

Politics 554
International Security Studies

Princeton University
Fall Semester, 2016
Wednesday, 1:30 – 4:15 p.m.

008 Robertson Hall

Instructor: Jacob N. Shapiro
Office: 032 Corwin
jns@princeton.edu
Office Hours: Wednesday, 9-11 a.m.

International Security Studies is a seminar devoted to the security studies subfield of international relations. The primary audience is political science graduate students intending to take the qualifying exam and/or write a 591 paper dealing with security issues. Graduate students from other departments and advanced undergraduates with adequate preparation may be admitted to the course with permission from the instructor.

The course has three main objectives:

1. To understand the major theoretical perspectives in security studies and the challenges to providing reliable evidence for or against them.
2. To survey some of the most important substantive areas and debates in the field with an emphasis on recent contributions and tying academic research on security-related issues to policy.
3. To help students initiate one or more of their own research projects so they gain practical experience in elaborating a theoretical argument, drawing out testable implications, assembling and analyzing relevant evidence, and presenting the work. For some students this may entail producing a first draft of a 591 paper.

Goals 2 and 3 necessarily constrain our ability to cover the entire subfield. They also mean we will spend less time reading some of the classics than in other courses. We can spend part of our last class session developing a reading list of classics if desired. For summaries of the current security literature students should review appendix B which is current through 2010 or consult Jack Levy's remarkable syllabus which is current through 2015 (124 pages!): <http://fas-polisci.rutgers.edu/levy/syllabi/WarPeacesyllabus2015s.pdf>.

Course Requirements:

1. Class participation.

2. Paper presentations (30%). Each week two students will present. They will each be responsible for giving one of the papers we have read for that week. The presentation should walk the class through the logic of the paper, describe the magnitude and significance of the effects (either by calculating for papers with statistics or by answering the “compared to what?” question for qualitative papers) and/or importance of the theoretical point, and articulate what you understand the paper’s contribution to be. The last means you’ll need to do some citation mapping and skimming outside of the assigned readings. Work with replication data is also encouraged. Papers to be presented each week are noted below.
3. Two 5-7 page research designs (35% each). Each of which should lay out a plan for analyzing a key theoretical or empirical issue in security. The research designs should include:
 - a. A clear and succinct statement of a theoretical argument on an important question that you extract from the literature or develop yourself.
 - b. A characterization of the population of cases to which the theoretical argument/hypotheses apply, and the description of a sample (or way of sampling) from this population.
 - If it’s a theoretical proposal this section must lay out the contribution you expect to make and what paradigm you want to work in (game theory, ABM, systems dynamics, verbal theory, etc.).
 - If it’s an empirical proposal, this section must define how you plan to make inferentially credible claims, either detailing an identification strategy or outlining how your theory implies a set of observable relationships that are inconsistent with competing arguments.
 - c. A preliminary assessment or “plausibility probe” based on brief examination of one or more cases from a sample, or a “quick” coding of variables for a simple descriptive analysis or reduce-form regressions.
4. Research presentations. In the final week students will present one of their papers and receive feedback from the class.

I will not allow incompletes in this course, so plan accordingly. Grades will be based on paper presentations (30%) and research proposals (35% each). I will use class participation as a heuristic for moving people up or down by as much as a half-grade at the end of the course. All assignments must be turned in by 5 p.m. on January 17 and no late papers will be accepted under any circumstances. Papers turned in by 5 p.m. on December 17 will receive more detailed feedback.

Readings:

You may notice that some weeks have an awful lot to read. That’s intentional, grad school is like exercise, the more it hurts the stronger it makes you. There are many potential questions to ask of any given reading (appendix A provides guidance on how to think about papers when you review them for journals and has a pretty exhaustive list), but I usually take my notes in 5 sections:

1. Question. This is straightforward, what's the question they are trying to answer. Think of this as the author's answer for why you should spend some of your precious limited time on this planet reading their research.
2. Key DV. How do they operationalize the key concept? If you're studying democratization, and you put Polity score on the LHS of a regression, then your DV is Polity scores.
3. Claims. Which IV matter? In empirical papers this is usually about which IV influence the DV and the outcome for which it proxies. In theoretical papers this can be more subtle. It could be, for example, about what the causal processes that are consistent with both observed outcomes and some set of assumptions about how people make decisions.
4. Evidence. What's the evidence they adduce for the argument? For empirical papers this should include: (b) the nature of the data; (b) claims re. identification/how they establish the counterfactual; and (c) what, if anything, they say about external validity. For theoretical papers this is usually some set of linked logical claims, whether expressed mathematically or verbally.
5. Discussion. Do you buy it? If not why not? If so, is it important?

I have not ordered books since they can be purchased online, usually at lower prices. If you want something put on reserve at Firestone Library just ask. Articles can be downloaded and those which cannot will be available on Blackboard or library e-reserves.

As a security scholar you should have the following in your library:

- Kenneth N. Waltz. *Man, the State, and War* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959).
- Thomas C. Schelling. *Arms and Influence* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966).
- Kenneth N. Waltz. *Theory of International Politics* (Reading Mass.: Addison Wesley, 1979).
- John J. Mearsheimer. *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (New York: W.W. Norton, 2001)
- Kenneth A. Schulz. *Democracy and Coercive Diplomacy* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001).
- Stephen Biddle. *Military Power: Explaining Victory and Defeat in Modern Battle* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004).
- Eric Schlosser. *Command and Control* (New York: Penguin Books, 2013).

Some extremely useful things to be familiar with if you want to think seriously about security issues and how we can develop reliable knowledge about social phenomena:

- Herbert A. Simon, "Rational Decision Making in Business Organizations," Nobel Memorial Lecture (1978).
- Gary King, Robert O. Keohane, and Sidney Verba. *Designing Social Inquiry* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994).
- John Conlisk, "Why Bounded Rationality," *Journal of Economic Literature* 34 (June 1996): 669-700.

- Henry E. Brady and David Collier, eds. *Rethinking Social Inquiry: Diverse Tools, Shared Standards* (New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2004).
- Joshua Angrist and Jörn-Steffen Pischke. *Mostly Harmless Econometrics: An Empiricist's Companion* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009).
- Nancy Cartwright and Jeremy Hardie, *Evidence-Based Policy: A Practical Guide to Doing it Better* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012).

And if you want to work with data for a living, you should absolutely read Edward Tufte's four books:

- *The Visual Display of Quantitative Information*
- *Envisioning Information*
- *Visual Explanations: Images and Quantities, Evidence and Narrative*
- *Beautiful Information*

Schedule and Assignments:

Most weeks we will focus on substantive questions, e.g. 'why do wars happen?' We will spend one week on methods at the start of the course. Students will present research papers during the final week of the course.

Paper Assignments - TBD

Week 2:

Week 3:

Week 4:

Week 5: N/A Yom Kippur

Week 6:

Week 7:

Week 8:

Week 9:

Week 10:

Course Organization

The course is divided into two sections. Weeks 2-6 will cover some topics you just need to get a handle on, including: methods in security (not the normal ones...); where the frontier is in empirical work on conflict; why wars happen; and two cuts on the role of domestic politics. Weeks 7-10 will be chosen by you guys from the following options. Weeks 11 and 12 will be student presentations given the size of the class. I have put past readings in weeks 7-11 to give you a sense of the kinds of substantive weeks we have had:

- Proliferation
- Insurgency and civil war
- Aid and conflict
- Elections and violence
- Endogenously ungoverned spaces
- Experiments in security

- Strategic culture
- The resource curse
- Working with proxies
- Religion and conflict

Week 1 (9/14): Methods in Security (and other fields). Students will coordinate to assign response papers and syllabi input at the end class. Readings listed below for the week are recommended.

Required readings

- a. Nancy Cartwright and Jeremy Hardie, *Evidence-Based Policy: A Practical Guide to Doing it Better* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), Part One and Part Five. Preface and conclusion recommended. This is about external validity.
- b. Joshua Angrist. *Mostly Harmless Econometrics: An Empiricist's Companion* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009), Chps 1-2. This is about how you establish causality.
- c. A smorgasbord on ML and social science, including:
 - i http://stanford.edu/~jgrimmer/bd_2.pdf
 - ii Hal Varian, "Causal inference in economics and marketing", PNAS 113(27):7310-15.
 - iii <http://people.ischool.berkeley.edu/~hal/Papers/2013/ml.pdf>

Recommended Readings

1. How do we make inferences about the world
 - a. Gary King, Robert O. Keohane, and Sidney Verba. *Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Interference in Qualitative Research* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), Chps. 1-4, 6 required.
 - b. John Lewis Gaddis. *The Landscape of History* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), Chps. 4-5.
 - c. Andrew Bennett and Alexander George, *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences* (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2005), Chps. 1, 7, 12, and appendix.
 - d. James Fearon, "Counterfactuals and Hypothesis Testing in Political Science," *World Politics* 43 (January 1991): 169-195.
2. Rational choice?
 - a. Steven M. Walt, "Rigor or Rigor Mortis? Rational Choice and Security Studies," *International Security* 23 (1999): 5-48.
 - b. Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and James D. Morrow, "Sorting Through the Wealth of Notions," *International Security* 24 (1999): 56-73.
 - c. John Conlisk, "Why Bounded Rationality," *Journal of Economic Literature* 34 (June 1996): 669-700.
3. Thinking clearly about causation and external validity
 - a. Nancy Cartwright and Jeremy Hardie, *Evidence-Based Policy: A Practical Guide to Doing it Better* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), Part One and Part Five. Preface and conclusion recommended.
 - b. Joshua Angrist. *Mostly Harmless Econometrics: An Empiricist's Companion* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009), Chps 1-2.

