PMP indicators are limited to measuring inputs and outputs and should be revised to include outcome indicators. Theory of change should be broken down into two separate but measurable theories (one focused on development/MRRD and the other on governance/IDLG). Gender programming practically non-existent. Certain activities have questionable relevance to security. ("Poetry reading competitions may not have been the most prudent use of USAID funds.") Use of in kind grants violates Kandahar Model and prevents SIKA from aligning with the Afghan government, as is contractually		Some useful finally	sufficient with		
SIKA-South Mid- MSI_2014_6 Term Performance MSI Oct 2014 Evaluation	SIKA Program Evaluation	A-South Development May 2014-Aug Governance and 2014 democracy Training and mentoring	g Helmand, Impact Evaluation Kandahar, Nimroz, Uruzgan, Zabul	n Quantitative Effectiveness Review Case Study	Qualitative: Interviews with SIKA-South staff, programming and project beneficiaries, USAID staff, and other stakeholders MISTI Stability Survey data used to support some findings	Improved security Extending the reach and legitimacy of the Afghan Government Building trust between citizens and local governments Sustainable reduction of poverty	Assess SIKA-S at midterm	SIKA-South lacks adequate theory of change that delineates a clear causal pathway between activities and intended outcomes. PMP approved by USAID is a general overview of strategy that is neither adequate for a stabilization program nor tied to measurable outcome indicators. Overreliance on MISTI survey results for outcomes measurement; SIKA-South has not done any outcomes measurement of specific programming. Need to adhere to a "governance process approach" resulted in delays in project approval process; this had the effect of disappointing community expectations and undermining communities' perceptions of local government. Too few projects were completed during period of performance for MISTI to assess impact.	Few projects and lack of regular process and output (as opposed to MISTI provided outcome) monitoring highlights the importance of a robust M&E process. A useful report in highlighting factors that can inhibit success in difficult operating environments but generalizability is questionable	Some useful findings or recommendations (implementation and oversight)	nsufficient evidence	Potentially effective	Potentially effective
MISTI Stabilization Trends and Impact Evaluation Survey Analytical Report, Wave 4: Apr 28 - Jun 30, 2014	ACAI CCI SIKA Program Evaluation	AP II Humanitarian Apr-Jun 2014 assistance A Community development Stabilization	Nationwide survey Impact Evaluation of Afghan citizens (18+) in 107 preselected districts throughout 21 provinces in Afghanistan.	n Quantitative Effectiveness Review Case Study	Multi-stage RCT	Perceptions of governance Service provision by district government Security Rule of law Support for GIROA Support for AGE		A small, statistically insignificant, but still negative change on the Social Capital sub-index (ability to work together to solve internal and external problems) after six months became a significant negative impact after one year. This negative impact on Social Capital is of similar magnitude to the positive impact on Stability. These negative findings may indicate that project interventions create new challenges that communities struggle to overcome using their existing capacities for local governance and problem solving. A negative change in District Government Satisfaction (perceived fairness, honesty, and understanding of local problems) was observed over the six-month impact measurement, but this finding was reversed in the one-year measurement. While neither effect was large enough to be considered statistically significant, the reversal from a negative to a positive effect is nevertheles worth noting because it suggests that stabilization interventions are helping build the legitimacy of local government officials. Gains in formal government capacity stand in contrast to negative findings on Local Governance and Social Capital over the one year timeframe. This suggests that the effort to build synergy between local informal governance institutions and formal government institutions should remain a key priority for sub-national governance and stability programming. Analysis also reveals how a small and statistically insignificant gain in Quality of Life after six months became a positive impact after one year. This finding suggests that stabilization activities have effects that mature over time into durable improvements i rural life. These results on Government Capacity and Quality of Life sustained positive impacts on Stability, despite the worseni of Local Governance indicators after six months. Wave 4 findings suggest that stabilization programming improves the public's perceptions of government service delivery. Afghans who report being aware of a development project in their community, regardle	s on on	NA E	ffective	Effective	Effective

	Δι	CAP II Humanitarian Sep 2011-Sep Ghazni	, Helmand, Impact Evaluation	Quantitative Effectiveness	Qualitative: FGs and depth interviews with randomly selected	Improved local governance USAID	Final review of ACAP program	Overall, ACAP II accomplished stated goals and objectives.	Provides additional details on ACAP but claims that it met its goals seem to be	NΔ	sufficient evidence	otentially effective	Potentially effective
ACAP II Final	Program	relief 2014 Herat, Khost,	Kandahar,	Review Case Study	program beneficiaries	Capacity building Small business creation Community grievances resulting from civilian casualties	Tillul Teview of ACAT program	Tailored Assistance (TA) was most effective. Coordination with the Afghan government, particularly MoLSAMD improved incident verification, beneficiary selection and IA distributions.	overstated relative to evidence provided in the overall MISTI review	The state of the s	Sufficient evidence	occidatily effective	rotentially effective
MSI_2015_1 Performance MSI Feb 2015 Evaluation	Evaluation	Nangar				addressed		Coordination with other organizations (AIHRC, EA, GAALO) contributed to effectiveness. ACAP II's contract does not include government capacity building; thus the program was disallowed from training. assisting and mentoring local government officials thereby minimizing long-term impact on governance.					
	KF	FZ Economic Dec 2014-Feb Kandał development 2015	nar Impact Evaluation	Quantitative Effectiveness Review Case	Qualitative: Interviews with KFZ staff, programming and project beneficiaries, USAID staff, and other stakeholders	Reduced poppy cultivation USAID Increased effectiveness and legitimacy of national and sub-		Contractually limited in scope and not obligated to implement transition to more sustainable long-term assistance/stabilization KFZ has performed well, but significantly hindered by factors outside the program's control. Scope, timeframe, and funding do not reflect realities on the ground.	Discussion of issues related to impacted.	some useful findings or recommendations (program design)	nsufficient evidence F	otentially effective	Potentially effective
		20100p.mont 2020		Study		national administrations		Inadequate Afghan government political will to conduct counter-narcotics/eradication. Alternative livelihood programs need to be multi-year and multi-agency efforts. KFZ was tasked with building capacity of MCN's Alternative Livelihoods Directorate, which has no programming component.		recommendations (program eco.g.r)			
Kandahar Food Zone Mid-Term	Program							Lack of strategic communications component. Unable to conduct meaningful mitigation activities due to limited budget.					
