**Damaging Democracy?**
**Security Provision and Turnout in Afghan Elections**

**Supporting Information**

In this Supporting Information, we provide further information about the data used in the empirical analysis, robustness checks on our main results, and tests of alternate explanations.

A. Data Appendix

A.1 *Turnout*

In the main analysis, we use turnout data from the Independent Election Commission (IEC) of Afghanistan for the 2009 and 2010 elections (http://afghanistanelectiondata.org/open/data). The IEC's procedures for auditing and certifying election results and investigating complaints, as well as election observation, are detailed extensively in NDI (2010) and NDI (2011). In particular, we refer readers to NDI (2011, pp. 36-38), which describes the institutional chain of custody for vote counting, recording, and certification in the 2010 election.

A.2 *ANQAR survey data*

The first survey dataset we employ consists of two waves from the International Security Assistance Force's (ISAF's) Afghanistan Nationwide Quarterly Research (ANQAR) survey (Berman, Callen, Felter, & Shapiro, 2011), fielded closest to the election by D3 Systems' local subsidiary, the Afghan Center for Socio-Economic and Opinion Research (ACSOR). The sample was drawn using a stratified multi-stage cluster design. D3 used the 2015–2016 updated figures provided by the Afghan government's Central Statistics Office (CSO).[1] D3 selected this data because, similar to the 2010–2011 update, much of the 2015–2016 update is based on data drawn from the Ministry of Rural Reconstruction and Development, relying on results from the National Reconstruction Vulnerability

[1] Afghanistan has no official census. The CSO has attempted to provide updates since 2003, but its base is influenced by figures from the 1979 census. The CSO has received support from the UN, the Ministry of Rural Reconstruction and Development, and the World Food Programme to issue updates. D3 reviewed the data used in our analysis and maintains they are acceptable replacements for the 2006 estimates.

Assessment (NRVA) and based on a detailed cataloging of households. While the proportions by province have mostly changed in a uniform, formulaic manner, the additional use of NRVA data increases the detail of the estimates.

Primary sampling units (PSU) were allocated across all of Afghanistan's 34 provinces using proportional stratification. Urban/rural status and province serve as the strata. Villages were considered rural, while towns, cities, and metros were considered urban. Settlements or neighborhoods within randomly selected districts were chosen by simple random sampling. Districts were selected via probability proportional to size systematic sampling. Districts serve as the PSU. A random walk method using a fixed sampling interval was performed from the starting point. For example, selecting every third house on the right in rural areas and every fifth house on the right in urban areas. After selecting a household, interviewers were instructed to utilize a Kish grid to randomize the target respondent within the household from a list with their names and ages in descending order. The Kish grid provides a random selection criteria based on which visit the household represents in his or her random walk and the number of inhabitants living in the household. Under no circumstances were interviewers allowed to substitute an alternate member of the household for the selected respondent. If the respondent refused to participate or was not available after three callbacks, the interviewer then moved onto the next household according to the random walk. Typically, interviewers were required to make two callbacks before replacing the household. These callbacks were made at different times of the same day or on different days in order to increase the chances of engaging the respondent. Data from surveys were subjected to three separate quality control tests using proprietary software, and a subset of surveys were randomly selected for double data entry (reported error rate of 0.1%). Further information about the survey is on file with the corresponding author.

A.3 *Kandahar survey data*

The second survey dataset we use consists of responses from (mostly Pashtun) residents of Kandahar Province, in southern Afghanistan, from the election period. We use geocoded survey responses from 369 Afghan civilians collected between August and October 2010 in 84 villages of Maiwand and Arghandab districts. The data were collected by a commercial entity with experience in social research. The data record general demographic information and answers to questions about perceptions of armed actors in Pashtun areas. Villages were selected within key terrain districts with 5–20 individuals surveyed, depending on population density.

A.4 *Primary survey data*

In the main analysis, we use two surveys that authors Callen and Long (2015) designed and administered to households living in the immediate vicinity of polling sites in August (baseline) and November/early December (endline) 2010. Our baseline survey (2,904 respondents) comprises 450 polling centers (7.8% operating on election day) in 19 of 34 provincial capitals. Our endline survey (3,100 respondents) includes 471 polling centers, matching the baseline sample with 21 centers added in Kabul. We selected our sample by identifying polling centers scheduled to open on election day and deemed secure by ISAF and the Afghan National Police (ANP). To obtain a representative sample of respondents living near polling centers, enumerators employed a random walk pattern starting from the polling site, and randomly selecting every fourth house or structure. Respondents within households were randomly selected using a Kish grid, with a 50% female sample. To improve the accuracy of the responses and avoid response bias, respondents could choose to take the survey in Dari or Pashto, the first language spoken by nearly all Afghans. Female respondents were interviewed by female enumerators. These data are more fully described in Callen and Long (2015), Callen, Isaqzadeh, Long, and Sprenger (2014), and Berman, Callen, Gibson, Long, and Rezaee (2018), which also address how the survey design and question wording guard against response bias. The survey data collection was approved by the University of California, San Diego's Institutional Review Board (#101052S).

A.5 *The Asia Foundation survey data*

We use data from the Asia Foundation's nationwide survey of Afghans administered in 2010 (wave 5). ACSOR administered this survey to a random, representative sample of 6,348 Afghan adults. The survey methodology is extensively described in Tariq, Ayoubi, and Haqbeen (2011, p. 179 ff.), including field dates, sampling, weighting, household and respondent selection, callback methods and results, enumerator training, and quality control methods.

A.6 *Violent Incidence, i.e. SIGACTs*

These data were shared with us courtesy of Andrew Shaver and Austin Wright, and are more fully described in Shaver and Wright (2017) and available upon request from those authors. These data were released to those authors by the U.S. Department of Defense as the Significant Activities (SIGACTs) Dataset and were collected by Afghanistan's military and police forces and ISAF during the course of Operation Enduring Freedom. Incidents in the data constitute insurgent attacks perpetrated against ISAF and the Afghan security forces, such as direct fire, indirect fire, and improvised explosive devices, and are coded with military grid coordinates, often to the specific minute of occurrence. Data

were collected according to "well-established military protocol and with the use of advanced georeferencing and collation technologies, ensuring that many report details were both objectively measured and captured with a high degree of precision" (Shaver & Wright, 2017). The systematic nature of data collection, coupled with the extreme geographic and temporal precision of incident coding, make these data much less susceptible to common biases inherent in data compiled based on media reporting (Weidmann, 2016). For examples of empirical analysis that use SIGACTs data, see Condra and Shapiro (2012), Biddle, Friedman, and Shapiro (2012), and Shaver and Shapiro (forthcoming) in Iraq, and Condra, Long, Shaver, and Wright (forthcoming) in Afghanistan.