- c. Recommended but not required: Guido Imbens and Jeffrey Woolridge, "Recent Developments in the Econometrics of Program Evaluation," *Journal of Economic Literature* 47 (2009): 5-86.
- 4. A case study:
 - a. Robert Pape. *Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism* (New York: Random House, 2005) or Robert Pape, "The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism," *American Political Science Review* 97:3 (August 2003): 343-361.
 - b. Scott Ashworth, Joshua Clinton, Adam Meirowitz and Kristopher Ramsay, "Design, Inference, and the Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism," AMCR (August 2007).
 - c. Robert Pape, "Methods and Findings in the Study of Suicide Terrorism," *American Political Science Review* 102: 2 (May 2008): 275-277.
 - d. Scott Ashworth, Joshua Clinton, Adam Meirowitz, and Kristopher Ramsay, "Design, Inference, and the Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism: A Rejoinder," AMCR (August 2008).

Week 2 (9/21): Work from the Empirical Frontier (CLASS TO START EARLY)

Students to present readings 1 and 2.

- 1. Allan Dafoe and Devin Caughey. "Honor and War: Southern U.S. Presidents and the Effects of Concern for Reputation." *World Politics*. 68(2). 2016.
- 2. Arindrajit Dube & Ethan Kaplan & Suresh Naidu, 2011. "Coups, Corporations, and Classified Information," *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, vol. 126(3), pages 1375-1409.
- 3. Christopher Blattman and Jeannie Annan. "Can Employment Reduce Lawlessness and Rebellion? A Field Experiment with High-Risk Men in a Fragile State." *American Political Science Review*. 2016.
- 4. Saumitra Jha and Steven Wilkinson. "Does Combat Experience Foster Organizational Skill? Evidence from Ethnic Cleansing During the Partition of South Asia." *American Political Science Review*.

Week 3 (9/28): Why Do Wars Happen?

- 1. Game Theoretic Accounts
 - a. James Fearon, "Rationalist Explanations for War," *International Organization* 49:3 (Summer 1995): 379-414.
 - b. Matthew O. Jackson and Massimo Morelli, "Political Bias and War," *American Economic Association* 97:4 (September 2007): 1353-1373.
 - c. Matthew O. Jackson and Massimo Morelli, "The Reasons for War – an Updated Survey," in Chris Coyne, ed., *Handbook on the Political Economy of War* (Elgar Publishing, 2011).
- 2. Traditional Rationalist Accounts – Student to present these three as a package
 - a. Stephen Van Evera, "The Cult of the Offensive and the Origins of the First World War," *International Security* 9:1 (Summer 1984): 58-107.
 - b. Keir A. Lieber, "The New History of World War I and what It Means for International Relations Theory," *International Security* 32:2 (Fall 2007) 155-191.

- c. Jack Snyder and Keir A. Lieber, "Correspondence: Defensive Realism and the 'New' History of World War I," *International Security* 33:1 (Summer 2008): 174-194.
- 3. A Syncretic View – Student to present
 - a. Dale Copeland. *The Origins of Major War* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001).

Recommended Reading:

- John Steinbruner. *The Cybernetic Theory of Decision-Making* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974).
- Dan Reiter, "Exploring the Bargaining Model of War," *Perspectives on Politics, American Political Science Association* 1 (2003): 27-43.

Week 4 (10/5): Domestic Politics and Interstate War Part I: Are Democracies Different?

- 1. Democratic Peace – Student to present Cederman
 - a. Lars-Erik Cederman, "Back to Kant: Reinterpreting the Democratic Peace as a Macrohistorical Learning Process," *American Political Science Review* 95 (March 2001): 15-31.
 - b. Sebastian Rosato, "The Flawed Logic of Democratic Peace Theory," *American Political Science Review* 97 (2003): 585-602.
 - c. Jessica L. Weeks, "Autocratic Audience Costs: Regime Type and Signaling Resolve," *International Organization* 62:1 (January 2008): 65-101.
- 2. Domestic Institutions and Military Power – Student to present Schultz & Weingast, Stasavage, and Scheve & Stasavage as a package.
 - a. Reiter & Stam, "Democracy, War Initiation, and Victory," *American Political Science Review* 92 (1993):377-389.
 - b. Stephen Rosen, "Military Effectiveness: Why Society Matters," *International Security* 19 (Spring 1995): 5-31.
 - c. Stephen Biddle and Stephen Long, "Democracy and Military Effectiveness: A Deeper Look," *JCR* 48/4 (August 2004): 525-46.
 - d. Alex B. Downes, "How Smart and Tough Are Democracies? Reassessing Theories of Democratic Victory in War," *International Security* 33(4): 9-51
 - e. Jason Lyall, "Do Democracies Make Inferior Counterinsurgents: Reassessing Democracy's Impact on War Outcomes and Duration," *International Organization* 64(1): 167-192.
 - f. Kenneth Schultz and Barry Weingast, "The Democratic Advantage: The Institutional Sources of State Power in International Competition," *International Organization* 57 (Winter 2003): 3-42.
 - g. David Stasavage, "Cities, Constitutions, and Sovereign Borrowing in Europe, 1274 -1785," *International Organization* 61 (Summer 2007): 489-525.
 - h. Kenneth Scheve and David Stasavage, "Democracy, War, and Wealth," *American Political Science Review* 106 (2012):81-102.

Week 5 (10/12): No Class, Yom Kippur

Week 6 (10/19): Domestic Politics and Interstate War Part II: Decision Making and Bureaucracy

1. Domestic Politics and Foreign policy decision-making. Student to present on Kaufman and Pape.
 - a. Chaim Kaufman and Robert Pape, "Explaining Costly Moral Action: Britain's Sixty-year Campaign against the Atlantic Slave Trade," *International Organization* 53 (1999):631-668.
 - b. Chaim Kaufmann, "Threat Inflation and the Failure of the Marketplace of Ideas: The Selling of the Iraq War," *IS 29/1* (Summer 2004): 5-48.
 - c. John Aldrich, Christopher Gelpi, Peter Feaver, Jason Reifer, and Kristin Sharp, "Foreign Policy And The Electoral Connection," *Annual Review of Political Science* 9 (2006): 477-502.

Optional: Matthew O. Jackson and Massimo Morelli, "War, Transfers, and Political Bias," *American Economic Review* 97:4 (September 2007): 1353-1373.

2. Bureaucracy. Student to present on Hammong and Bendor and Hammond.
 - a. Thomas Hammond, "Agenda Control, Organizational Structure, and Bureaucratic Politics." *American Journal of Political Science* (1986).
 - b. Jonathan Bendor and Thomas Hammond, "Rethinking Allison's Models," *American Political Science Review* 86:2 (1992): 301-322.
 - c. Amy Zegart, *Spying Blind: The CIA, the FBI, and the Origins of 9/11* (Princeton University Press: 2009).
3. And some amazing stories of organizational/bureaucratic happenstance:
 - a. <http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2012/oct/27/vasili-arkhipov-stopped-nuclear-war>
 - b. http://faculty.virginia.edu/nuclear/vault/readings/sagan_limits_of_safety.pdf
 - c. <http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2013/09/30/nukes-of-hazard>

Week 7 (10/26): Experiments in Security

1. Milner and co. Uganda experiments on foreign aid, as below
 - a. Multilateral vs. bilateral:
<http://www.princeton.edu/~hmlner/working%20papers/EffectofMLvsBLAidonRecipientBehavioralSupport.pdf>
 - b. Impact on political feedback cycles
<http://www.princeton.edu/~hmlner/working%20papers/WhichDevilInDevelopment.pdf>
2. Experiments and IR
 - a. Michael Tomz and Jessica Weeks, "Public Opinion and the Democratic Peace," *American Political Science Review* 107, no. 4 (November 2013): 849–865.