MSI_2015_2	Program Evaluation												
	AC	CAP II Humanitarian Sep-Nov 2014 Nation	wide survey Impact Evaluation	Quantitative Effectiveness	Multi-stage RCT	Perceptions of governance USAID		The first four Waves of the survey data, as captured by the impact evaluation, showed many positive impacts from stability	(See separate discussion of this study)	NA E	ffective E	ffective	Effective
	KF	FZ assistance of Afgh KA Community (18+) in	nan citizens n 107 pre- ed districts	Review Case Study		Service provision by district government Security Rule of law		programming. Although these positive impacts showed some erosion in Wave 5, in the villages where both USAID programming and NSP took place, the positive impact was maintained during Wave 5. In addition, the endorsement experiment research showed that support for the GIRoA was stronger than support for the Talibar					
MISTI Stabilization Trends and Impact Evaluation Survey MSI_2015_3 MSI Nov 2015	Program	Economic throug development province Stabilization Afghan	ces in			Support for GIRoA Support for AGE		across all five survey Waves. The research also showed that stabilization programming reduced support for the Taliban through the spring of 2014. Within this broader context of positive impact from stability programming, Wave 5 found an unexpected increase in support for					
Analytical Report, Wave 5: Sep 28 - Nov 3, 2014	EVALUATION							the Taliban for the single period of spring to autumn of 2014. However, this finding was mainly the result of a large average increase in support for the Taliban in a group of only five villages. Survey data collectors reported that these five villages were under Taliban control at the time of the Wave 4 Survey. These five villages then received project activities before Wave 5					
								interviews were conducted. These five villages were not representative of the large majority of villages where stabilization programming took place between 2012 and 2014. · We do not know for certain what other external factors may have influenced the observed increase in support for the Taliban i					
A Pathway to	NS	governance Rural	wide Impact Evaluation	Qualitative Effectiveness Review Case Study	Qualitative policy review and recommendations	Buttressing Afghan government legitimacy N Strengthening local-level institutions	Discuss the success of NSP	The NSP has become one of the government's most successful rural development projects.4 Under the program, the Afghan Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development (MRRD) disburses modest grants to village-level elected organizations called Community Development Councils (CDCs), which in turn identify local priorities and implement small-scale development	directly.	Limited value for current planning or Ir insufficient practical application	isufficient evidence I	nsufficient evidence	Insufficient evidence
Nagl, Exum, Success in Nagl, Exum, Humayun_2009 National Solidarity Humayun	Policy/Think tank	development						projects. A limited number of domestic and international non-governmental organizations (NGOs) then assist the CDCs. Once a CDC agrees on a venture, \$200 per family (with a ceiling of \$60,000 per village) is distributed for project execution. Afghans contribute 10 percent of project costs through cash, labor, or other means.					
Program 		2 Humanitarian 1060 2009 229 co	narata civil Impact Evaluation	Quantitative Effectiveness	Panel analysis of data on humanitarian aid administered cross-	Correction of civil conflict	Access aid in Afghanistan and the relationship to	Buttressing the Afghan government's legitimacy — and the governance and development efforts that underpin it — is the fundamental coalition objective in Afghanistan today. The United States and its allies face a long and difficult road in Afghanistan. But by building relationships between Kabul and far-flung communities, the NSP is easing the journey ahead.	Little effort to disentangle the selection effect of higher levels of aid into more	NA D	otentially effective E	ffective	Potentially effective
	114		nce 1945	Review Case Study Panel Analysis	nationally from 1969-2008 using Cox proportional hazards mode to estimate the effects of humanitarian aid, controlling for level of	Alleviation of suffering during and in the aftermath of	civil intrastate conflict	outskirts of a state. Most scholarship on the effect of humanitarian aid on conflict underspecifies causal mechanisms and takes place largely through case studies. This study uses a bargaining framework to argue that aid can inadvertently increase each	Little effort to disentangle the selection effect of higher levels of aid into more complex and protracted conflicts. Also, limited discussion of how to conceive of counterfactor of no (or more) aid (depending on the case). Limited external collidity.	NA P	otentially effective	nective	Potentially effective
				Patiet Attalysis	casualties, geographic conditions, per-capita GDP, regime type, presence of international guarantees, and presence of "lootable' resources. Data used to define the population of civil wars taken from the Armed Conflict Database (ACD). Estimates of			combatant's uncertainty about the other side's relative strength, thereby prolonging civil war. Dynamic bargaining models of conflict treat war as a costly learning process in which opponents fight in order to reduce uncertainty in a less-manipulable forum than the bargaining table. It follows that the less costly war becomes, the longer crises will be marked by uncertainty.	validity				
Aiding Uncertainty: How Humanitarian					humanitarian aid disbursed in each conflict year based on OECD data on Official Development Assistance (ODA).			Humanitarian assistance is explicitly designed to mitigate the costs of war. This suggests that greater levels of humanitarian aid may cause conflicts to last longer. Empirical support: quantitative analyses of civil wars since 1945 indicate increasing humanitarian aid is negatively correlated					
Narang_2015 Aid can Narang 2015 Inadvertently Prolong Civil War	Academic							with the likelihood of the civil war ending. The effect is mitigated by uncertainty over the advantage gained from relief. If sides can directly observe how aid mitigates cost of fighting, they factor this into settlement offers over time and reach an agreement as quickly as if no aid were provided.					
								General tendency for humanitarian aid to prolong war will be more acute under conditions in which the provision of aid is itself uncertain, e.g. humanitarian aid may be especially prone to prolonging war in conflicts with weak central governments [like Afghanistan] that lack capacity to observe where insurgents operate.					