We argue that these data are a valid and useful measure of threats to civilians who are deciding whether to turn out to vote for three reasons. First, the dataset contains the most complete and comprehensive data measuring violence during this period. No other dataset comes close to it, either in the precision of coding incident locations or in the sheer number of incidents recorded.[2] Second, we now have considerable evidence that these incidents carry considerable risk of harm to civilians, even though the primary targets of the attacks are government forces and installations. As a general point, this is true in Afghanistan (Shaver & Shapiro, forthcoming; Wright, Condra, Shapiro, & Shaver, 2017) as well as Iraq (Berman, Shapiro, & Felter, 2011; Condra & Shapiro, 2012), where we have comparable data.

More importantly for this study, we now have high-quality causal evidence from Afghan elections that the violent events recorded in the SIGACTs data not only injure and kill civilians at a significant rate, but they also (negatively) affects citizens' willingness to turn out and vote (Condra et al., forthcoming). Citizens' beliefs about the ability of local insurgents to target and attack appears to be a major factor impacting citizens' risk assessments, and the SIGACTs event data are a useful metric for the larger universe of violence informing those assessments. Third, precisely because insurgents seek to disrupt the electoral process by attacking state targets (not civilians), the type of violence recorded in administrative event data is exactly the right type to use to measure citizens' perceived threat to themselves on and around election day.

The presence of other violence against civilians not captured in these data does not, in and of itself, pose a problem for inference. To be problematic, the following would have to be true. First, some other dimension of violence targeting civilians would have to be orthogonal to SIGACTs. Second, officials

[2] For example, other datasets, such as those from the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, the Global Terrorism Database, or the National Democratic Institute, do not provide information at sufficient temporal or geographic specificity to enable matching of incidents to polling center locations.

would have had to assign treatment *not* according to an assessment of the history of SIGACTs around polling centers, as they claimed, but according to this other measure of insurgent violence against civilians. Assigning treatment in this way would have required officials to have access to a similarly systematic measure of that non-SIGACTs violence, something we found no evidence of in many years working on the conflict. Third, the other dimension of violence targeting civilians would have had to systematically depress turnout in the same way as the dimension associated with SIGACTs. These conditions seem unlikely to be met. We use the SIGACTs data because it is geographically precise, nearly comprehensive in scope for violence against state targets during the period of study, systematically collected, and empirically substantiated as a valid measure of citizens' perceived risk of turning out to vote.

B. Robustness Checks

While we have shown that the assignment of levels of police deployment to polling centers was not a function of previous levels of violence, and have argued for plausibly exogenous variation in this assignment, we further test that claim in two principal ways.

B.1 *Sensitivity of Effects of Interest to the Inclusion of Observed Controls*

We test whether our results are robust to the inclusion of controls for other observables. We consider four principal factors that might correlate with both police deployment levels *and* turnout, such that the estimated effects of police on turnout and violence around election day that we report would reflect those factors and not the impact of police deployments. Our estimates remain robust to the inclusion of variables capturing these potential confounds, which is consistent with our interpretation of the estimates.

The first is the competitiveness of the 2009 election. It is not immediately clear how to sign the bias in this case with respect to the theoretical effect that competitiveness in the previous election should have on both turnout and police levels in the next election. Its effect on turnout seems likely to be positive, based on the reasoning that one's vote is more likely to be consequential in a competitive area than in one where a candidate won handily last time. The effect on police deployment is ambiguous.

Second, the strategic deployment of police could have been designed to help the political fortunes of President Karzai and politicians close to him. In the main text we note that the results on turnout were consistent with the possibility that police were positively associated with electoral fraud (Panel B of Table 4; SI Tables 5A–B). Here, we conduct a different test of a threat to inference that could

emanate from the political use of police. In their study of fraud in the 2010 Afghan election, Callen and Long (2015) use measures of the political connectedness of candidates running in the 2010 election. They explain how candidates' connections to provincial- or district-level election officials might affect the level of fraud associated with the electoral returns reported for a polling center, particularly fraud that is perpetrated at the Provincial Aggregation Center and other levels above the polling center. If this connectedness affected police deployment and turnout, we should expect the bias to be in the positive direction. Given that these factors operate at the district or province level (Rundlett and Svolik (2016) note that fraud often is perpetrated at the local – rather than central – level of political organization), we control for them by including district- and province-fixed effects in our model specifications.

Third, ethnicity could play a role in levels of turnout and police deployment. We might expect more police to be allocated to areas where more violence is expected (e.g., heavily Pashtun areas where the Taliban was more active) and higher turnout in areas where voters are more supportive of non-Taliban rule of the state (e.g., non-Pashtun areas). We do not have data that would allow us to control for this at the polling center level, given the lack of a recent publicly available census. However, numerous studies note that ethnic groups in Afghanistan are geographically clustered, such that there is ethnic homogeneity concentrated at the local level. Ethnic groups are geographically clustered by district, to the extent that there is a low level of heterogeneity in ethnic mixes of the population across districts. Therefore including district fixed effects controls for this factor.

Note that in the cases above where the direction of the bias is not ambiguous, the sign is hypothesized to be positive, and thus presents less of a problem for our results. If the hypothesized effect of the factor on police deployment is positive, then the bias is in the opposite direction of our hypothesized results. Examining the effect of police deployment on violence and finding a weak negative effect thus constitutes a "hard" test. SI Table 2 summarizes these factors, their expected correlations with the independent and dependent variables, and the resulting expected bias.

To test the plausibility of these alternate explanations, we use data on the 2010 election to replicate our main results from regressing police deployment levels on turnout (Tables 4A–B) and include these other factors individually as controls in regression specifications. These results are shown in SI Table 3. Following our main specifications, in both Panels A and B, the dependent variable is the turnout in the 2010 election, but in Panel B, we include turnout in the 2009 election as a control variable, as in the main analysis.

There is little evidence to suggest that these sets of potentially confounding factors affect our results: the core negative effect of police on turnout is consistently strong in most specifications.

Including district or province fixed effects (columns 1 and 4) – to control for connections of election officials to President Karzai – does not noticeably change the estimated coefficient on the security classification variable.

We also include dummy variables that code the majority ethnicity of the district in which the polling center is located. In column 2, we include a dummy for whether the district is Pashtun majority or not. In column 3, we include dummies for the other main ethnic groups. (Province fixed effects are included in each model.) Controlling for ethnicity in this way does not alter our estimates of the police's effect on turnout.

In column 5, we include a measure of the competitiveness of each polling center in the 2009 election, the log of the difference between President Karzai's vote share and challenger Abdullah Abdullah's vote share. Including this measure slightly reduces the size of the estimated effect of police on turnout.

SI Tables 4–5 replicate the results from Tables 2 and 4, respectively, but include polling centers that would be deemed fraudulent by our definition in 2010, as well as polling centers open in 2010 but not in 2009. The results are largely unaffected.

We provide further evidence that supports our identification assumption that, after controlling for a polling center's history of violence, we can treat the assignment of police as essentially random. Above, we tested several threats to this assumption by identifying possible ways in which police might be assigned through mechanisms other than the area's history of violence, which officials responsible for developing the plan identified as the determinant. Another concern with our identification strategy might be that within districts, polling centers that are geographically adjacent may differ not only in their security classification, but also might differ systematically in ways that correlate with the assignment strategy. For example, the population of people living within polling center catchment areas could differ by living standards or socio-demographic characteristics that correlate with having extra policing (and the degree to which our survey was limited to more urban places would increase the likelihood of finding such an effect).