- b. Andy Baker, "Race, Paternalism, and Foreign Aid: Evidence from U.S. Public Opinion," *American Political Science Review* (2015) 109: 93-109.
- 3. What should we make of experiments, some examples from economics
 - a. John A. List, "Does Market Experience Eliminate Market Anomalies?," *Quarterly Journal of Economics* (2003) 118: 41-71.
 - b. John A. List, "Does Market Experience Eliminate Market Anomalies? The Case of Exogenous Market Experience," *NBER Working Paper* #16908, <http://www.nber.org/papers/w16908>.
- 3. Development research with security implications (2nd two to be skimmed, read Callen and Long):
 - a. Michael Callen and James D. Long, "Institutional Corruption and Election Fraud: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Afghanistan." *American Economic Review* 105, no. 1 (2015), 354-81.
 - b. Paul Collier and Pedro C. Vicente, "Votes and Violence: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Nigeria," *The Economic Journal* 124, no. 574 (February 2014): F327-F355.
 - c. Marcel Fafchamps and Pedro C. Vicente, "Political Violence and Social Networks: Experimental Evidence from a Nigerian Election." *Journal of Development Economics* 101 (March 2013): 27-48.

Week 8 (11/9): Aid and Conflict

1. Boix, Carles. "Democracy, development, and the international system." *American Political Science Review* 105.4 (2011): 809-28.
2. Richard A. Nielsen, Michael G. Findley, Zachary S. Davis, Tara Candland, and Daniel L. Nielson, "Foreign Aid Shocks as a Cause of Violent Armed Conflict." *American Journal of Political Science* 55 (2011): 219-232.
3. Nathan Nunn and Nancy Qian, "US Food Aid and Civil Conflict." *American Economic Review* vol. 104, no. 6 (2014): 1630-1666
4. Raghurman Rajan and Arvind Subramanian, "Does Aid Affect Governance?" *American Economic Review* 97 (2007): 322-327.
5. Raghurman Rajan and Arvind Subramanian, "Aid and Growth: What Does the Cross-Country Evidence Really Show?" *Review of Economics and Statistics* 90 (2008): 643-665.
6. William Easterly, "The Cartel of Good Intentions: Bureaucracy versus markets in foreign aid." Center for Global Development, Working Paper Number 4 (2002), <http://www.cgdev.org/publication/cartel-good-intentions-markets-vs-bureaucracy-foreign-aid-working-paper-4>.
7. Eli Berman, Joseph H. Felter, Jacob N. Shapiro, and Erin Troland, "Modest, Secure, and Informed." NBER Working Paper 18674 (2013), <http://www.nber.org/papers/w18674>.
8. Joseph Wright and Matthew Winters, "The Politics of Effective Foreign Aid." *Annual Review of Political Science* 13 (2010): 61-80.

Week 9 (11/16): Transnational Crime

1. Jeff Clemens, "An Analysis of Economic Warfare," *AER Perspectives* 103, no. 3 (2013): 523-527.

2. Melissa Dell, "Trafficking Networks and the Mexican Drug War", *American Economic Review*, vol 105, no. 6 (2015): 1739-79.
3. Paulo Mauro, "Corruption and Growth", *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* 110, no. 3 (August, 1995): 681-712.
4. Dal Bó, Ernesto, Pedro Dal Bó, and Rafael di Tella, "'Plata o Plomo?': Bribe and Punishment in a Theory of Political Influence." *American Political Science Review* 100, no. 1 (February, 2006): 41-53.
5. Additional article TBD, possibly piracy
6. Additional article TBD, possibly gang conflict

Week 10 (11/30): Topic TBD – Below is last year's on space security

1. Keir A. Lieber, "Grasping the Technological Peace: The Offense-Defense Balance and International Security." *International Security* 25, no. 1 (Summer 2000): 71-104.
2. Bruce M. DeBlois, Richard L. Garwin, R. Scott Kemp, and Jeremy C. Marwell. "Space Weapons: Crossing the U.S. Rubicon." *International Security* 29, no. 2 (Fall 2004): 50-84.
3. Keren Yarhi-Milo, "In the Eye of the Beholder: How Leaders and Intelligence Communities Assess the Intentions of Adversaries." *International Security* 38, no. 1 (2013): 7-51
4. Elinor Ostrom, "Beyond Markets and States: Polycentric Governance of Complex Economic Systems," *American Economic Review* 100 (June 2010): 1-33.
5. Juan-Pablo Montero, "A Simple Auction Mechanism for the Optimal Allocation of the Commons," *AER* 98, no. 1 (2008): 496-518.
6. Ashley J. Tellis, "China's Military Space Strategy," *Survival* 49: 3, 41–72.
<http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00396330701564752#.VNk7k9LFZ0>

Week 11 (12/7): Civil War, Insurgency, and Terrorism

1. Maria J. Stephan and Erica Chenoweth. "Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict." *International Security* 33, no. 1 (Summer 2008): 7-44.
2. Robert Powell, "Monopolizing Violence and Consolidating Power," *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* 128 (2013): 807–859.
3. James Fearon, "Economic Development, Insurgency, and Civil War." In Elhanan Helpman ed., *Institutions and Economic Performance* (Harvard University Press, 2008): 292-238.
4. Edward Miguel, Shanker Satyanath, and Ernest Sergenti, "Economic Shocks and Civil Conflict: An Instrumental Variables Approach," *Journal of Political Economy* 112 (August 2004): 725-753.
5. Melissa Dell, Benjamin F. Jones, and Benjamin A. Olken, "What Do We Learn from the Weather? The New Climate-Economy Literature." *Journal of Economic Literature* 52, no. 3 (2014): 740-98.

6. David Cunningham, Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, and Idean Salehyan. "Explaining External Support for Insurgent Groups," *International Organization* 65, no. 4 (2011): 709-744.
7. Eric Chaney, "Revolt on the Nile: Economic Shocks, Religion, and Political Power." *Econometrica* 81, no. 5 (September 2013): 2033-2053.

Recommended:

8. Christopher Blattman and Edward Miguel, "Civil War," *Journal of Economic Literature* 48, no. 1 (2010): 3-57.
9. Eli Berman and Aila M. Mattanock, "The Empiricist's Insurgency," *Annual Review of Political Science* (2015), posted in Course Materials section of Blackboard.

Weeks 11 and 12 (12/7 and 12/14): Student Presentations

13 Class Presentations:

- 1.
- 2.
- 3.
- 4.
- 5.
- 6.
- 7.
- 8.
- 9.
- 10.
- 11.
- 12.
- 13.

Appendix A: How to Read and Review an Academic Paper

These comments apply best to quantitative empirical papers, but are also applicable to formal theory and qualitative or comparative works. They draw on my experiences, a checklist by Chris Blattman (who draws on similar checklists from Alain de Janvry, Elisabeth Sadoulet, and Macartan Humphreys), and the nice review pieces by Miller et. al. (2013).

A good review should be separated into two sections. Put your recommendation on the disposition of the paper into your confidential comments to the editor with a one or two sentence explanation why. Make the comments to the author constructive and useful, regardless of what you think should be done with the paper.

General strategies

Treat reviews with the respect you would want your own work to receive. A review report for a serious article being considered for a top journal could take you a serious amount of time, such as a day.

Reviews vary in length a great deal. Two to four pages of comments are customary, longer is reasonable if the article is likely to be exceptionally important but needs substantial revision. Shorter reviews would be acceptable for clear “accept” or clear “reject” cases, though you should be able to generate detailed comments on even the best papers (or help out the worst ones).

Reviews should be courteous and professional. Think of how you would like to be treated. Do not be insulting or devastating. Do not be sarcastic, cruel, mocking, haughty or dismissive. Frame your critiques constructively whenever possible. Even if you are recommending rejection, you do the editors and authors a favor by explaining how they could address the concern in the current work (or, as a last resort, future work).

Be clear about what you see as the central and important issues, and put this material at the beginning. Use sub-points or a later section for points of moderate importance. Cluster small comments and quibbles, or minor corrections you see, as the very end. Do not force the editor to read the entire review to get the main points. Your critiques should be thorough and persuasive. A gut feeling that something is wrong is not enough. Do the work to figure out whether your instincts are correct or not.

Remember, if the paper is good you have a responsibility to the authors to give the editor reasons to accept it. If the paper is bad you have a responsibility to the field and to science to make sure it is not published, at least not until the problems are fixed.

Do not hold a paper up with suggestions for extensions unless they are critical to the central contribution of the paper. Let the authors decide, it's their paper.

Research question and hypothesis

- Is the researcher focused on well-defined questions?
- Are the questions interesting and important?

- Are the propositions falsifiable?
- Have alternative hypotheses been clearly stated?

Substantive importance

- How does the paper inform the profession or the subfield more broadly? Did the argument, method or result change how you think about a broadly important question or issue?
- What is the most general application of this finding? Has the author made that case clearly and persuasively?
- If the question and issue is fairly specialized, is a major contribution in this sub field (or sub sub field) sufficiently important?
- Is there real-world importance of the issue? Is this something people making policy should know?