								The tendency for aid to prolong conflict is far from an absolute empirical law and the broader policy implications of these findings are not straightforward. Given the short-term consequences of not providing aid are often more predictable (and disastrous) than its future influence on conflict duration, the imperative to					
	na	a na Nov 2011-Jan Kabul, 2012	Faryab Performance/Proces Evaluation	s Qualitative Effectiveness Review Case Lessons Learned	The data collection methods combined document analysis and interviews in Oslo with field work in Kabul and Faryab. A	na N	Evaluate norwegian development/stabilization programs	immediately reduce suffering may take precedence. Also, determining whether the provision of aid is on balance a net negative Norway's policy and interventions match closely with the international agenda for Afghanistan and within that framework its development agenda is certainly relevant. Norway has managed to navigate a position, which reflects its policy to clearly	Study largely summarizes reasons why Norway's impact was limited due to a variety of external factors. Limited applicability to US or larger donor programs	NA Ir	nsufficient evidence	nsufficient evidence	Insufficient evidence
				Study	preparatory phase in October 2011 was used to refine the key evaluation questions and to meet stakeholders including the Embassy in Kabul to discuss expectations and limitations. The			separate military strategy on the one hand and humanitarian and development strategy on the other hand. The focus on governance, gender equality, education and community development has been consistent over the years, just as consistent as the choice of channels and partners. However, it is the question whether this consistency is laudable in itself. Alignment with					
Evaluation of					main phase took place between November 2011 and January 2012, during which field visits were carried out and a first draft report was submitted.			Afghan priorities has always been high on the Norwegian agenda and has been realized to the extent possible. However, Afghan priorities are still to a large extent defined by the international community. Limited participation of Afghans undermines genuing local ownership. This is for example the case for gender equality. Through its support to UNIFEM/ UN Women Norway has contributed to national policies related to women such as the National Action Plan for Women in Afghanistan, However, there	e e				
Norwegian Norad_2012 Cooperation with Evaluation Dept Norad_2012	Government Documents							contributed to national policies related to women such as the National Action Plan for Women in Afghanistan. However, there are clear indications that Afghan ownership of this Action Plan is still limited. However, there is still limited evidence of concrete outcomes. Exceptions are improved access to services (such as midwifery) and enhanced pedagogy skill of teachers. But the overall quality of newly constructed schools is poor, literacy remains low and					
Afghanistan 2001- 2011								school dropout rates are high, governance remains poor and gender equality is still far from reality. Some explanatory factors that affect effectiveness are a rigid separation of civ-mil leading to an ethnically skewed distribution of beneficiaries and thereby possible implications for the conflict; insufficient integration of conflict analysis in operationalization of plans; limited results-					
								based management, responses to risk mainly at an ad-hoc basis at the level of individual projects, rather than at the level of the Faryab portfolio. Sustainable peace, after various years of deteriorating security, remains elusive. The necessary political solutio is unlikely to be realized in the foreseeable future. Main features are:					
								Governance is still poor and no signs of real improvement are visible. Poverty has been reduced for some people, but has deteriorated for others especially in the face of deteriorating security across the whole country.	s				
	na	Monitoring and January 2013- Nation evaluation March 2015	wide Audit	Meta-Analysis Lessons Learned	Audit	na USAID	Audit of M&E for USAID Afghanistan programs	The drawdown in U.S. forces, however, has created significant challenges for the Agency. The United States reduced the numbe of troops from roughly 100,000 in 2011 to around 10,000 in 2015. As a result, USAID lost access to regional facilities, from which the staff directly observe activities in the field. In addition, the number of Agency employees was scheduled to drop from 387 in	insight into the impact of individual or collective programs	useful findings or recommendations (M&E)	otentially effective F	otentially effective	Insufficient evidence
								2012 to about 110 by the end of 2015. These reductions, in conjunction with ongoing fighting with the Taliban, have restricted the ability of USAID officials to travel to project sites and made monitoring the Agency's work in Afghanistan extremely difficult. Despite USAID's intent, monitoring data were not in Afghan Info because the system did not have a place to enter it. Instead, the	e				
Audit of								system was limited to storing documents, such as quarterly performance reports and agreements, added by mission and partne officials. Out of 127 awards—contracts, grants, and cooperative agreements—for project activities as of September 2014, the mission and partner to those bour part and provide information to those bour part and agreements.	er i				
Audit of USAID/Afghanistan' s Strategy for Monitoring and	Government							could provide information to show how only 1 used MTM as described. Recommend that USAID/Afghanistan: 1. Implement written standards for what constitutes effective, sufficient oversight, including the amount of monitoring deemed necessary for an activity to continue, the relative contributions of the five tiers, and potential events that warrant a decision on	1				
OIG_2015 Evaluating OIG Dec 2015 Programs Throughout	Documents							the status of the activity. 2. Implement written procedures for having mission managers decide whether to continue an activity if standards are not met o if such future events occur.					
Afghanistan								3. Prepare a written determination to add a module to capture and analyze monitoring data in Afghan Info, or establish a different system to store centralized monitoring data for analysis and set a deadline for making any design changes.4. Implement procedures to periodically reconcile awards listed in Afghan Info with records held by the Office of Acquisition and	d d				
								Assistance, the Office of Program and Project Development, and technical offices, including those based in Washington D.C., and update Afghan Info as necessary. 5. Adopt a policy of reviewing Mission Order 203.02 or any subsequent order on monitoring at its quarterly monitoring review					
								meetings to make sure all staff are aware of the requirement to promptly verify and approve reports submitted in Afghan Info. 6. Implement a strategy to analyze project performance information and make recommendations to mission leaders in light of anticipated staffing reductions and travel restrictions. 7. Develop procedures to verify that annual monitoring plans required under Mission Order 203.02 or any subsequent order on					
	na	·	Kandahar, Impact Evaluation Nangarhar, and	Qualitative Effectiveness Review Case Lessons Learned Study	Dozens of individual interviews and focus groups conducted with partner nongovernmental organizations in late 2009 and 2010. Over 250 Afghans participated in focus groups or individual	na N		Failure to understand the impact of Afghan narratives of the conflict has contributed to ill-informed policymaking, leading to Western policies that are either not as effective as they could be, or worse, inadvertently exacerbating existing problems. So lon as these perceptions continue to be ignored, Western policies on issues ranging from reconciliation, to rehabilitation and	largely focuses on mistaken assumptions from the "western" perspective. Likely	NA Ir	nsufficient evidence F	otentially effective	Insufficient evidence
		Warda	k		interviews across Kabul and in six provinces: Herat, Kandahar, Khost, Nangarhar, Paktia, and Wardak. Participants were primari male, although women from Kabul, Kandahar, Khost, Nangarhar,	ly		reintegration, to civilian protection, to Afghan government mentorship will operate based on fundamentally mistaken assumptions about how Afghan actors will react to these initiatives. Sustainable conflict resolution must be brokered from a base of trust, something the international military and policy communit					
The Trust Deficit: The Impact of Local Open Society	Policy/Think				Paktia, and Herat were also interviewed.			currently do not have given the record of the last nine years. The analysis in this policy brief suggests many local Afghans see the international community, particularly the international military, as an entity that they are forced to interact with rather than engage with as a trusted partner. This does not engender productive or sustainable resolution of differences, but simply a	e				
OSF_2010 Perceptions on Foundations Policy in Afghanistan	tank							jockeying for position among groups prioritizing immediate survival followed by short- to medium-term power grabs. While statistics show that insurgents are responsible for most civilian casualties, many we interviewed accused international forces of directly stoking the conflict and causing as many, if not more, civilian casualties than the insurgents. Many were even suspicious that international forces were directly or indirectly supporting insurgents. These suspicions, in turn, have fed into broader shifts					
								toward framing international forces as occupiers, rather than as a benefit to Afghanistan. Today, each incident of abuse, whether caused by international forces or insurgents, reinforces these negative perceptions and further undermines any remaining Afghan trust.					