To address this concern, SI Table 6 shows within-district, across-polling center correlation (one-way analysis of variance) on individuals' socio-demographic characteristics and perceptions of government, as recorded in our survey of voters across 471 polling centers discussed in the main text. We lack such data for the entire sample of polling stations in our analysis, given the limited sample of the survey within 19 provincial capitals.

We expect that polling center catchment areas will be similar across centers within a district on living standard and socio-demographic characteristics, and we note our expected degree of correlation

in Column 2. Panel A confirms this general expectation. Access to consistent electricity has a high degree of correlation at the local level, as does the proportion of respondents of the same ethnicity (Pashtun, Tajik, and Uzbek). Therefore, accounting for across-district variation in these measures (i.e., via district fixed effects), polling centers within districts are highly similar across living standard and socio-demographic features and would therefore not explain or confound our results.

As a robustness check on the correlation of survey responses generally, Panel B includes the intra-class correlation of responses on questions that we *would not* expect to correlate highly within polling centers within districts, accounting for across-district variation, with expectations listed in Column 2. These include three questions on national issues: ratings of President Karzai's performance in office, respondents' beliefs about whether the central government will maintain control in Afghanistan, and performance ratings of central government services. As our results show, these national-level issues do not correlate strongly at the local level, demonstrating that i) they are likely orthogonal to the security assignment per our identification strategy and ii) there is not a latent or spurious factor driving all survey responses to correlate highly that an analysis of intra-class correlation would miss.

Taken together, these results strengthen confidence in our identification strategy and that, accounting for across-district heterogeneity, there is not significant within-district, across-polling center heterogeneity that does not correlate with local living standard and socio-demographic characteristics but *does* strongly correlate with the assignment strategy of policing.

Finally, we test for spatial externalities (SI Tables 8A–B and 9), following the approach in Callen and Long (2015). In SI Tables 8A–B, we regress polling center security deployment classification on election-day violence, replicating models in Table 3 of the main text, but adding controls for the number of polling stations at various distances that were also assigned medium/high deployment: a dummy variable that equals 1 if any polling center within a 1 (2) km radius was assigned medium/high deployment; a variable equal to the number of polling centers within a 1 (2) km radius; and a dummy variable that equals 1 if one (or two, or three) polling center within a 1 (2) km radius was treated. SI Tables 8A and 8B collapse medium/high deployment as treatment; Table 8A includes the set of treated polling centers listed above within a 1 km radius, while SI Table 8B expands the radius to 2 km. The null result of the impact of police deployments on violence is unchanged once we control for nearby police deployments. In SI Table 9, we regress turnout on police deployment classification, replicating model 8 of Tables 4A–B, but add various controls for nearby deployments: a dummy variable that equals 1 if any polling center within a 1 km radius was assigned medium/high deployment; a variable equal to the number of polling centers within a 1 km radius; and a dummy variable that equals 1 if one (or two, or three) polling center within a 1 km radius was assigned medium/high deployment. The

addition of these controls does not alter the size or significance of the estimated effects of police deployment classification on either violence or turnout reported in the main results.

B.2 *Estimating Bias from Unobservables*

While we have shown that our results are robust to the inclusion of other potential observable confounds in the models, one might still worry that a small amount of selection on unobservable factors could explain the effects. To further increase confidence in the causal nature of our results, we pursue a second approach, estimating how large any bias arising from selection on unobservable factors would have to be to render the true effect of police deployment classification to be zero. Altonji, Elder, and Taber (2005) develop an approach that uses the degree of selection on observables to quantitatively assess the degree of omitted variable bias.[3] We follow Nunn and Wantchekon (2011, pp. 3237-3238) in implementing this approach, comparing estimates of the police deployment classification effect $\left(\hat{\beta}\right)$ from two regressions: one with a full set of controls $\left(\hat{\beta}^F\right)$ and one with a restricted set of controls $\left(\hat{\beta}^R\right)$. The ratio of these estimates $\left(\hat{\beta}^F/\left(\hat{\beta}^R-\hat{\beta}^F\right)\right)$ is increasing in the size of the effect of unobservables that would be necessary to explain away the police deployment classification effect.

SI Table 7 provides the results of this approach for two sets of equations previously estimated. In row 1, the "restricted" estimating equation regresses 2010 turnout on measures of previous violence and district fixed effects (SI Table 3A, column 4). The "full" estimating equation adds 2009 turnout as a covariate (SI Table 3B, column 4). The calculated ratio is 8.70, which means that to attribute the entire estimated effect of police deployment to selection effects, selection on unobservables would have to be almost 9 times greater than selection on 2009 turnout, which seems unreasonable. Row 2 compares a "restricted" model that controls for previous violence, ethnicity dummies, 2009 turnout and province fixed effects to a "full" model that controls for previous violence, 2009 turnout, and district fixed effects. The ratio comparing estimated effects of interest here is 3.72, indicating that selection on unobservables would have to be almost 4 times as large as selection on observables (moving to a model with district fixed effects) to account for the effect. Again, this seems unreasonably large.

[3] A key assumption of this approach is that the part of the outcome related to the set of observables in the model has the same relationship with the independent variable as the part of the outcome that is related to unobservables (Altonji et al., 2005, p. 154).

SI Table 1. Descriptive Statistics

| Variables | Observations | Mean | Std. Dev. |
|---|---|---|---|
| SIGACTs (1-week lag) | 72,920 | 0.0470 | 0.344 |
| SIGACTs (2-week lag) | 72,920 | 0.0468 | 0.342 |
| SIGACTs (3-week lag) | 72,920 | 0.0465 | 0.341 |
| SIGACTs (4-week lag) | 72,920 | 0.0461 | 0.341 |
| SIGACTs (5-week lag) | 72,920 | 0.0455 | 0.338 |
| SIGACTs (6-week lag) | 72,920 | 0.0447 | 0.336 |
| SIGACTs (7-week lag) | 72,920 | 0.0440 | 0.334 |
| SIGACTs (8-week lag) | 72,920 | 0.0435 | 0.332 |
| Does the Government do a Good Job with Resources? (Yes/No) (pre) | 130 | 0.543 | 0.308 |
| Does the Government do a Good Job with Resources? (Yes/No) (post) | 130 | 0.451 | 0.288 |
| Satisfaction with Afghan Democracy? (5-pt scale) (pre) | 121 | 0.863 | 0.188 |
| Satisfaction with Afghan Democracy? (5-pt scale) (post) | 128 | 0.779 | 0.232 |
| Is Afghanistan a Democracy? (pre) | 130 | 0.657 | 0.287 |
| Is Afghanistan a Democracy? (post) | 130 | 0.694 | 0.244 |
| Will you use Courts or Police to Solve a Dispute? (Yes/No) (pre) | 130 | 0.278 | 0.234 |
| Will you use Courts or Police to Solve a Dispute? (Yes/No) (post) | 130 | 0.212 | 0.210 |
| How Important is it to Pay Your Taxes? (Very/Not) (pre) | 130 | 0.491 | 0.305 |
| How Important is it to Pay Your Taxes? (Very/Not) (post) | 130 | 0.454 | 0.265 |