Theory/Model

- Does the theory clarify some pre-existing uncertainty? Secondly, is anything about the theory novel or surprising? Be careful here, what may seem second nature to you after reading a really nice theoretical argument likely did not immediately beforehand.
- Is the idea being presented simple and self-evident enough that a formal or detailed treatment of the theory is not required, or could a more formal treatment be useful in the main body or an appendix?
- Is the theory/model clear, insightful, and appropriate?
- Could the theory benefit from being more explicit, developed, or formal? Could it benefit from being simpler and less formal?
- Are there clear predictions that can be falsified? Are these predictions “risky” enough? Does the theory generate any prohibitions that can be tested?
- How are the theories’ predictions different from simpler alternatives? Are those differences important and testable?
- Could there be alternative models that produce similar predictions—that is, does evidence on the predictions necessarily weigh on the model or explanation?
- Does the theory rely on substantively reasonable assumptions and have those been validated in some way?
- Is the theory actually a theory, or a just list of predictions?
- Does it feel like the theory was derived after the results, moved to the front of the paper, and then “tested” with data?
- Is the theory consistent with past literature and findings?
- Are elements that are excluded or simplified plausibly unimportant for the outcomes?
- Is the theory general or specific? Are there more general theories on which this theory could draw or contribute?

Empirical strategy (from theory to hypotheses and tests)

- Is the empirical strategy related to or derived from the theory?
 - Are predictions simply stated or are they derived logically?
- Is the theory needed to generate the hypotheses? Would other theories do so as well?

- Does the theory generate more hypotheses than considered?
- Does the theory suggest heterogeneous effects?
- Have all the relevant predictions and empirical strategies been employed?
 - Does the paper ignore important descriptive analysis in favor of a jump to causal inference?
 - Are there pieces of evidence (patterns, levels, etc) that would support the theoretical approach?
 - Are there assumptions made in the theory that have not been tested or articulated?
- Is the approach inductive, deductive, or an exercise in data mining? Is this the right structure?
- Could the question be addressed with another approach?
- Does the theory suggest heterogeneous effects?
- Do the tests match the theory in that concepts in the theory are well-represented by the measures that author is using.

Data and measures

- Are the data clearly described?
 - Summary statistics
 - Clear statement of sources
 - Could you replicate what they did
- Is the choice of data well-suited to the question and test?
- Could the data sources or collection method be biased?
 - Is collection of key variables likely to be correlated in any way with outcomes? What about treatment status?
 - Are there any worrying sources of measurement error or missing data?
 - Have the authors described the consequences of any data problems for their inferences (e.g. magnitude and direction of bias)
- Are there sample size or power issues?
- Are there better sources of data that you would recommend?
- Are there types of data that should have been reported, or would have been useful or essential in the empirical analysis?

Measurement

- Do they provide details of the measurement and construction of major variables
- Do the measures capture the objects specified by the theory? Are any proxies reasonable?
- If the data are from other sources, have they established the credibility of those sources or given evidence that they know enough about them to be sure the data are of high quality?
- If the data are from surveys, have they described enough of the survey procedures to provide evidence of quality?

Causal identification and internal validity

- Is the “cause” clear? Is there a cause/treatment/program/first stage?

- Is the specific method and counterfactual clearly defined? Is it compelling?
- Is the method for identifying the causal effect clear and compelling? Has statistical inference been confused with causal inference?
- Does the research design identify a very narrow or a very general source of variation?
- Does the analysis conform with the “latest technology” for that particular method?
- Useful trick: ask yourself, “What experiment would someone run to answer this question?”
- Did the author make any assumptions for identification (e.g. of distributions, exogeneity, etc)? Were these assumptions tested and, if not, how would you test them?
- Some specific things to look out for:
 - Does the argument for exogeneity of treatment draw on knowledge of the treatment, or do they simply throw in standard panel data controls without justification?
 - Is there selection not just in who receives the “treatment”, but in who we observe, or who we measure?
 - Could differencing, or the use of fixed effects, exacerbate any measurement error?
 - Are there concerns of attenuation bias or systematic measurement bias from measurement error?
 - Are there concerns of reverse causality?
 - Are there concerns of omitted variables?
 - If using instruments, have they clearly discussed plausibility of exogeneity, exclusion restrictions and strength? Has the instrument been used previously to test a different causal relationship? If so there’s an issue there for the exclusion restriction.
 - Is matching confused with a solution for unobservable selection?
 - Does their argument for identification have testable ancillary predictions and if so do they check them?

Other aspects of empirical analysis

- Are the statistical techniques well suited to the problem at hand? Is the empirical model used consistent with the theory?
- What are the endogenous and exogenous variables? Is it clear?
- Has the paper adequately dealt with concerns about measurement error, simultaneity, omitted variables, selection, and other forms of bias and identification problems?
- Are the results demonstrated to be robust to alternative assumptions? How complete and persuasive are these robustness tests?
- Is the depth of robustness checks consistent with the seriousness of the issue at hand?
- Have they shown you where the results break and discussed what that tells us about the internal and external validity of the analysis.
- Does the disturbance term have an interpretation, or is it just tacked on?
- Are the observations i.i.d., and if not, have corrections to the standard errors been made? Have they discussed how standard errors are calculated.

- What additional tests of the empirical strategy would you suggest for robustness and confidence in the research strategy?
- Are there any dangers in the empirical strategy (e.g. sensitivity to identification assumptions)?
- Can you imagine a better, or alternative, empirical strategy?
- Look at the “not significant” effects: are they substantively large? Do the confidence intervals include very large effects?

Results

- Are the results presented in an intuitive and clear way? Could this be improved?
- Do the authors do the simplest thing that makes the point or do they use unnecessarily complicated methods?
- Is substantive significance of results clearly explained and discussed, or is the focus merely on statistical significance?
- Do the results adequately answer the question at hand?
- Are the conclusions convincing? Are appropriate caveats mentioned?
- What variation in the data identifies the elements of the model?
- Are there alternative explanations for the results, and can we test for them? Do the results admit rival interpretations? If so is this important/acknowledged.
- Could the author have taken the analysis further, to look for impact heterogeneity, for causal mechanisms, for effects on other variables, etc?
- Is absence of evidence confused with evidence of absence?

Scope and external validity

- Can we generalize these results?
- Is the population examined representative of the larger population of interest? If not are the implications of the findings different than what the authors say?
- Has the author specified the scope conditions?
- Are the conditions under which the relationship of interest is examined consistent with the conditions of interest for other scholars or policy makers?
- Have casual mechanisms been explored?
- Are there further types of analysis that would illuminate the external validity, or the causal mechanism at work?
- Are there other data or approaches that would complement the current one?
- Do any policy implications really follow from the results?

General organization

- Has the study been presented in a way that it can be replicated?
- Is the paper laid out logically and follow, to some degree, the scientific method?
- If empirical, are there clear and logically ordered sections for theory, empirical strategy, data, measurement, results, etc.? If theoretical, do the authors lay out clearly the players and structure of the interaction, their utility functions, the resulting best responses, and then characterize the equilibrium of interest and its substantively important comparative statics?

For other weeks

5. Include Laura and Gaurav's paper on insurgency in India
6. Add Berman et. al. piece on taxation and conflict in the PI
- 7.

Appendix B: The Literature through 2010 per Downes, Krebs, etc.. Needs to be updated, maybe by someone studying for comps!

Neorealism, Defensive Realism, and Offense-Defense Theory

Recommended Advocates:

- Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979), chapters 4-9.
- Robert Jervis, "Cooperation under the Security Dilemma," *WP* 30/2 (January 1978): 167-214.
- Charles L. Glaser, "Realists as Optimists: Cooperation as Self-Help," *IS* 19/3 (Winter 1994/95): 50-90.
- Stephen Van Evera, "Offense, Defense, and the Causes of War," *IS* 22/4 (Spring 1998): 5-43.
- Keir Lieber, "Grasping the Technological Peace: The Offense-Defense Balance and International Security," *IS* 25/1 (Summer 2000): 71-104.
- João Resende-Santos, *Neorealism, States, and the Modern Mass Army* (Cambridge, 2007).
- Andrew H. Kydd, *Trust and Mistrust in International Relations* (Princeton, 2005).
- ❖ Michael E. Brown, Owen R. Coté, Jr., Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller, eds., *Offense, Defense, and War* (MIT, 2004).
- ❖ Karen Ruth Adams, "Attack and Conquer? International Anarchy and the Offense-Defense-Deterrence Balance," *IS* 28/3 (Winter 2003/04): 45-83.
- ❖ Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, "Security Seeking Under Anarchy: Defensive Realism Revisited," *IS* 25/3 (Winter 2000/01): 128-61.
- Kenneth N. Waltz, "Structural Realism after the Cold War," *IS* 25/1 (Summer 2000): 5-41.
- ❖ Stephen Van Evera, *The Causes of War, Vol. 1: Power and the Roots of Conflict* (Cornell, 1999).
- ❖ Charles L. Glaser and Chaim Kaufmann, "What Is the Offense-Defense Balance and How Can We Measure It?" *IS* 22/4 (Spring 1998): 44-82.
- Charles L. Glaser, "The Security Dilemma Revisited," *WP* 50/1 (October 1997): 171-201.
- Andrew Kydd, "Sheep in Sheep's Clothing: Why Security Seekers Do Not Fight Each Other," *SS* 7/1 (Autumn 1997): 114-54.
- ❖ Andrew Kydd, "Game Theory and the Spiral Model," *WP* 49/3 (April 1997): 371-400.
- João Resende-Santos, "Anarchy and the Emulation of Military Systems: Military Organization and Technology in South America, 1870-1914," *SS* 5/3 (Spring 1996): 193-260.