								By dismissing Afghan perceptions of the international community as propaganda or conspiracy theories alone, policymakers hav often failed to understand how much these negative perceptions may be distorting their policies and efforts. The international community needs the trust and cooperation of Afghan communities for many of its most crucial policies to succeed, including					
	na	a na na na	Methods Review	Methods Review Guidelines	Peer review of MISTI, examination of methodology and tools developed by MISTI. Analyzed MISTI reports, surveyed relevant academic research and conducted interviews with relevant USAI	meaningful for an impact evaluation like the one conducted D by MISTI. USAID programs being evaluated by MISTI are not	External review of MISTI methodology	MISTI evaluation is well-designed to measure direct effects of USAID programming, but it is less clear whether it is able to provide credible estimates of the impact on perceptions of stability. It lacks a theory of change for each stabilization program to explain how these programs would influence perceptions of stability. The tools to measure perceptions of stability (the stability		NA n	a r	a	na
					program officers, MSI Survey Specialists and MISTI researchers.	MISTI research team coordinate with ISAF and Department of Defense to assess the relationship between their		index and endorsement experiment) are viewed as unlikely to accurately measure either stability or relative support for the Taliban. The stability index is poorly defined, combining elements that do not form a clear construct for defining stability. There are problems in data collection regarding measuring support for the Taliban, wording appears variable and could elicit different responses depending on location and moment in time. Other confounding variables include the education level of participants.					
Peer Review of the MISTI Survey and Evaluation RAND Sep 2014	Program Evaluation					measure of stability and other measures.		responses depending on location and moment in time. Other confounding variables include the education level of participants and length of survey. There are potential difficulties in identifying which villages in the MISTI household survey received USAID programming; this leads to misclassification of treatment and control status. Implementing partners were not prepared to support an impact evaluation. Errors included geospatial data that did not match other pieces of data for a village, locational					
Methodology								support an impact evaluation. Errors included geospatial data that did not match other pieces of data for a village, locational data that did not match the type of project being implemented in a village that some projects which impacted more than one village only listed a single location, and that location information did not always refer to a populated area. Potential issues in the 'quasi-experimental' methods used no evidence to show how matching approaches for villages successfully identify appropriate					
								'quasi-experimental' methods used, no evidence to show how matching approaches for villages successfully identify appropriate control groups. MISTI does not account for the impact of all past programming on the relative effectiveness of current efforts. External validity: Unsure whether the treatment and control villages are representative of the overall populations of interest. Additionally, unsure whether the programming studied is representative of what is and what will be carried out.					
	na	a na na na	Methods Review	Qualitative Guidelines Review Case	Desk review of M&E best practice in stabilization interventions 22 semi-structured interviews with individuals from the United	violent		ze Four main challenges in applying conventional M&E frameworks in stabilization interventions: (1) stabilization interventions tend to unfold, with a wide range of often concurrent activities that have different underlying	Very useful layout of key theories of the case: Individual change theory: stabilization comes through the transformative change of knowledge, attitude, behaviors and skills from a critical mass.	useful findings or recommendations (implementation and oversight)	a r	a	na
				Study	Kingdom, the United States, Australia, the United Nations, the European Union and the World Bank	Improved perceptions of government and corruption Sustained and consistent movement towards non-violent conflict resolution		logics; (2) the different time horizons and pressures for measuring progress that apply to the actors and activities in a given stabilizatio intervention; (3) the limited capacities (e.g. organizational culture and technical skills) of actors involved in stabilization for undertaking M&E	down isolation/polarization/bias between among groups.				
van Stolk, Ling,								 (3) the limited capacities (e.g. organizational culture and technical skills) of actors involved in stabilization for undertaking M&E activities, owing to time pressure and the lack of training in M&E (4) the complexity of the environment in which stabilization takes place: what you are trying to measure is often intangible, which has an impact on M&E processes such as data collection and the interpretation of data. For instance, the assessment of 	disrupted, the war-making system will collapse. Reduction of violence theory: stabilization results from a reduction in the level of				
Monitoring and Reding, Bassford RAND Evaluation in (RAND Europe Europe_2011 Stabilisation for UK	Policy/Think tank							whether progress has been made and whether objectives have been achieved has to be clearly informed by the perceptions and	Root causes/justice theory: stabilization can be achieved by addressing the				
Interventions Stabilisation Unit)								additional corroboration from other sources of information.	institutions that guarantee democracy Political elites theory: stabilization comes about when it is in the interest of political (and other) leaders to take the necessary steps.				
									Economic theory: . Stabilization is achieved by changing the economic gains/losses associated with war. Public attitudes theory: war and violence are partly motivated by prejudice,				
									misperceptions and intolerance of difference. Stabilisation is achieved by changing public attitudes to build greater tolerance in society.				
	US	ggregated Various 2007-2011 Nation SAID spending	wide Impact Evaluation	Quantitative Effectiveness Review Case	Panel analysis of district-level data on aid, economic developmer public opinion and violence.	Improved perception of central government's performance	economic welfare, political attitudes,	Development and security objectives were in direct tension from a targeting perspective, and we show that aid donors overwhelmingly prioritized wealthier, violence-prone districts over poorer, more peaceful districts.		NA			
	lev	the district vel by year and ector		Study Panel Analysis		Decreased sympathy for armed opposition groups Improved household welfare (income and assets)	and violence in a panel of Afghan districts from 2007 to 2011.	Comparing changes over time, regressions suggest a large impact of aid on development outcomes, a small positive impact on support for both the Kabul government and insurgents, and no effect on violence. these results may be biased toward finding positive effects as aid was frequently allocated to areas with good development prospects, e.g., as part of a "clear, hold, and build" strategy.					