SI Table 2. Expected Effect of Other Factors on Police and Turnout

| *Factor* | *Expected Effect on Police* | *Expected Effect on Turnout* |
|---|---|---|
| Competitiveness of the 2009 election | ? | (+)<br>Voters turn out if they believe their vote will be consequential. |
| President Karzai's interests | ? | ? |
| Ethnic politics | (+)<br>Pashtun areas expected to be more violent and could receive more police. | (+)<br>Non-Pashtun areas support non-Taliban rule and more likely to turn out. |

SI Table 3: Addressing Potential Confounders

*Panel A: 2010 Turnout*

| Variables | (1) Province FE | (2) Pashtun Dummy (Province FE) | (3) Ethnicity Dummies (Province FE) | (4) District FE | (5) Competitiveness (District FE) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Medium or High Security Deployment | -37.7*** | -37.6*** | -38.9*** | -33.9*** | -25.6** |
| | (13.0) | (13.0) | (13.9) | (12.1) | (12.0) |
| Ismaili | | | -33.7 | | |
| | | | (25.0) | | |
| Mixed | | | -65.1 | | |
| | | | (43.1) | | |
| Nuristani | | | 21.9 | | |
| | | | (80.2) | | |
| Pashai | | | -69.3 | | |
| | | | (58.5) | | |
| Pashtun | | | -74.8 | | |
| | | | (54.3) | | |
| Tajik | | | -236.6*** | | |
| | | | (62.8) | | |
| Waziri | | | -97.3 | | |
| | | | (60.5) | | |
| SIGACTs (1-week lag) | -20.7 | -20.5 | -11.2 | -9.2 | -0.5 |
| | (19.8) | (19.7) | (18.6) | (17.7) | (18.8) |
| SIGACTs (2-week lag) | 18.0 | 18.2 | 11.7 | 4.1 | -4.0 |
| | (20.1) | (20.1) | (18.4) | (16.7) | (17.1) |
| SIGACTs (3-week lag) | -12.6 | -12.6 | -5.0 | -9.5 | -11.4 |
| | (19.3) | (19.3) | (18.6) | (19.5) | (18.3) |
| SIGACTs (4-week lag) | 14.5 | 15.1 | 7.6 | -13.0 | -16.2 |
| | (21.2) | (20.8) | (19.8) | (23.0) | (24.2) |
| Total violence previous 5 months | -162.3* | -163.5* | -127.7 | 28.3 | 37.0 |
| | (92.5) | (93.2) | (89.3) | (83.2) | (82.2) |
| Total violence squared | 103.1* | 103.2* | 84.8 | 9.8 | 3.8 |
| | (59.8) | (59.8) | (57.3) | (52.0) | (50.7) |
| Total violence cubed | -14.4* | -14.4* | -12.0* | -2.5 | -1.3 |
| | (7.3) | (7.4) | (7.0) | (6.1) | (5.8) |
| Pashtun Majority District | | -7.7 | | | |
| | | (24.1) | | | |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Log(\|Karzai VS - Dr. Abdullah VS\|) | | | | | -23.2*** |
| | | | | | (4.4) |
| Constant | 340.7*** | 343.6*** | 415.2*** | 336.2*** | 203.3*** |
| | (7.1) | (12.4) | (44.4) | (4.0) | (25.3) |
| N | 1,823 | 1,823 | 1,823 | 1,823 | 1,817 |
| R-squared | 0.210 | 0.210 | 0.240 | 0.431 | 0.458 |
| *Panel B: 2010 Turnout (Controlling for 2009 Turnout)* | | | | | |
| Medium or High Security Deployment | -38.3*** | -38.1*** | -38.5*** | -30.4*** | -27.2** |
| | (11.9) | (11.9) | (12.7) | (11.1) | (11.2) |
| Ismaili | | | -48.7** | | |
| | | | (21.6) | | |
| Mixed | | | -58.2 | | |
| | | | (40.2) | | |
| Nuristani | | | -12 | | |
| | | | (77.1) | | |
| Pashai | | | -81 | | |
| | | | (56.1) | | |
| Pashtun | | | -77.2 | | |
| | | | (52.4) | | |
| Tajik | | | -177.8*** | | |
| | | | (62) | | |
| Waziri | | | -104.7* | | |
| | | | (57.4) | | |
| SIGACTs (1-week lag) | -8.1 | -7.9 | -2 | -2.7 | -0.8 |
| | (19.1) | (19) | (18.4) | (19.8) | (20.3) |
| SIGACTs (2-week lag) | 5.2 | 5.4 | 1.4 | -8.6 | -11.9 |
| | (18.9) | (18.8) | (17.6) | (17.2) | (17) |
| SIGACTs (3-week lag) | -1.2 | -1.1 | 2.6 | -4.5 | -4.9 |
| | (16) | (15.9) | (15.8) | (18.1) | (18) |
| SIGACTs (4-week lag) | 14.9 | 15.7 | 10.8 | -10.8 | -13.8 |
| | (20.5) | (20.5) | (19.9) | (24.9) | (25.6) |
| Total violence previous 5 months | -163.8** | -165.3** | -136.4* | 7.8 | 12.3 |
| | (82.8) | (83.7) | (79.7) | (74.9) | (75) |
| Total violence squared | 111.7** | 111.8** | 96.5* | 23.9 | 21.8 |
| | (51.9) | (52) | (49.7) | (47.9) | (47.9) |
| Total violence cubed | -15.6** | -15.6** | -13.6** | -3.9 | -3.4 |
| | (6.5) | (6.5) | (6.1) | (5.4) | (5.4) |
| Pashtun Majority District | | -10 | | | |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | (20.1) | | | |
| Log(\|Karzai VS - Dr. Abdullah VS\|) | | | | | -6.8* |
| | | | | | (3.9) |
| Turnout 2009 | 0.4*** | 0.4*** | 0.4*** | 0.4*** | 0.3*** |
| | (0) | (0) | (0) | (0.1) | (0.1) |
| Constant | 248.7*** | 252.5*** | 324.4*** | 249.4*** | 216.2*** |
| | (12.8) | (16) | (43.6) | (12.6) | (24.3) |
| N | 1,823 | 1,823 | 1,823 | 1,823 | 1,817 |
| R-squared | 0.3 | 0.301 | 0.317 | 0.491 | 0.496 |

*Notes*: In Column 3 (Ethnicity dummies), Hazara is the reference category. Robust standard errors are clustered at the district level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