- Stephen M. Walt, *Revolution and War* (Cornell, 1996).
- ❖ Sean M. Lynn-Jones, "Offense-Defense Theory and its Critics," *SS* 4/4 (Summer 1995): 660-94.
- Charles L. Glaser, "Political Consequences of Military Strategy: Expanding and Refining the Spiral and Deterrence Models," *WP* 44/4 (July 1992): 497-538.
- Barry R. Posen, *Inadvertent Escalation: Conventional War and Nuclear Risks* (Cornell, 1991).
- ❖ Thomas J. Christensen and Jack Snyder, "Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks: Predicting Alliance Patterns in Multipolarity," *IO* 44/2 (Spring 1990): 137-68.
- Stephen M. Walt, "The Case for Finite Containment: Analyzing U.S. Grand Strategy," *IS* 14/1 (Summer 1989): 5-49.
- ❖ Kenneth N. Waltz, "The Origins of War in Neorealist Theory," in *The Origin and Prevention of Major Wars*, ed. Robert I. Rotberg and Theodore K. Rabb (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 39-52.
- ❖ Stephen Walt, *The Origins of Alliances* (Cornell, 1987).
- ❖ Barry R. Posen, *The Sources of Military Doctrine* (Cornell, 1984).
- ❖ Stephen Van Evera, "The Cult of the Offensive and the Origins of the First World War," *IS* 9/1 (Summer 1984): 58-108. Reprinted in *Military Strategy and the Origins of the First World War*, ed. Steven E. Miller, Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Stephen Van Evera (Princeton, 1991), 59-109.
- George Quester, *Offense and Defense in the International System* (New York: Wiley, 1977).
- ❖ Robert Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics* (Princeton, 1976), 58-113 (Chapter 3: "Deterrence, the Spiral Model, and the Intentions of the Adversary").

Recommended Critiques:

- ❖ Keir Lieber, "The New History of World War I and What it Means for International Relations Theory," *IS* 32/2 (Fall 2007): 155-91.
- ❖ Evan Braden Montgomery, "Breaking Out of the Security Dilemma: Realism, Reassurance, and the Problem of Uncertainty," *IS* 31/2 (Fall 2006): 151-85.
- Yoav Gortzak, Yoram Z. Haftel, and Kevin Sweeney, "Offense-Defense Theory: An Empirical Assessment," *JCR* 49/1 (February 2005): 67-89.
- Keir Lieber, *War and the Engineers: The Primacy of Politics over Technology* (Cornell, 2005).
- Stephen Biddle, "Rebuilding the Foundations of Offense-Defense Theory," *JOP* 63/3 (August 2001): 741-74.
- Peter D. Feaver, et al., "Correspondence: Brother Can You Spare a Paradigm? (Or Was Anybody Ever a Realist?)," *IS* 25/1 (Summer 2000): 165-93.
- ❖ Jeffrey W. Legro and Andrew Moravcsik, "Is Anybody Still a Realist?" *IS* 24/2 (Fall 1999): 5-55.
- Richard K. Betts, "Must War Find a Way? A Review Essay," *IS* 24/2 (Fall 1999): 166-98 (review of Van Evera, *Causes of War*).
- Alexander Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics* (Cambridge, 1999).

- ❖ John A. Vasquez, “The Realist Paradigm and Degenerative versus Progressive Research Programs: An Appraisal of Neotraditional Research on Waltz’s Balancing Proposition,” *APSR* 91/4 (December 1997): 899-912, and responses by Waltz, Christensen and Snyder, Elman and Elman, Schweller, and Walt.
- ❖ James D. Fearon, “The Offense-Defense Balance and War Since 1648” (unpub. ms., April 1997, available at <http://www.stanford.edu/~jfearon>).
- ❖ Colin Elman, “Horses for Courses: Why *Not* Neorealist Theories of Foreign Policy?” *JS* 6/1 (Autumn 1996): 7-53.
- ❖ Randall L. Schweller, “Neorealism’s Status Quo Bias: What Security Dilemma?” *JS* 5/3 (Spring 1996): 90-121.
- Dan Reiter, “Exploding the Powder Keg Myth: Preemptive Wars Almost Never Happen,” *IS* 20/2 (Fall 1995): 5-34.
- Jonathan Shimshoni, “Technology, Military Advantage, and World War I: A Case for Military Entrepreneurship,” *IS* 15/3 (Winter 1990/91): 187-215.
- ❖ Robert O. Keohane, ed., *Neorealism and its Critics* (Columbia, 1986).
- ❖ Jack S. Levy, “The Offensive/Defensive Balance of Military Technology: A Theoretical and Historical Analysis,” *ISQ* 28/2 (June 1984): 219-38.

Recommended, “Neoclassical” Realism:

- Randall L. Schweller, *Unanswered Threats: Political Constraints on the Balance of Power* (Princeton, 2006).
- Randall L. Schweller, “Unanswered Threats: A Neoclassical Realist Theory of Underbalancing,” *IS* 29/4 (Fall 2004): 159-201.
- Gideon Rose, “Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy,” *WP* 51/1 (October 1998): 144-72.
- Fareed Zakaria, *From Wealth to Power: The Unusual Origins of America’s World Role* (Princeton, 1998).
- ❖ Randall L. Schweller, *Deadly Imbalances: Tripolarity and Hitler’s Strategy of World Conquest* (Columbia, 1998).
- Thomas J. Christensen, *Useful Adversaries: Grand Strategy, Domestic Mobilization, and Sino-American Conflict, 1947-1958* (Princeton, 1996).
- ❖ Randall L. Schweller, “Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In,” *IS* 19/1 (Summer 1994): 72-107.
- William Curti Wohlforth, *The Elusive Balance: Power and Perceptions during the Cold War* (Cornell, 1993).

Offensive Realism

Recommended Advocates:

- John J. Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (New York: Norton, 2001).
- Colin Elman, “Extending Offensive Realism: The Louisiana Purchase and America’s Rise to Regional Hegemony,” *APSR* 98/4 (November 2004): 563-76.

- Christopher Layne, “The ‘Poster Child for Offensive Realism’: America as a Global Hegemon,” *SS* 12/2 (Winter 2002): 120-64.
- Stephen G. Brooks, “Dueling Realisms,” *IO* 51/3 (Summer 1997): 445-77.
- ❖ Christopher Layne, *The Peace of Illusions: American Grand Strategy from 1940 to the Present* (Cornell, 2006).
- ❖ Eric Labs, “Beyond Victory: Offensive Realism and the Expansion of War Aims,” *SS* 6/4 (Summer 1997): 1-49.
- Peter Liberman, *Does Conquest Pay? The Exploitation of Occupied Industrial Societies* (Princeton, 1996).
- ❖ John J. Mearsheimer, “The False Promise of International Institutions,” *IS* 19/3 (Winter 1994/95): 5-49.
- ❖ Peter Liberman, “The Spoils of Conquest,” *IS* 18/2 (Fall 1993): 125-53.
- ❖ Hans Morgenthau, *Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1948). States maximize power because human beings have a lust for power and a will to dominate.
- John H. Herz, “Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma,” *WP* 2/2 (January 1950): 157-80.
- G. Lowes Dickinson, *The European Anarchy* (New York: Macmillan, 1917), esp. 13-17, 127-133.

Recommended Critiques:

- Richard Little, “British Neutrality versus Offshore Balancing in the American Civil War: The English School Strikes Back,” *SS* 16/1 (January 2007): 68-95.
- Peter Thompson, “The Case of the Missing Hegemon: British Nonintervention in the American Civil War,” *SS* 16/1 (January 2007): 96-132.
- Richard N. Rosecrance, “War and Peace,” *WP* 55/1 (October 2002): 137-66.
- Glenn H. Snyder, “Mearsheimer’s World—Offensive Realism and the Struggle for Security: A Review Essay,” *IS* 27/1 (Summer 2002): 149-73.
- Peter Gowan, “A Calculus of Power,” *New Left Review* 16 (July-August 2002): 47-67.
- Barry R. Posen, “The Best Defense,” *The National Interest* (Spring 2002): 119-26.
- Steven Lobell, “War is Politics: Offensive Realism, Domestic Politics, and Security Strategies,” *SS* 12/2 (Winter 2002): 165-95.
- Gerald Geunwook Lee, “To Be Long or Not to Be Long—That is the Question: The Contradiction of Time-Horizon in Offensive Realism,” *SS* 12/2 (Winter 2002): 196-217.