Sandefur, Development Aid & Sandefur, Dykstra, Counterinsurgency Cenny_2014 in Afghanistan Dykstra, Kenny	Academic Literature							Instrumental variables estimates show mixed results for development outcomes, and little or no impact on political opinions or civilian casualties. Results suggest that aid increased asset accumulation, but there is no sign in a district-level fixed effects regression that asset					
								accumulation itself is significantly associated with any shift in public opinion away from the insurgency, much less any decrease in violence. Interestingly, fluctuations over time in public opinion (for or against the Kabul government and the insurgency) are significantly associated with fluctuations in violence against both NATO troops and civilians.					
		FRP Humanitarian May 2000 D	wide Impact Evaluation	Quantitative Effectiveness	Quantitative analysis of a dataset of fine-grained and geo-located	1 Conflict reduction	Assess effectiveness of development () ! "	Find statistically significant effects of aid on both economic and violence outcomes, but the overall context from which data is taken is one of a massive scale-up in international development assistance on an almost unprecedented scale, combined with a strong secular rise in violence and very limited improvements in public perceptions of the central government, placing bounds or impact of military-led aid is highly dependent on levels of government control and insurgent presence in the districts where aid	on	NA	ffective E	ffective	Potentially effective
Aid as a Tool	CE	ERP Humanitarian May 2008-Dec Nation aid 2010	ac impact Evaluation	Quantitative Effectiveness Review Case Study	Quantitative analysis of a dataset of fine-grained and geo-located violence incidents across Afghanistan and the administration of CERP spend data at the district-weeks level.	. coc. caacton N	Assess effectiveness of development/stabilization assistance as a counterinsurgency tool	on Impact of military-led aid is highly dependent on levels of government control and insurgent presence in the districts where aid administered. Previous studies typically ignore the strategic implications of aid distribution by pro-government forces, namely that rebel groups should resist the implementation of aid projects that would undermine their position. Insurgents strategically respond to counter-insurgency aid in contested districts by resisting through both violent and non-violent means. Results	But findings appear consistent with other CERP studies. Generalizability remains	E			Potentially effective
Against Insurgency: Evidence from Sexton_2015 Contested and Sexton Nov 2015	Academic Literature							indicate that civilian aid only reduces insurgent violence when distributed in districts already controlled by pro-government forces; when allocated to contested districts civilian aid in fact causes a significant increase in insurgent violence. Results also indicate that the effect of counterinsurgency aid on violence varies by project type, and can be overwhelmed by macro-level					
Controlled Territory in Afghanistan								strategic changes in the conflict. Type of counter-insurgency aid project matters to the strategic interaction that occurs between insurgents and pro-government forces. Projects that boost the fighting and defense capacity of the government and progovernment forces are heavily and swiftly targeted by insurgents. Humanitarian projects that are less visible in the short term	n				
Evaluating U.S.		SP, Basic Community- 2009-2011 Nation	· ·	Effectiveness .	Desk research and site visits	Improved security, enhanced legitimacy and reach of MIL	Background document	and do not raise the fighting capacity of the government do not result in any changes in violence. Finally, projects that aim to raise the governance capacity of the government result in national targets being attacked by insurgents, rather than internation US stabilization strategy assumes short-term aid promotes stability in COIN operations and wins "hearts and minds" by	prepared as a background document for staff and highlights the risks of spending	NA Ir	nsufficient evidence	nsufficient evidence	Insufficient evidence
Foreign Assistance to Afghanistan: A Majority Staff	He Pe	ackage of driven ealth Services, development, erformance- health care, sub-	Reporting	Lessons Learned		central government, reduced support for Taliban.		improving security, enhancing legitimacy and reach of central government and drawing support away from Taliban. Assumes international community and Afghan government have shared development, governance, etc. objectiveswhich may not be correct. The evidence that stabilization programs promote stability in Afghanistan is limited. Some research suggests the	large sums of money. Not intended to be a formal assessment and lacks evidence or method to support explicit analysis.				
SFRC_2011 Report Prepared SFRC Majority Jun 2011 for the Use of the Staff Committee on Foreign Relations	Government Ba Documents Fu	ased Governors national und governance						opposite, and development best practices question the efficacy of using aid as a stabilization tool over the long run. The unintended consequences of pumping large amounts of money into a war zone cannot be underestimated. Aid assumptions do not account for the fact that the root causes of insecurity differ by province and district. US stabilization efforts have raised expectations and changed incentive structures					
United States Senate													

Commander's CERP Humanitarian July-December Laghman Audit Qualitative Effectiveness Emergency assistance 2010 Review Case Lessons Learn Study in Laghman Province Provided Some Benefits, but SIGAR_2011_1 Oversight SIGAR Jan 2011 Government Weakness and Sustainment Concerns Led to Questionable Outcomes and	Evaluation of 69 CERP projects in Laghman Province approved in fiscal years 2008-2010 and committed for \$50,000 or greater. Analysis of contract and disbursement data File reviews for all 69 projects and site visits for 36. Increased security Increased government accountability Greater protection for civilians	To assess to what extent (1) expended costs were In Laghman Province CERP project costs and outcomes were mixed. About \$2 mill was obligated and 19 projects had generally allowable, allocable, and reasonable; (2) successful outcomes. However, about \$49.2 million was obligated for 27 projects that are at risk or have resulted in questionable evaluation systems have been implemented; and approved without adequate assurance that GIROA had the resources needed to operate and maintain them. (3) progress has been made toward program outcomes CERP oversight not in compliance with applicable requirements (lacked legal reviews and sufficient documentation to substantiate payments) raising risk of questionable outcomes or potential waste. CERP oversight official's turnover frequently and lack training for implementing large-scale projects. Better oversight and assurances that GIROA can sustain projects are essential. Coordinated, results-oriented approach for evaluating the effectiveness of CERP projects must include goals that are objective, quantifiable, and measurable.	