SI Table 4. Assignment of Police Deployment Classification and Violence
(including "fraudulent" 2010 Polling Centers and Polling Centers not open in 2009)

| Variables | (1) Recent violence and cubic polynomial in past violence nearby | (2) Adding Province FE | (3) Adding District FE | (4) Dropping last 4 weeks of violence District FE |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| SIGACTs (1-week lag) | -0.045 | -0.019 | 0.014 | |
| | (0.075) | (0.075) | (0.083) | |
| SIGACTs (2-week lag) | 0.018 | -0.047 | -0.03 | |
| | (0.06) | (0.059) | (0.068) | |
| SIGACTs (3-week lag) | 0.015 | 0.004 | 0.064 | |
| | (0.071) | (0.066) | (0.053) | |
| SIGACTs (4-week lag) | 0.064 | 0.049 | -0.071 | |
| | (0.053) | (0.051) | (0.065) | |
| Total violence previous 5 months | 0.274 | 0.13 | -0.571* | -0.478 |
| | (0.306) | (0.319) | (0.311) | (0.3) |
| Total violence squared | -0.205 | -0.124 | 0.223 | 0.165 |
| | (0.169) | (0.167) | (0.152) | (0.157) |
| Total violence cubed | 0.019 | 0.013 | -0.02 | -0.016 |
| | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.017) | (0.018) |
| Constant | 1.363*** | 1.371*** | 1.388*** | 1.387*** |
| | (0.032) | (0.027) | (0.008) | (0.009) |
| N | 2,290 | 2,290 | 2,290 | 2,290 |
| R-squared | 0.003 | 0.104 | 0.335 | 0.333 |

*Notes*: Unlike Table 2, these models include polling centers with turnout results from 2010 that indicate fraud, as well as those that were not open in 2009. The dependent variable is polling center security deployment category (1=Low, 2=Medium, 3=High). Robust standard errors clustered at the district level in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

SI Table 5A. Effect of Police Deployment Classification (Medium/High combined) on Polling Center-level Turnout in 2010 Election (including "fraudulent" 2010 Polling Centers and Polling Centers not open in 2009)

| VARIABLES | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) | (10) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Medium/High Security Deployment | -6.81 | -6.58 | -7.21 | -11.97 | -16.45 | -19.07* | -18.66* | -19.97* | -16.96 | -26.84** |
| | (11.74) | (11.81) | (11.89) | (12.45) | (12.28) | (11.20) | (11.27) | (11.54) | (11.54) | (11.74) |
| SIGACTs Prediction | | 3.72 | | | | | 5.68 | | | |
| | | (9.47) | | | | | (12.99) | | | |
| SIGACTs (1-week lag) | | | -1.93 | 11.82 | 0.13 | | | 7.53 | 9.79 | 9.07 |
| | | | (13.84) | (17.76) | (14.11) | | | (17.80) | (18.18) | (17.71) |
| SIGACTs (2-week lag) | | | -3.33 | -5.86 | -5.12 | | | -7.99 | -10.94 | -9.70 |
| | | | (14.81) | (15.93) | (15.01) | | | (15.92) | (15.66) | (15.75) |
| SIGACTs (3-week lag) | | | 8.17 | -11.48 | 12.08 | | | -3.21 | -3.90 | 5.69 |
| | | | (10.32) | (17.94) | (9.50) | | | (17.94) | (17.75) | (17.31) |
| SIGACTs (4-week lag) | | | -2.50 | -23.06 | -5.62 | | | -16.65 | -18.25 | -17.92 |
| | | | (16.47) | (17.64) | (15.65) | | | (18.14) | (18.30) | (18.22) |
| Total violence previous 5 months | | | -56.85 | 48.57 | -38.33 | | | | | |
| | | | (68.81) | (84.95) | (65.78) | | | | | |
| Total violence squared | | | 48.41 | -2.31 | 38.41 | | | | | |
| | | | (36.39) | (45.29) | (35.44) | | | | | |
| Total violence cubed | | | -6.62 | 0.62 | -5.34 | | | | | |
| | | | (4.54) | (5.55) | (4.43) | | | | | |
| Log(\|Karzai VS – Abdullah VS\|) | | | | -24.97*** | | | | | -7.69** | |
| | | | | (4.04) | | | | | (3.71) | |
| PC treated within 1 km(=1) | | | | | 45.10* | | | | | 32.48 |
| | | | | | (23.91) | | | | | (23.66) |
| Total PCs within 1 km | | | | | -8.88** | | | | | -9.94*** |
| | | | | | (4.22) | | | | | (3.59) |
| Turnout in 2009 | | | | | | 0.36*** | 0.36*** | 0.36*** | 0.33*** | 0.36*** |
| | | | | | | (0.05) | (0.05) | (0.05) | (0.04) | (0.05) |
| Constant | 375.11*** | 374.476*** | 375.83*** | 227.82*** | 381.68*** | 278.01*** | 277.10*** | 278.26*** | 241.71*** | 284.81*** |
| | (2.89) | (3.43) | (3.68) | (23.60) | (5.02) | (12.22) | (12.18) | (12.00) | (22.46) | (12.25) |
| N | 2,290 | 2,290 | 2,290 | 2,110 | 2,290 | 2,116 | 2,116 | 2,116 | 2,110 | 2,116 |
| R2 | 0.495 | 0.495 | 0.496 | 0.511 | 0.499 | 0.538 | 0.538 | 0.539 | 0.544 | 0.542 |

*Notes*: Unlike Table 4A, these models include polling centers with turnout results from 2010 that indicate fraud, as well as those that were not open in 2009. Robust standard errors clustered at the district level in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

SI Table 5B. Effect of Police Deployment Classification (Medium/High separated) on Polling Center-level Turnout in 2010 Election (including "fraudulent" 2010 Polling Centers and Polling Centers not open in 2009)