Democratic Peace

The Basic Debate:

- Brown, Lynn-Jones, and Miller, eds., *Debating the Democratic Peace*:
 - Michael Doyle, “Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs,” 3-57.

- Bruce Russett, “The Fact of Democratic Peace,” and “Why Democratic Peace?” 58-115.
- John M. Owen, “How Liberalism Produces Democratic Peace,” 116-54.
- Christopher Layne, “Kant or Cant: The Myth of the Democratic Peace,” 157-201.
- Ido Oren, “The Subjectivity of the ‘Democratic’ Peace: Changing U.S. Perceptions of Imperial Germany,” 263-300.
- Edward D. Mansfield and Jack Snyder, “Democratization and the Danger of War,” 301-34.
- Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, et.al., “An Institutional Explanation of the Democratic Peace,” *APSR* 94/4 (December 1999): 791-807.
- Sebastian Rosato, “The Flawed Logic of the Democratic Peace,” *APSR* 97/4 (November 2003): 585-602.
- Douglas A. Van Belle, “Dinosaurs and the Democratic Peace: Paleontological Lessons for Avoiding the Extinction of Theory in Political Science,” *International Studies Perspectives* 7/3 (August 2006): 287-306.

Recommended, General:

- Paul K. Huth and Todd L. Allee, *The Democratic Peace and Territorial Conflict in the Twentieth Century* (Cambridge, 2003).
- Lars-Erik Cederman, “Back to Kant: Reinterpreting the Democratic Peace as a Macrohistorical Learning Process,” *APSR* 95/1 (March 2001): 15-31.
- ❖ Bruce M. Russett and John R. Oneal, *Triangulating Peace: Democracy, Interdependence, and International Organizations* (Norton, 2001).
- Zeev Maoz, “The Controversy over the Democratic Peace: Rearguard Action or Cracks in the Wall?” *IS* 22/1 (Summer 1997): 162-98.
- Kurt Taylor Gaubatz, “Democratic States and Commitment in International Relations,” *IO* 50/1 (Winter 1996): 109-39.
- ❖ David L. Rousseau et al., “Assessing the Dyadic Nature of the Democratic Peace, 1918-1988,” *APSR* 90/3 (September 1996): 512-33.
- James Lee Ray, *Democracy and International Conflict: An Evaluation of the Democratic Peace Proposition* (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1995).
- ❖ Zeev Maoz and Bruce Russett, “Normative and Structural Causes of Democratic Peace,” *APSR* 87/3 (September 1993): 624-38.
- ❖ Bruce Russett, *Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for a Post-Cold War World* (Princeton, 1993).
- Stuart A. Bremer, “Dangerous Dyads: Conditions Affecting the Likelihood of Interstate War, 1816-1965,” *JCR* 36/2 (1992): 309-41.
- ❖ Francis Fukuyama, “The End of History?” *The National Interest* (Summer 1989): 3-18.
- ❖ Immanuel Kant, *Perpetual Peace and Other Essays*, trans. Ted Humphrey (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1983), 107-43.

Recommended, Norms:

- ❖ Markus Fischer, “The Liberal Peace: Ethical, Historical, and Philosophical Aspects,” BCSIA Discussion Paper 2000-07, Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University.
- Spencer Weart, *Never at War: Why Democracies Will Not Fight One Another* (Yale, 1998).
- Michael W. Doyle, *Ways of War and Peace: Realism, Liberalism, and Socialism* (Norton, 1997).
- ❖ John M. Owen, *Liberal Peace, Liberal War: American Politics and International Security* (Cornell, 1997).
- ❖ William J. Dixon, “Democracy and the Peaceful Settlement of International Conflict,” *APSR* 88/1 (March 1994): 14-32.
- Michael Doyle, “Liberalism and World Politics,” *APSR* 80/4 (December 1986): 1151-69.

Recommended, Institutions:

- Michael Tomz, “Domestic Audience Costs in International Relations: An Experimental Approach,” *IO* 61/4 (Fall 2007): 821-40.
- Bruce Bueno de Mesquita et. al., “Testing Novel Implications from the Selectorate Theory of War,” *WP* 56/3 (April 2004): 363-88.
- ❖ Bruce Bueno de Mesquita et. al., *The Logic of Political Survival* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2003).
- ❖ Charles Lipson, *Reliable Partners: How Democracies Have Made a Separate Peace* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003).
- Kenneth A. Schultz, “Looking for Audience Costs,” *JCR* 45/1 (2001): 32-60.
- ❖ Kenneth A. Schultz, *Democracy and Coercive Diplomacy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001).
- Kenneth A. Schultz, “Do Democratic Institutions Constrain or Inform?” *IO* 53/2 (Spring 1999): 233-66.
- Kurt Taylor Gaubatz, *Elections and War: The Electoral Incentive in the Democratic Politics of War and Peace* (Stanford, 1999).
- ❖ Kenneth A. Schultz, “Democratic Opposition and Signaling in International Crises,” *APSR* 92/4 (December 1998): 829-44.
- Susan Peterson, “How Democracies Differ: Public Opinion, State Structure, and the Lessons of Fashoda,” *SS* 5/1 (Autumn 1995): 3-37.
- ❖ James D. Fearon, “Domestic Audience Costs and the Escalation of International Disputes,” *APSR* 88/3 (September 1994): 577-92.
- David A. Lake, “Powerful Pacifists: Democratic States and War,” *APSR* 86/1 (March 1992): 24-37.

Recommended Extensions:

- Barbara Harff, “No Lessons Learned from the Holocaust? Assessing Risks of Genocide and Political Mass Murder since 1955,” *APSR* 97/1 (February 2003): 57-73.
- Gil Merom, *How Democracies Lose Small Wars: State, Society, and the Failures of France in Algeria, Israel in Lebanon, and the United States in Vietnam* (Cambridge, 2003).

- Norrin M. Ripsman, *Peacemaking by Democracies: The Effect of State Autonomy on the post-World War Settlements* (Penn State, 2002).
- Håvard Hegre, et al., "Toward a Democratic Civil Peace? Democracy, Political Change, and Civil War, 1816-1992," *APSR* 95/1 (March 2001): 33-48.
- Gary Jonathan Bass, *Stay the Hand of Vengeance: The Politics of War Crimes Tribunals* (Princeton, 2000).
- David P. Forsythe, "Democracy, War, and Covert Action," *JPR* 29/4 (November 1995): 385-95.
- ❖ Randall L. Schweller, "Domestic Structure and Preventive War: Are Democracies More Pacific?" *WP* 44/2 (January 1992): 235-69.

Recommended Critiques:

- ❖ Jessica L. Weeks, "Autocratic Audience Costs: Regime Type and Signaling Resolve," *IO* 62/1 (Winter 2008): 35-64.
- Edward D. Mansfield and Jack Snyder, *Electing to Fight: Why Emerging Democracies Go to War* (MIT, 2005).
- Errol A. Henderson, *Democracy and War: The End of an Illusion?* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2003).
- ❖ Mark Peceny, et.al., "Dictatorial Peace?" *APSR* 96/1 (March 2002): 15-26.
- Edward D. Mansfield and Jack Snyder, "Democratic Transitions, Institutional Strength, and War," *IO* 56/2 (Spring 2002): 297-337.
- Jack Snyder, *From Voting to Violence: Democratization and Nationalist Conflict* (Norton, 2000).
- ❖ Bernard I. Finel and Kristin M. Lord, "The Surprising Logic of Transparency," *ISQ* 43/2 (June 1999): 315-39.
- Joanne Gowa, *Ballots and Bullets: The Elusive Democratic Peace* (Princeton, 1999).
- Erik Gartzke, "Kant We All Just Get Along? Opportunity, Willingness, and the Origins of the Democratic Peace," *AJPS* 42/1 (January 1998): 1-27.
- ❖ Henry S. Farber and Joanne Gowa, "Common Interests or Common Politics? Reinterpreting the Democratic Peace," *JOP* 59/2 (May 1997): 393-417.
- ❖ Miriam Fendius Elman, ed., *Paths to Peace: Is Democracy the Answer?* (MIT, 1997).
- Stanislav Andreski, "On the Peaceful Disposition of Military Dictatorships," *JSS* 3/3 (December 1980): 3-10.

Institutions

- Virginia Page Fortna, *Peace Time: Cease-Fire Agreements and the Durability of Peace* (Princeton, 2004).
- Suzanne Werner and Amy Yuen, "Making and Keeping Peace," *IO* 59/2 (Spring 2005): 261-92.
- Nigel Lo, Barry Hashimoto, and Dan Reiter, "Ensuring Peace: Foreign Imposed Regime Change and Post-War Peace Duration, 1914-2001," *IO* 62/4 (Fall 2008): 717-36.