Potential Waste Review Case Review Case Review Case Lessons Learn	Analysis of funding data and documentation Improved local governance N Interviews with key stakeholers at World Bank, MRRD, NSP, implementing partners and other donors File review of 62 randomly selected NSP projects	While NSP has reported meeting or exceeding most of its quantitative targets (outputs), it lacks data and reporting on one of its primary objectives (outcomes)—improving local governance. Without regularly measuring improvements in this area, it is difficult to determine the extent to which NSP has succeeded. Implementation of NSP has been enhanced by experience local facilitating partners: ability to "buy" ready implementation capacity for organizations with established community linkages; provides continuous presence; provides access to insecure areas. Future role of Community Development Councils (CDCs) as official local governance bodies remains uncertain. Key challenges include: delayed receipt of block grants; late payments to implementing partners; expansion to insecure areas in Afghanistan Expansion into less secure areas increases the level of risk and potentially limits or dilutes ability to achieve intended outcomes.	ling or Insufficient evidence Insufficient evidence Insufficient evidence n
LGCD Governance March 2006 Nationwide Audit Qualitative Effectiveness Community March 2011 Review Case Lessons Learn development Study USAID Spent Almost \$400 Million on an Afghan Stabilization SIGAR_2012_1 Project despite SIGAR Apr 2012 Government Uncertain Results, but Has Taken Steps to Better Assess Similar Efforts	To examine cost and outcomes of the LGCD project, interviewed officials from USAID headquarters in Washington, D.C.; USAID/Afghanistan in Kabul, Afghanistan; and the two construction contractors, ARD and DAI; reviewed the task order documentation for the period October 2006 through August 20 To further assess whether LGCD was achieving its principal objective of improving stability, assessed reporting by a variety of governmental and non-governmental organizations, including the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, U.S. Government Accountability Office, the U.S. Army National Ground Intelligence Center, and a series of studies undertaken by Tufts University Feinstein International Center. To examine oversight, reviewed USAID policies and procedures detailing oversight responsibilities and its Federal Managers Financial Integrity Act reporting; examined USAID contract files; and analyzed USAID/Afghanistan supplied examples that typified activity manager monitoring reports and interviewed the contractors.	To assest to what extent (1) expended costs were LGCD's implementation raises important questions about USAID's significant investment in stabilization efforts in Afghanistan. allowable, allocable, and reasonable; (2) performance oversight, monitoring, and evaluation systems have been implemented; and (3) progress has been made toward program outcomes Some detailed information based on DAI regression analysis which found that improved health, increased work opportunities, rises in monthly income, and land program design) ownership were all unrelated to stability. The analysis concluded that while most of LGCD to focused on short-term cash-for-work projects, long-term employment assure that contractor costs are appropriate is typically limited by the size and geographic scope of the program, coupled with logistical and security challenges that limit travel. Given this risk, the absence of a requirement in the LGCD task orders for contractors to submit support for invoices is problematic. Unless USAID institutes stronger requirements, it will continue to hamper CORs' ability to conduct thorough oversight of ongoing and future contracts. Some detailed information based on DAI regression analysis which found that improved the lith, increased work opportunities, rises in monthly income, and land ownership were all unrelated to stability. The analysis concluded that while most of LGCD focused on short-term cash-for-work projects, long-term employment of the program and extend its life. In programs design) ownership were all unrelated to stability, and some affective in improving assure that contractors of the program and extend its life. In programs design) ownership were all unrelated to stability, The analysis concluded that while most of the program design) ownership were all unrelated to stability, The analysis concluded that while most of the program design ownership were all unrelated to stability, The analysis concluded that while most of the program design ownership were all unrelated to stability, The anal	Potentially effective Potentially effective Potentially effective
ASI-East Infrastructure June 2009-June Nangarhar, Kunar, Audit Qualitative Effectiveness Economic 2012 Wardak, Paktika Review Case Lessons Learn development Study Progress Made Toward Increased Stability under USAID'S Afghanistan SIGAR_2012_2 Initiative—Est SIGAR Jun 2012 Government Frogram but Transition to Long Term Development Efforts Not Yet Achieved	To determine if incurred project costs were allowable, allocable, and reasonable, examined invoices, evaluated timekeeping and billing policies and procedures related to internal controls. To determine whether performance oversight, monitoring and evaluation systems had been implemented, examined the task order to determine the reporting requirements; interviewed USAID officials in Kabul, Afghanistan and the contracting officer in Washington, DC to determine the reports that were being sent and received and compared them to the reporting requirements; interviewed the contracting officer and COTR in Washington, DC to determine how they provide oversight to the program. Improved allegiance and confidence between local communities and the GIRoA in target regions and districts. The intended outcome is to achieve immediate employment generation, improve the community's infrastructure, and increase access to public services with the overall goal of improving community and government capacity and public support for GIRoA.	To assess to what extent (1) expended costs were SIGAR found that although incurred costs under the ASI-East task order were generally allowable, allocable, and reasonable, allocable, and reasonable, (2) performance oversight, monitoring, and evaluation systems have been implemented; and evaluation systems have been implemented; and outcomes Obtain the program oversight, monitoring, and evaluation systems; however, final program results remain to be determined, and certain administrative issues relating to program oversight need to be addressed in the follow-on task order award. USAID's efforts to evaluate ASI-East's final program results will be extincted to assisting with short and long-term decisions regarding whether and how extensively the vectersively to we extensively thou extensively the vectersively to be addressed in the follow-on task order award. USAID's Stabilization in key Areas program. Program monitoring, and evaluation centered on the three-tier system called for by the DSF methodology. Preliminary results indicate that ASI-East Stability remains poor across ASI-East's 10 programming districts based on seven leading indicators of stability developed by DAI and its monitoring and evaluation subcontractor. Despite nearly 3 years of program efforts, none of ASI-East's larged districts have transitioned to the "build" phase of the COIN strategy, which is designed to solidify the gains during the "hold" phase of COIN operations. OTI has only recently drafted district-level diseagement criteria. An exit strategy for OTI programming in Afghanistan remains to be developed under the follow-on task order for ASI. These efforts will need to be integrating costs resulting from the application of the DSF methodology to ASI-East's implementation of the DSF, and (6) develop approved district-level diseagement criteria and a related exit strategy for OTI programming in Afghanistan regions the same program controlling from the application of the DSF and (6) developed by Originating and the program of the prop	Insufficient evidence Insufficient evidence Insufficient evidence