| VARIABLES | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) | (10) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Medium Security Deployment | -17.65 | -17.44 | -18.54 | -22.42 | -26.39* | -31.31** | -30.84* | -33.17** | -28.93* | -39.17** |
| | (14.50) | (14.50) | (14.42) | (17.24) | (14.90) | (15.75) | (15.69) | (15.85) | (16.29) | (16.02) |
| High Security Deployment | 2.69 | 2.96 | 2.68 | 3.28 | -7.32 | -8.61 | -8.30 | -8.83 | -7.02 | -15.82 |
| | (14.50) | (14.60) | (14.71) | (14.88) | (14.81) | (14.30) | (14.42) | (14.68) | (14.54) | (14.97) |
| SIGACTs Prediction | | 3.82 | | | | | 5.41 | | | |
| | | (9.67) | | | | | (13.01) | | | |
| SIGACTs (1-week lag) | | | -0.93 | 12.22 | 0.98 | | | 8.06 | 10.24 | 9.51 |
| | | | (13.92) | (17.64) | (14.19) | | | (17.60) | (17.99) | (17.54) |
| SIGACTs (2-week lag) | | | -4.13 | -6.66 | -5.82 | | | -9.12 | -11.86 | -10.76 |
| | | | (14.69) | (15.89) | (14.92) | | | (15.85) | (15.61) | (15.70) |
| SIGACTs (3-week lag) | | | 7.84 | -11.83 | 11.75 | | | -3.65 | -4.28 | 5.26 |
| | | | (10.34) | (18.00) | (9.55) | | | (18.03) | (17.82) | (17.42) |
| SIGACTs (4-week lag) | | | -2.51 | -23.40 | -5.62 | | | -17.14 | -18.62 | -18.40 |
| | | | (16.60) | (17.80) | (15.76) | | | (18.33) | (18.48) | (18.37) |
| Total violence previous 5 months | | | -57.09 | 49.59 | | | | 21.35 | 24.03 | 35.02 |
| | | | (70.15) | (86.62) | | | | (79.60) | (79.39) | (78.40) |
| Total violence squared | | | 49.21 | -2.28 | | | | 15.74 | 13.08 | 7.88 |
| | | | (36.88) | (45.86) | | | | (42.34) | (42.21) | (42.28) |
| Total violence cubed | | | -6.73 | 0.62 | | | | -1.89 | -1.37 | -1.05 |
| | | | (4.59) | (5.61) | | | | (5.20) | (5.17) | (5.25) |
| Log(\|Karzai VS – Abdullah VS\|) | | | | -24.92*** | | | | | -7.60** | |
| | | | | (4.05) | | | | | (3.73) | |
| PC treated within 1km(=1) | | | | | 43.82* | | | | | 30.64 |
| | | | | | (23.87) | | | | | (23.80) |
| Total PCs within 1km | | | | | -8.84** | | | | | -9.96*** |
| | | | | | (4.22) | | | | | (3.57) |
| Turnout in 2009 | | | | | | 0.36*** | 0.36*** | 0.36*** | 0.33*** | 0.36*** |
| | | | | | | (0.05) | (0.05) | (0.05) | (0.04) | (0.05) |
| Constant | 375.23*** | 374.58*** | 375.96*** | 228.30*** | 381.80*** | 278.17*** | 277.30*** | 278.48*** | 242.28*** | 285.04*** |
| | (2.86) | (3.41) | (3.66) | (23.64) | (5.01) | (12.19) | (12.15) | (11.96) | (22.50) | (12.21) |
| N | 2,290 | 2,290 | 2,290 | 2,110 | 2,290 | 2,116 | 2,116 | 2,116 | 2,110 | 2,116 |

| | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| R2 | 0.495 | 0.495 | 0.496 | 0.511 | 0.5 | 0.539 | 0.539 | 0.54 | 0.544 | 0.543 |

*Notes*: Unlike Table 4B, these models include polling centers with turnout results from 2010 that indicate fraud, as well as those that were not open in 2009. Robust standard errors clustered at the district level in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

SI Table 5B. Effect of Police Deployment Classification (Medium/High separated) on Polling Center-level Turnout in 2010 Election (including "fraudulent" 2010 Polling Centers and Polling Centers not open in 2009)

| VARIABLES | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Medium Security Deployment | -33.409 | -17.65 | -17.439 | -18.541 | -64.948*** | -31.312** | -30.838* | -33.173** |
| | (21.76) | (14.497) | (14.495) | (14.418) | (17.488) | (15.745) | (15.693) | (15.853) |
| High Security Deployment | 36.437* | 2.691 | 2.955 | 2.684 | -4.119 | -8.609 | -8.298 | -8.827 |
| | (20.612) | (14.497) | (14.601) | (14.707) | (17.539) | (14.303) | (14.415) | (14.684) |
| SIGACTs Prediction | | | 3.818 | | | | 5.413 | |
| | | | (9.673) | | | | (13.013) | |
| SIGACTs (1-week lag) | | | | -0.926 | | | | 8.061 |
| | | | | (13.916) | | | | (17.596) |
| SIGACTs (2-week lag) | | | | -4.132 | | | | -9.122 |
| | | | | (14.688) | | | | (15.847) |
| SIGACTs (3-week lag) | | | | 7.835 | | | | -3.646 |
| | | | | (10.336) | | | | (18.034) |
| SIGACTs (4-week lag) | | | | -2.512 | | | | -17.141 |
| | | | | (16.597) | | | | (18.331) |
| Total violence previous 5 months | | | | -57.091 | | | | 21.346 |
| | | | | (70.153) | | | | (79.601) |
| Total violence squared | | | | 49.212 | | | | 15.737 |
| | | | | (36.877) | | | | (42.34) |
| Total violence cubed | | | | -6.734 | | | | -1.891 |
| | | | | (4.587) | | | | (5.202) |
| Turnout in 2009 | | | | | 0.513*** | 0.358*** | 0.358*** | 0.357*** |
| | | | | | (0.045) | (0.045) | (0.045) | (0.045) |
| Constant | 372.901*** | 375.231*** | 374.575*** | 375.961*** | 240.557*** | 278.169*** | 277.301*** | 278.480*** |
| | (12.359) | (2.862) | (3.406) | (3.661) | (14.525) | (12.193) | (12.148) | (11.963) |
| District FE | N | Y | Y | Y | N | Y | Y | Y |
| N | 2,290 | 2,290 | 2,290 | 2,290 | 2,116 | 2,116 | 2,116 | 2,116 |
| R2 | 0.009 | 0.495 | 0.495 | 0.496 | 0.199 | 0.539 | 0.539 | 0.540 |

*Notes*: Unlike Table 4B, these models include polling centers with turnout results from 2010 that indicate fraud, as well as those that were not open in 2009. Robust standard errors clustered at the district level in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

SI Table 6. Intraclass Correlation of Survey Responses by Local and National Issues

| | (1) Intraclass Correlation by Polling Center (within district) | (2) Expected Intraclass Correlation |
|---|---|---|
| *Panel A* | | |
| Electricity | 0.603 | High |
| Pashtun | 0.894 | High |
| Tajik | 0.744 | High |
| Uzbek | 0.630 | High |
| *Panel B* | | |
| Karzai Performance | 0.329 | Low |
| Government Control | 0.265 | Low |
| Central Govt. Services | 0.310 | Low |

SI Table 7. Estimating Bias from Unobservables

| Controls in restricted set | Controls in full set | $\hat{\beta}^F/(\hat{\beta}^R - \hat{\beta}^F)$ |
|---|---|---|
| District FE, violence | District FE, violence, 2009 turnout | 8.70 |
| Province FE, violence, ethnicity dummies, 2009 turnout | District FE, violence, 2009 turnout | 3.72 |

*Notes*: 'Restricted' model in row 1 corresponds to SI Table 3A, column 4; 'full' model in row 1 corresponds to SI Table 3B, column 4. 'Restricted' model in row 2 corresponds to SI Table 3B, column 3; 'full' model in row 2 corresponds to SI Table 3B, column 4. Ratio is calculated using the estimated coefficients for medium/high security deployment in the 'full' and 'restricted' models.