- ❖ Erik Voeten, “The Political Origins of the UN Security Council’s Ability to Legitimize the Use of Force,” *IO* 59/3 (July 2005): 527-57.
- Robert Jervis, Henry R. Nau, and Randall L. Schweller, “Correspondence: Institutionalized Disagreement,” *IS* 27/1 (Summer 2002): 174-85.
- ❖ G. John Ikenberry, *After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order after Major Wars* (Princeton, 2001).
- David A. Lake, “Beyond Anarchy: The Importance of Security Regimes,” *IS* 26/1 (Summer 2001): 129-60.
- Randall L. Schweller, “The Problem of International Order Revisited: A Review Essay,” *IS* 26/1 (Summer 2001): 161-86.
- Robert Jervis, “Realism, Neoliberalism, and Cooperation: Understanding the Debate,” *IS* 24/1 (Summer 1999): 42-63.
- Robert O. Keohane and Lisa L. Martin, “The Promise of Institutional Theory,” *IS* 20/1 (Summer 1995): 39-51.
- ❖ John J. Mearsheimer, “The False Promise of International Institutions,” *IS* 19/3 (Winter 1994/95): 5-49.
- ❖ David A. Baldwin, ed., *Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate* (Columbia, 1993).
- ❖ Lisa Martin, *Coercive Cooperation: Explaining Multilateral Economic Sanctions* (Princeton, 1992).
- Charles A. Kupchan and Clifford A. Kupchan, “Concerts, Collective Security, and the Future of Europe,” *IS* 16/1 (Summer 1991): 114-61.
- ❖ Robert O. Keohane, *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy* (Princeton, 1984).
- Stephen Krasner, ed., *International Regimes* (Cornell, 1981).

Interdependence

- Stephen G. Brooks, *Producing Security: Multinational Corporations, Globalization, and the Changing Calculus of Conflict* (Princeton, 2005).
- Christopher Gelpi and Joseph Grieco, “Democracy, Trade, and the Nature of the Liberal Peace,” *JPR* 45/1 (January 2008): 17-36.
- ❖ “Producing Debate: A Symposium on Stephen Brooks’ Producing Security,” *SS* 16/4 (2007): 583-678.
- Erik Gartzke, “The Capitalist Peace,” *AJPS* 51/1 (January 2007): 166-91.
- David M. Rowe, “The Tragedy of Liberalism: How Globalization Caused the First World War,” *SS* 14/3 (July-September 2005): 407-47.
- Emilie Hafner-Burton, “Trading Human Rights: How Preferential Trade Agreements Influence Government Repression,” *IO* 59/3 (Summer 2005): 593-629.
- Erik Gartzke and Quan Li, “War, Peace, and the Invisible Hand: Positive Political Externalities of Economic Globalization,” *ISQ* 47 (2003): 561-86.
- ❖ Edward D. Mansfield and Brian M. Pollins, ed., *Economic Interdependence and International Conflict: New Perspectives on an Enduring Debate* (Michigan, 2003).

- Katherine Barbieri, *The Liberal Illusion: Does Trade Promote Peace?* (Michigan, 2002).
- ❖ Bruce M. Russett and John R. O Neal, *Triangulating Peace: Democracy, Interdependence, and International Organizations* (Norton, 2001).
- Erik Gartzke, Quan Li, and Charles Boemer, “Investing in the Peace: Economic Interdependence and International Conflict,” *IO* 55/2 (Spring 2001): 391-438.
- Jean-Marc F. Blanchard, Edward D. Mansfield, and Norrin M. Ripsman, eds., “Power and the Purse: Economic Statecraft, Interdependence, and National Security,” special issue, *JS* 9/1-2 (Autumn 1999-Winter 2000).
- ❖ John R. O Neal and Bruce Russett, “The Kantian Peace: The Pacific Benefits of Democracy, Interdependence, and International Organizations, 1885-1992,” *WP* 52/1 (October 1999): 1-37.
- Stephen G. Brooks, “The Globalization of Production and the Changing Benefits of Conquest,” *JCR* 43/5 (October 1999): 646-70.
- Gerald Schneider and Katherine Barbieri, eds., “Special Issue on Trade and Conflict,” *JPR* 36/4 (July 1999).
- ❖ Susan M. McMillan, “Interdependence and Conflict,” *Mershon International Studies Review* 41/1 (May 1997): 33-58. Good literature review.
- Katherine Barbieri, “Economic Interdependence: A Path to Peace or a Source of Interstate Conflict?” *JCR* 33/1 (February 1996): 29-49.
- ❖ Dale Copeland, “Economic Interdependence and War: A Theory of Trade Expectations,” *IS* 20/4 (Spring 1996): 5-41.
- ❖ Paul Papayoanou, “Interdependence, Institutions, and the Balance of Power,” *IS* 20/4 (Spring 1996): 42-76.
- Richard Rosecrance, *The Rise of the Trading State: Commerce and Conquest in the Modern World* (Basic Books, 1986).
- Norman Angell, *The Great Illusion: A Study of the Relation of Military Power to National Advantage* (G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1913).

Norms, Culture, and Force

Prominent Pieces:

- Alexander Wendt, “Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics,” *IO* 46/2 (Spring 1992): 391-425.
- Elizabeth Kier, “Culture and French Military Doctrine Before World War II,” in *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics*, ed. Peter J. Katzenstein (Columbia, 1996), 186-215 (e-res).
- Martha Finnemore, “Constructing Norms of Humanitarian Intervention,” in Katzenstein, ed., *Culture of National Security*, 153-85 (e-res).
- Jeffrey W. Legro, “Which Norms Matter? Revisiting the ‘Failure’ of Internationalism,” *IO* 51/1 (Winter 1997): 31-63.
- Nina Tannenwald, “The Nuclear Taboo: The United States and the Normative Basis of Nuclear Non-Use,” *IO* 53/3 (Summer 1999): 433-68.
- Richard Price, “Reversing the Gun Sights: Transnational Civil Society Targets Land Mines,” *IO* 52/3 (Summer 1998): 613-44.

- Ward Thomas, “Norms and Security: The Case of International Assassination,” *IS* 25/1 (Summer 2000): 105-33.

Recommended:

- Nina Tannenwald, *The Nuclear Taboo: The United States and the Non-Use of Nuclear Weapons Since 1945* (Cambridge, 2008).
- Ian Hurd, *After Anarchy: Legitimacy and Power in the UN Security Council* (Princeton, 2007).
- ❖ Ian Hurd, “The Strategic Use of Liberal Internationalism: Libya and the UN Sanctions, 1992-2003,” *IO* 59/3 (Summer 2005): 495-526.
- Nina Tannenwald, “Stigmatizing the Bomb: Origins of the Nuclear Taboo,” *IS* 29/4 (Spring 2005): 5-49.
- ❖ Martha Finnemore, *The Purpose of Intervention: Changing Beliefs About the Use of Force* (Cornell, 2003).
- Daniel C. Thomas, *The Helsinki Effect: International Norms, Human Rights, and the Demise of Communism* (Princeton, 2001).
- Ward Thomas, *The Ethics of Destruction: Norms and Force in International Relations* (Cornell, 2001).
- ❖ Alexander Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics* (Cambridge, 1999).
- ❖ Chaim Kaufmann and Robert A. Pape, “Explaining Costly International Moral Action: Britain’s Sixty-Year Campaign against the Atlantic Slave Trade,” *IO* 53/4 (Autumn 1999): 631-68.
- ❖ Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics and Political Change,” *IO* 52/4 (Autumn 1998): 887-917.
- Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, eds., *Security Communities* (Cambridge, 1998).
- Thomas U. Berger, *Cultures of Antimilitarism: National Security in Germany and Japan* (Johns Hopkins, 1998).
- ❖ Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, *Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics* (Cornell, 1998).
- ❖ Elizabeth Kier, *Imagining War: French and British Military Doctrine between the Wars* (Princeton, 1997).
- Richard M. Price, *The Chemical Weapons Taboo* (Cornell, 1997).
- Martha Finnemore, *National Interests in International Society* (Cornell, 1996).
- ❖ Peter J. Katzenstein, ed., *The Culture of National Security* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996).
- Peter J. Katzenstein, *Cultural Norms and National Security: Police and Military in Postwar Japan* (Cornell, 1996).
- Alistair I. Johnston, *Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Ming China* (Princeton, 1995).
- ❖ Jeffrey W. Legro, *Cooperation under Fire: Anglo-German Restraint During World War II* (Cornell, 1995).
- Jeffrey W. Legro, “Military Culture and Inadvertent Escalation in World War II,” *IS* 18/4 (Spring 1994): 108-42.
- ❖ Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics* (Columbia, 1977).

Recommended Critiques:

- ❖ Dale C. Copeland, "The Constructivist Challenge to Structural Realism: A Review Essay," *IS* 25/2 (Fall 2000): 187-212.
- "Correspondence: Isms and Schisms: Culturalism versus Realism in Security Studies," *IS* 24/1 (Summer 1999): 156-80.
- Michael C. Desch, "Culture Clash: Assessing the Importance of Ideas in Security Studies," *IS* 23/1 (Summer 1998): 141-70.
- ❖ John J. Mearsheimer, "The False Promise of International Institutions," *IS* 19/3 (Winter 1994/95): 5-49.