CCI Community March 2012- development December 2015 Performance/Process Review Case Evaluation of the Social USAID/OTI Social Impact Feb 2016 Program Impact_2016 Community Ochesion Initiative in Afghanistan CCI Community March 2012- development December 2015 Performance/Process Review Case Evaluation Study Final Performance Evaluation Study	135 interviews with local stakeholders in eleven CCI districts (33 female, 102 male) 19 interviews with current and former USAID and USAID/OTI officials 23 interviews with IP senior management from Creative, IOM, RSI, and USIP 57 interviews with IP staff from Creative, IOM, and RSI responsible for implementation in the districts 29 interviews with USIP grantees responsible for implementation in the districts 33 FGDs to collect data from project stakeholders. Three FGDs—one with male elder participants, one with female elder participants, and one with male youth participants—were conducted in each of the eleven districts where CCI implemented programming	recommendations. Based on USAID's comments, SIGAR revised recommendations four and five to also address the Stabilization CCI programming made important contributions to the popitical and security transitions in Afghanistan. During the 2012–2014 transition period, there was a significant risk of state collapse and civil war. CCI activities that linked rural villages to GIRoA successfully demonstrated the durability of government presence amid the uncertainty around whether GIRoA was capable of taking over security responsibility from international military forces. Amid threats of civil war during the crisis after the second round of voting in the 2014 presidential election, CCI's quick mobilization of international observers for the audit of the vote count was important for creating time and space for the two sides in the election dispute to reach a power-sharing agreement and avert state collapse by eventually establishing a new unity government. Changes to objectives and sub-objectives in 2013 and 2014 helped clarify the program's intent, but the program goal of increasing community resilience was not well understood by IP local staff and stakeholders. Interviews with IP local staff revealed weak understanding of the concepts of resilience and resiliency, mainly because these terms have no direct translation in local languages, and their English usage had multiple valences that complicated their explanation. CCI documents used the term resilience variously to describe influential individuals, the abilities of local people to cope with shocks arising from violence and economic exigencies and/or natural phenomena, linkages between communities and GIRoA, and resistance to the insurgency by local communities. The extent to which CCI could redefine its strategy for transition was constrained by the orientation of the program towards COIN, which was determined both by USG policy and the mindset of much of the implementation team. Despite changes in CCI's	Potentially effective Effective Effective
na na na na Historical Review Qualitative Effectiveness Review Case Lessons Learn Study Civilian-Military Cooperation in Achieving Aid Margaret Taylor Lessons from Recent Stabilization Contexts Name of Achieving Aid Historical Review Qualitative Effectiveness Review Case Lessons Learn Study Policy/Think tank	Qualitative review na N	Assess how the military provides aid in Stabilization context in Afghanistan Methanistan Metha	Insufficient evidence Insufficient evidence Insufficient evidence
na Provincial 2008-2010 Helmand Impact Evaluation Qualitative Effectiveness Reconstruction Review Case Lessons Learn Teams (PRT) UK, Study Stabilisation Case Study: UKAID_2010 Infrastructure in Helmand, Afghanistan Nov 2010 Documents Afghanistan	capabilities of the state, and providing tangible benefits to the population. Infrastructure delivery can help improve the relationship between the state and the people and act as a gateway for dialogue, but can undermine stabilization efforts if poorly delivered and can become a target for insurgents.	Lay out best practices for stabilization focused on Helmand Province where the British forces and DFID operated most heavily. DFID	
Law and Order Rule of law 2012-2013 Nationwide Impact Evaluation Qualitative Effectiveness Performance/Process Review Case Lessons Learn Afghanistan and LOTFA) disarmament Afghanistan Institution and Peace and capacity building Reconstruction Poverty Project (APRP) Project (APRP) Results: Afghanistan Facultisian Afghanistan Pocuments Afghanistan Project (NIBP) National Results: Afghanistan Facultion Office Facultion Office Rule of law 2012-2013 Nationwide Impact Evaluation Qualitative Effectiveness Performance/Process Review Case Lessons Learn and capacity building Reconstruction Project (LOTFA) disarmament Afghanistan Institution and capacity building Project (APRP) Project (APRP) Project (APRP) Project (APRP) Project (APRP) Reconstruction Powerty Project (NIBP) National Area-Based Development Programme (NABDP)	Data collection triangulated the results of multiple evaluation d techniques, including document reviews, group and individual interviews, telephone interviews, direct observations during field visits, and a survey commissioned to review the results achieved at the district level.	Assessment of Development Results (ADR) Overall: UNDP's goals during 2010-2014 were ambitious; it was inevitable that the program would fall short in a number of aspects given the difficult security conditions and complex political situation. Important achievements have been made. However, there remain strong imbalances in terms of program areas, geographic distribution of assistance, and types of beneficiaries. As a result, donor trust in UNDP's capacity to effectively deliver quality programs on a national scale has been undermined. Limited, sustainable results: UNDP programs have relied on the assumption that they are in Afghanistan over the long term. Very few of the key development results UNDP contributed to are sustainable beyond the end of international support. Poor management: During the first years of the period under review, a "questionable management culture" in the UNDP Country Office hampered efficiency. Insufficient ties with Afghan government and NGOs: Over the reviewed period, UNDP has had insufficient ties with civil society, including civil society organizations and NGOs. Afghan nation requires strong public pressure and active civil society organizations to lobby for improving education and health, gender equality, accountable government, and the battle against corruption.	