SI Table 8A. Effect of Police Deployment Classification on Violence (Timing Change at Election) – Spatial Treatment Externalities (1 km)

| | Election week vs. week before | Election week vs. week before | Election week vs. 4-week pre-election average | Election week vs. 4-week pre-election average | 4-week average post vs. 4-week average before | 4-week average post vs. 4-week average before | 2-month average post vs. 2-month average before | 2-month average post vs. 2-month average before |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Med/High Security Deployment | -0.042 | -0.038 | -0.006 | -0.002 | 0.001 | 0.0002 | 0.015 | 0.016 |
| | (0.046) | (0.046 | (0.042) | (0.042) | (0.013) | (0.013) | (0.013) | (0.014) |
| PC treated within 1 km(=1) | 0.209 | | 0.153 | | 0.027 | | -0.006 | |
| | (0.151) | | (0.121) | | (0.03) | | (0.017) | |
| Total PCs within 1 km | -0.018 | -0.02 | -0.027 | -0.028 | -0.015*** | -0.014*** | -0.001 | -0.002 |
| | (0.018) | (0.018) | (0.017) | (0.017) | (0.005) | (0.005) | (0.009) | (0.01) |
| 1 treated PC within 1 km(=1) | | 0.205 | | 0.146 | | 0.033 | | -0.01 |
| | | (0.172) | | (0.142) | | (0.035) | | (0.018) |
| 2 treated PCs within 1 km(=1) | | 0.062 | | 0.027 | | 0.032 | | -0.019 |
| | | (0.082) | | (0.075) | | (0.031) | | (0.023) |
| 3 treated PC within 1 km(=1) | | 0.911 | | 0.837 | | -0.147* | | 0.128 |
| | | (0.694) | | (0.783) | | (0.082) | | (0.105) |
| SIGACTs (2-week lag) | 0.04 | 0.039 | | | | | | |
| | (0.185) | (0.184) | | | | | | |
| SIGACTs (3-week lag) | -0.03 | -0.027 | | | | | | |
| | (0.131) | (0.131) | | | | | | |
| SIGACTs (4-week lag) | -0.067 | -0.09 | | | | | | |
| | (0.131) | (0.129) | | | | | | |
| SIGACTs (5-week lag) | 0.356* | 0.359* | 0.269 | 0.271 | -0.037 | -0.038 | | |
| | (0.21) | (0.21) | (0.196) | (0.197) | (0.073) | (0.073) | | |
| SIGACTs (6-week lag) | | | -0.032 | -0.029 | -0.058 | -0.059 | | |
| | | | (0.198) | (0.197) | (0.049) | (0.049) | | |
| SIGACTs (7-week lag) | | | 0.156 | 0.153 | -0.017 | -0.017 | | |
| | | | (0.158) | (0.156) | (0.066) | (0.066) | | |
| SIGACTs (8-week lag) | | | -0.166 | -0.162 | -0.086 | -0.087 | | |
| | | | (0.173) | (0.172) | (0.063) | (0.063) | | |
| Total violence previous 5 months | 0.566 | 0.547 | 0.736 | 0.7 | -0.313 | -0.304 | -0.634*** | -0.639*** |
| | (0.678) | (0.667) | (0.601) | (0.575) | (0.247) | (0.246) | (0.19) | (0.19) |
| Total violence squared | 0.229 | 0.25 | -0.059 | -0.042 | 0.179 | 0.175 | -0.068 | -0.065 |
| | (0.487) | (0.48) | (0.398) | (0.387) | (0.122) | (0.122) | (0.113) | (0.113) |
| Total violence cubed | -0.068 | -0.069 | -0.043 | -0.046 | -0.035** | -0.034** | 0.008 | 0.008 |
| | (0.064) | (0.064) | (0.052) | (0.051) | (0.015) | (0.015) | (0.015) | (0.015) |
| Constant | 0.073*** | 0.072*** | 0.067*** | 0.066*** | 0.006 | 0.006 | 0.007 | 0.007 |
| | (0.019) | (0.019) | (0.017) | (0.017) | (0.008) | (0.008) | (0.011) | (0.011) |
| Observations | 1,823 | 1,823 | 1,823 | 1,823 | 1,823 | 1,823 | 1,823 | 1,823 |
| R-squared | 0.506 | 0.509 | 0.513 | 0.516 | 0.649 | 0.65 | 0.79 | 0.791 |

*Notes:* Replicates Table 3, but includes: a dummy variable that equals 1 if any polling center (PC) within a 1 km radius received treatment; total PCs within 1 km is a variable equal to the number of PCs within a 1 km radius; a dummy variable that equals 1 if one (two, and three) PC within a 1 km radius was treated. All regressions include district fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered at the district level in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

SI Table 8B. Effect of Police Deployment Classification on Violence (Timing Change at Election) – Spatial Treatment Externalities (2 km)

| | Election week vs. week before | Election week vs. week before | Election week vs. 4-week pre-election average | Election week vs. 4-week pre-election average | 4-week average post vs. 4-week average before | 4-week average post vs. 4-week average before | 2-month average post vs. 2-month average before | 2-month average post vs. 2-month average before |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Med/High Security Deployment | 0.005 | 0.004 | 0.034 | 0.032 | 0.008 | 0.009 | 0.015 | 0.015 |
| | (0.036) | (0.036) | (0.036) | (0.036) | (0.015) | (0.015) | (0.014) | (0.014) |
| PC treated within 2km(=1) | -0.051 | | -0.065 | | -0.014 | | -0.006 | |
| | (0.064) | | (0.07) | | (0.025) | | (0.015) | |
| Total PCs within 2km | 0.001 | 0.002 | -0.005 | -0.005 | -0.007** | -0.007** | -0.002 | -0.002 |
| | (0.009) | (0.009) | (0.008) | (0.008) | (0.003) | (0.003) | (0.004) | (0.004) |
| 1 treated PC within 2km(=1) | | -0.044 | | -0.065 | | -0.019 | | -0.009 |
| | | (0.074) | | (0.08) | | (0.029) | | (0.017) |
| 2 treated PCs within 2km(=1) | | -0.109 | | -0.093 | | -0.004 | | -0.003 |
| | | (0.15) | | (0.12) | | (0.023) | | (0.018) |
| 3 treated PC within 2km(=1) | | 0.034 | | 0.06 | | -0.01 | | 0.021 |
| | | (0.223) | | (0.216) | | (0.034) | | (0.035) |
| SIGACTs (2-week lag) | 0.046 | 0.047 | | | | | | |
| | (0.185) | (0.185) | | | | | | |
| SIGACTs (3-week lag) | -0.049 | -0.051 | | | | | | |
| | (0.13) | (0.13) | | | | | | |
| SIGACTs (4-week lag) | -0.059 | -0.059 | | | | | | |
| | (0.133) | (0.132) | | | | | | |
| SIGACTs (5-week lag) | 0.342 | 0.344 | 0.254 | 0.255 | -0.04 | -0.04 | | |
| | (0.212) | (0.212) | (0.199) | (0.199) | (0.073) | (0.073) | | |
| SIGACTs (6-week lag) | | | -0.031 | -0.031 | -0.056 | -0.056 | | |
| | | | (0.205) | (0.204) | (0.049) | (0.049) | | |
| SIGACTs (7-week lag) | | | 0.149 | 0.147 | -0.012 | -0.012 | | |
| | | | (0.165) | (0.164) | (0.064) | (0.064) | | |
| SIGACTs (8-week lag) | | | -0.155 | -0.155 | -0.077 | -0.077 | | |
| | | | (0.176) | (0.176) | (0.061) | (0.061) | | |
| Total violence previous 5 months | 0.537 | 0.525 | 0.691 | 0.685 | -0.31 | -0.308 | -0.619*** | -0.618*** |
| | (0.687) | (0.675) | (0.606) | (0.601) | (0.249) | (0.249) | (0.188) | (0.188) |
| Total violence squared | 0.251 | 0.256 | -0.029 | -0.025 | 0.161 | 0.159 | -0.076 | -0.077 |
| | (0.5) | (0.496) | (0.397) | (0.389) | (0.122) | (0.122) | (0.11) | (0.109) |
| Total violence cubed | 0.07 | -0.071 | -0.047 | -0.047 | -0.032** | -0.032** | 0.009 | 0.01 |
| | (0.066) | (0.066) | (0.052) | (0.051) | (0.015) | (0.015) | (0.015) | (0.014) |
| Constant | 0.063*** | 0.062*** | 0.065*** | 0.064*** | 0.011 | 0.011 | 0.01 | 0.01 |
| | (0.023) | (0.024) | (0.019) | (0.02) | (0.009) | (0.009) | (0.012) | (0.012) |
| Observations | 1,823 | 1,823 | 1,823 | 1,823 | 1,823 | 1,823 | 1,823 | 1,823 |
| R-squared | 0.503 | 0.503 | 0.511 | 0.511 | 0.649 | 0.65 | 0.791 | 0.791 |