Provincial Community 2005 - 2014 na Historical Review Qualitative Effectiveness Reconstruction building Review Case Lessons Learn Teams (PRTs) Rethinking the Civilian Surge: Lessons from the Provincial Heela Dec 2015 Tank Study Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan Provincial Community 2005 - 2014 na Historical Review Qualitative Effectiveness Reconstruction building Review Case Lessons Learn Study Policy Propos Provincial Community 2005 - 2014 na Historical Review Qualitative Effectiveness Reconstruction building Review Case Lessons Learn Study Policy Propos		Focus on the role of civilian representatives in PRTs to understand the role they played in stabilization efforts Role of civilian representatives. In the short-term, civilian representatives were able to reduce local grievances and develop reconstruction projects which helped encourage the resolution of local disputes. Civilian representatives were not able to produce sustainable, nationwide changes because success was often undermined by lack of coordination with larger, systemic political shifts. Civilian representatives needed to be incorporated into nationwide efforts, connecting their work to the actions of the Afghan government. Different objectives by different agencies: Policymakers did not fully recognize different objectives pursued by civilian representatives. Civilian representatives were meant to use governance and economic development to improve security, but it was not clear whether security objectives were short or long-term. No metrics: The PRT program had few metrics to measure its impact. Projects can create conflicts: While the projects did not resolve local conflicts by themselves, civilian representatives stated that they offered more opportunities for dialogue where resolving parties. Lack of sustainable projects: Civilian representatives are concerned that their activities raised the expectations of local Afghans, which the local government could not meet post-withdrawal of the PRT. 80 percent of U.S. civilian representative respondents stated that they first of the PRT projects was not sustainable. Resources were not appropriately aligned: Civilian representatives were not able to reconstruction projects which helped encourage the resolution of local disputes. Civilian representatives were not able to a define the strategic reasoning behind and purpose of civilian representatives. Civilian representatives success to a define the strategic reasoning behind and purpose of civilian representatives success were not able to the work of the PRT. 80 percent of U.S. civilian representati	Potentially effective Potentially effective Potentially effective
Falling Short: Aid Waldman_2008 Effectiveness in Afghanistan Waldman_2008 Effectiveness in Afghanistan Waldman_2008 Effectiveness in Afghanistan Focus on na 2001-2007 Nationwide Historical Review Qualitative Effectiveness Review Case Lessons Learn governance institutions with particular emphasis on role of Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) na na na na Conference Various Effectiveness	Advocacy component of the Agency Coordinating Body for Afghan ina MIL Relief's (ACBAR) Afghanistan Pilot Participatory Poverty Assessment (APPPA). Qualitative review of amount and impact of aid spent in Afghanistan. Conference proceedings na N	the Afghan government. Representatives report that local knowledge and relationships were critical to producing projects that Study the effect of PRTs to determine overall effective ness Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) have gone well beyond their interim, security-focused mandate, engaging in substantial development work of variable quality and impact. Although arguable necessary in highly insecure areas, PRTs have in many cases undermined developments of effective governance (institutions) by diverting resources from civilian development activities. PRTS contributed to blurring of distinction between military and civilian aid, which undermines perceived neutrality of civilian agencies. Aid that bypasses Afghan government (estimated at 2/3 of all aid) undermines efforts to build effective state institutions. Efficiency is compromised by contractor (implementer) overhead and donor agency bureaucracy. Significant lack of coordination among international donors: Afghan government claims it has no info on how 1/3 of all assistance since 2001 was spent; results in a lack of alignment between assistance programs and Afghan national and provincial government planning. Research findings presented at the conference The research findings from Afghanistan highlight that many of the fundamental conflict drivers there are inherently political in Thoughtful discussion by practitioners of key issues. Limited evidence on useful findings or recommendate included is limited and many of the issues are raised without sufficient support. Broad coverage and focus on PRTs provides a useful focus. However, evidence included is limited and many of the issues are raised without sufficient support. Broad coverage and focus on PRTs provides a useful focus. However, evidence included is limited and many of the issues are raised without sufficient support. Broad coverage and focus on PRTs provides a useful focus. However, evidence included is limited and many of the issues are raised without sufficient support. Broad coverag	
Winning 'Hearts and Minds' in Wilton Park Afghanistan: Report on the Conference_201 Assessing the Wilton Park Mar 2010 tank 0 Effectiveness of Conference 1022 Development Aid in COIN Operations na na na Afghanistan and Historical Review Qualitative Effectiveness		aimed at discussing common assumptions underpinning COIN stabilization strategies, including that: key drivers of insecurity are poverty, unemployment and/or radical Islam; economic development and "modernization" are stabilizing; aid projects "win hearts and minds" and help legitimize the government teads to stabilization and development projects are an effective means to extend this reach; and the international community and the Afghan government have shared objectives when it comes to promoting development, good governance and the rule of law. International or adical or stabilization and development, good governance and the rule of law. International community and the Afghan government leads to stabilization and development, good governance and the rule of law. International community and the Afghan government leads to stabilization and development, good governance and the rule of law. International community and the Afghan government leads to stabilization and development, good governance and the rule of law. International community and the Afghan government leads to stabilization and development, good governance and the rule of law. International community and the Afghan government and intra-tribal disputes. Indeed, many Afghans believe the main cause of insecurity and unjust. A COIN strategy premised on using aid a tow in the population over to such a negatively perceived government faces an uphill struggle, especially in a competitive own in the population value and unjust. A COIN strategy premised on using aid to win the population over to such a negatively perceived government faces an uphill struggle, especially in a competitive own the population value and unjust. A COIN strategy premised on using aid to win the population over to such a negatively perceived government faces an uphill struggle, especially in a defective in addressing the people's highest priority needs of security and access to justice. Without getting the population value in the door'), which had proven useful in terms of deve	ing or Insufficient evidence Insufficient evidence Insufficient evidence
The Use and Abuse of the 'Dutch Thijs Brocades Zaalberg_2013 Approach' to Zaalberg Counter-Insurgency		there is little evidence of the often praised, and allegedly subtle and successful. Dutch approach to claims that the "Dutch approach" was more effective than other countries approaches. evidence for its existence of the other praised, and allegedly subtle and successful. Dutch approach to stabilization and counter-insurgency operations in Iraq or Afghanistan. Proving that the relatively positive developments in Dutch approaches or even efforts at measurement and evaluation areas of operations can actually be attributed primarily to a uniquely national approach turns out to be extremely complex. The evidence of the Dutch approach on what approaches or even efforts at measurement and evaluation areas of operations can actually be attributed primarily to a uniquely national approach turns out to be extremely complex. The evidence of the Dutch approaches or even efforts at measurement and evaluation areas of operations can actually be attributed primarily to a uniquely national approach turns out to be extremely complex. The evidence of the Dutch approaches or even efforts at measurement and evaluation areas of operations on what approaches or even efforts at measurement and evaluation areas of operations on what approaches or even efforts at measurement and evaluation areas of operations on the Dutch approach turns out to be extremely complex. The evidence of the Dutch approaches or even efforts at measurement and evaluation areas of operations on what approaches or even efforts at measurement and evaluation areas o	