*Notes:* Replicates Table 3, but includes: a dummy variable that equals 1 if any polling center (PC) within a 2 km radius received treatment; total PCs within 2 km is a variable equal to the number of PCs within a 2 km radius; a dummy variable that equals 1 if one (two, and three) PC within a 2 km radius was treated. All regressions include district fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered at the district level in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

SI Table 9. Effect of Police Deployment Classification on Polling Center-level Turnout in 2010 Election, Controlling for Turnout in 2009 Election – Spatial Treatment Externalities

| VARIABLES | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Medium/High Security Deployment | -32.224*** | | -26.516** | | -33.412*** | |
| | (11.702) | | (12.148) | | (11.69) | |
| Medium Security Deployment | | -43.388** | | -38.240** | | -43.284** |
| | | (16.937) | | (17.56) | | (16.884) |
| High Security Deployment | | -21.996 | | -16.414 | | -24.304* |
| | | (13.985) | | (14.125) | | (13.774) |
| PC treated within 1 km(=1) | 3.929 | 1.038 | | | | |
| | (21.405) | (21.716) | | | | |
| Total PCs within 1 km | -9.034*** | -9.048*** | | | -8.721** | -8.734** |
| | (3.471) | (3.457) | | | (3.484) | (3.472) |
| 1 treated PC within 1 km(=1) | | | -18.944 | -19.387 | | |
| | | | (16.799) | (16.798) | | |
| 2 treated PCs within 1 km(=1) | | | -2.838 | -2.89 | | |
| | | | (2.139) | (2.135) | | |
| 3 treated PCs within 1 km(=1) | | | | | 2.302 | -0.036 |
| | | | | | (21.833) | (22.173) |
| SIGACTs (1-week lag) | -1.46 | -1.409 | -2.953 | -2.794 | 0.52 | 0.535 |
| | (19.454) | (19.398) | (19.623) | (19.579) | (19.636) | (19.592) |
| SIGACTs (2-week lag) | -9.2 | -10.47 | -7.157 | -8.493 | -8.945 | -10.084 |
| | (17.218) | (17.073) | (17.169) | (17.033) | (17.051) | (16.935) |
| SIGACTs (3-week lag) | 3.656 | 3.254 | 1.236 | 0.915 | 2.254 | 1.916 |
| | (17.502) | (17.596) | (17.21) | (17.337) | (17.505) | (17.593) |
| SIGACTs (4-week lag) | -11.335 | -11.774 | -11.055 | -11.536 | -5.416 | -5.896 |
| | (24.391) | (24.506) | (23.814) | (23.968) | (23.407) | (23.477) |
| Total violence previous 5 months | 21.146 | 23.941 | 25.266 | 28.467 | 24.824 | 27.241 |
| | (74.083) | (76.034) | (74.394) | (76.486) | (73.961) | (75.684) |
| Total violence squared | 15.666 | 14.899 | 10.907 | 9.902 | 9.804 | 9.226 |
| | (47.854) | (48.498) | (47.631) | (48.332) | (47.014) | (47.597) |
| Total violence cubed | -3.076 | -2.959 | -2.443 | -2.297 | -2.639 | -2.544 |
| | (5.411) | (5.455) | (5.351) | (5.409) | (5.311) | (5.354) |
| Turnout in 2009 | 0.359*** | 0.359*** | 0.364*** | 0.364*** | 0.360*** | 0.359*** |
| | (0.052) | (0.052) | (0.052) | (0.052) | (0.052) | (0.052) |
| Constant | 256.191*** | 256.486*** | 255.178*** | 255.533*** | 256.334*** | 256.579*** |
| | (12.871) | (12.846) | (13.065) | (13.034) | (12.772) | (12.76) |
| District FE | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y |
| N | 1,823 | 1,823 | 1,823 | 1,823 | 1,823 | 1,823 |
| R2 | 0.494 | 0.495 | 0.493 | 0.494 | 0.497 | 0.497 |

*Notes*: Replicates column 8, Tables 4A-B, but includes: a dummy variable that equals 1 if any polling center (PC) within a 1 km radius received treatment; total PCs within 1 km is a variable equal to the number of PCs within a 1 km radius; a dummy variable that equals 1 if one (two, and three) PC within a 1 km radius was treated. Robust standard errors clustered on district in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

SI Table 10. Citizens' Fear of Voting and Fear of ANP

| | | *Fear when encountering ANP officers* | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | No fear | Some/a lot of fear | Total |
| *Fear of voting in a national election* | No fear | 1,714 | 806 | 2,520 |
| | | 58.84% | 24.07% | 40.25% |
| | Some/a lot of fear | 1,199 | 2,542 | 3,741 |
| | | 41.16% | 75.93% | 59.75% |
| | Total | 2,913 | 3,348 | 6,261 |
| | | 100% | 100% | 100% |

*Notes*: Pearson's $\chi^2_1 = 782.85$, $p<0.001$. Cells provide N and (column) percentages for responses to the question: "Now I will read you five different activities that you could participate in. Please, tell me, whether you would participate in the following activities with 'no fear', 'some fear' or a 'lot of fear'?" No response and refuse to answer were omitted for ease of presentation but does not affect results. Data are from the Asia Foundation's nationwide Afghanistan survey (wave 5), conducted in 2010, prior to the national election.

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