Bargaining, Crisis Bargaining, and War

Core Readings:

- Geoffrey Blainey, *The Causes of War*, 3rd ed. (New York: Free Press, 1988), 108-24 (e-res).
- James D. Fearon, "Rationalist Explanations for War," *IO* 49/3 (Summer 1995): 379-414.
- Erik Gartzke, "War is in the Error Term," *IO* 53/3 (Summer 1999): 567-87.
- Dan Reiter, "Exploring the Bargaining Model of War," *POP* 1/1 (March 2003): 27-43.
- James D. Fearon, "Domestic Audience Costs and the Escalation of International Disputes," *APSR* 88/3 (September 1994): 577-92.
- Kenneth A. Schultz, "Democratic Opposition and Signaling in International Crises," *APSR* 92/4 (December 1998): 829-44.
- Branislav L. Slantchev, "The Principle of Convergence in Wartime Negotiations," *APSR* 97/4 (November 2003): 621-32.
- Jonathan D. Kirshner, "Rationalist Explanations for War?" *SS* 10/1 (Autumn 2000): 143-50.

Recommended:

- Bahar Leventoğlu and Ahmer Tarar, "Does Private Information Lead to Delay or War in Crisis Bargaining?" *ISQ* 52/3 (September 2008): 533-53.
- Bahar Leventoğlu and Branislav L. Slantchev, "The Armed Peace: A Punctuated Equilibrium Theory of War," *AJPS* 51/4 (October 2007): 755-71.
- ❖ R. Harrison Wagner, *War and the State: The Theory of International Politics* (Michigan, 2007).
- ❖ Robert Powell, "War as a Commitment Problem," *IO* 60/1 (January 2006): 169-203.
- ❖ Bahar Leventoğlu and Ahmer Tarar, "Pre negotiation Public Commitment in Domestic and International Bargaining," *APSR* 99/3 (August 2005): 419-33.
- Alastair Smith and Allan C. Stam, "Bargaining and the Nature of War," *JCR* 48/6 (December 2004): 783-813.

- Robert Powell, “The Inefficient Use of Power: Costly Conflict with Complete Information,” *APSR* 98/2 (May 2004): 231-41.
- William Reed, “Information, Power, and War,” *APSR* 97/4 (November 2003): 633-41.
- Branislav L. Slantchev, “The Power to Hurt: Costly Conflict with Completely Informed States,” *APSR* 97/1 (February 2003): 123-33.
- Robert Powell, “Bargaining Theory and International Conflict,” *ARPS* 5 (2002): 1-30.
- Christopher Gelpi, *The Power of Legitimacy: Assessing the Role of Norms in Crisis Bargaining* (Princeton, 2002).
- R. Harrison Wagner, “Bargaining and War,” *AJPS* 44/3 (July 2000): 469-84.
- ❖ “Formal Methods, Formal Complaints: Debating the Role of Rational Choice in Security Studies,” *IS* 24/2 (Fall 1999): 56-130.
- ❖ Stephen M. Walt, “Rigor or Rigor Mortis? Rational Choice and Security Studies,” *IS* 23/4 (Spring 1999): 5-48.
- James D. Fearon, “Signaling versus the Balance of Power and Interests: An Empirical Test of a Crisis Bargaining Model,” *JCR* 38/2 (June 1994): 236-69.

Shifting Power and War

Core Readings:

- Dale C. Copeland, *The Origins of Major Wars* (Cornell, 2000), 1-117, 146-208.
- A.F.K. Organski, *World Politics* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1965), 338-76 (Chapter 14, “The Power Transition,” e-res).
- Jack S. Levy, “Declining Power and the Preventive Motivation for War,” *WP* 40/1 (October 1987): 82-107.
- Randall L. Schweller, “Domestic Structure and Preventive War: Are Democracies More Pacific?” *WP* 44/2 (January 1992): 235-69.
- Jack S. Levy and Joseph R. Gochal, “Democracy and Preventive War: Israel and the 1956 Sinai Campaign,” *SS* 11/2 (Winter 2001/02): 1-49.

Recommended:

- Norrin M. Ripsman and Jack S. Levy, “Wishful Thinking or Buying Time? The Logic of British Appeasement in the 1930s,” *IS* 33/2 (Fall 2008): 148-81.
- ❖ Jack S. Levy, “Preventive War and Democratic Politics,” *ISQ* 52/1 (March 2008): 1-24.
- Michael W. Doyle, *Striking First: Preemption and Prevention in International Conflict* (Princeton, 2008).
- Norrin M. Ripsman and Jack S. Levy, “The Preventive War that Never Happened: Britain, France, and the Rise of Germany in the 1930s,” *SS* 16/1 (January 2007): 32-67.
- Scott A. Silverstone, *Preventive War and American Democracy* (Routledge, 2007).
- Dan Reiter, *Preventive War and its Alternatives: The Lessons of History* (Strategic Studies Institute, April 2006; <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil>).
- ❖ Daniel Treisman, “Rational Appeasement,” *IO* 58/2 (Spring 2004): 345-73.

- ❖ “Fear of Falling: Debating Dale Copeland’s *The Origins of Major War*,” *SS* 10/4 (Summer 2001). Articles by Jeffrey W. Taliaferro (145-78), Robert G. Kaufman (179-211), and Dale C. Copeland (212-39).
- William Burr and Jeffrey T. Richelson, “Whether to ‘Strangle the Baby in the Cradle’: The United States and the Chinese Nuclear Program, 1960-64,” *IS* 25/3 (Winter 2000/01): 54-99.
- Robert Powell, “Uncertainty, Shifting Power, and Appeasement,” *APSR* 90/4 (December 1996): 749-64.
- Marc Trachtenberg, “A ‘Wasting Asset’: American Strategy and the Shifting Nuclear Balance, 1949-1954,” in Trachtenberg, *History and Strategy* (Princeton, 1991), 100-152.
- ❖ Paul Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000* (Random House, 1987).
- ❖ Robert Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics* (Cambridge, 1981).
- A.F.K. Organski and Jacek Kugler, *The War Ledger* (Chicago, 1980).

Coercion/Compellence

Core Readings:

- Thomas C. Schelling, *Arms and Influence* (Yale, 1966), 1-125, 166-89.
- Robert A. Pape, *Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War* (Cornell, 1996), 1-136, 211-313.
- Robert J. Art, “Coercive Diplomacy: What Do We Know?” in *The United States and Coercive Diplomacy*, ed. Robert J. Art and Patrick M. Cronin (USIP, 2003), 359-420 (e-res, 2 parts).

Recommended:

- ❖ Bruce W. Jentleson and Christopher A. Whytock, “Who ‘Won’ Libya? The Force-Diplomacy Debate and Its Implications for Theory and Policy,” *IS* 30/3 (Winter 2005/06): 47-86.
- Solomon Major and Anthony J. McGann, “Caught in the Crossfire: ‘Innocent Bystanders’ as Optimal Targets of Economic Sanctions,” *JCR* 43/3 (June 2005): 337-59.
- ❖ Daniel Drezner, “The Hidden Hand of Economic Coercion,” *IO* 57/3 (Summer 2003): 643-59.
- Andrew L. Stigler, “A Clear Victory for Air Power: NATO’s Empty Threat to Invade Kosovo,” *IS* 27/3 (Winter 2002/03): 124-57.
- Jonathan Kirshner, “Economic Sanctions: The State of the Art,” *SS* 11/4 (Summer 2002): 160-79.
- Risa A. Brooks, “Sanctions and Regime Type: What Works, and When?” *SS* 11/4 (Summer 2002): 1-50.
- Daniel Byman and Matthew Waxman, *The Dynamics of Coercion: American Foreign Policy and the Limits of Military Might* (Cambridge, 2002).
- ❖ Daryl G. Press, “The Myth of Air Power in the Persian Gulf War and the Future of Warfare,” *IS* 26/2 (Fall 2001): 5-44.

- Daniel L. Byman and Matthew C. Waxman, “Kosovo and the Great Air Power Debate,” *IS* 24/4 (Spring 2000): 5-38.
- John Mueller and Karl Mueller, “The Methodology of Mass Destruction: Assessing Threats in the New World Order,” *Journal of Strategic Studies* 23/1 (March 2000): 163-87; or “Sanctions of Mass Destruction,” *FA* 78/3 (May/June 1999): 43-53.
- Daniel Drezner, *The Sanctions Paradox: Economic Statecraft and International Relations* (Cambridge, 1999).
- ❖ Karl Mueller, “Strategies of Coercion: Denial, Punishment, and the Future of Air Power,” *JS* 7/3 (Spring 1998): 182-228.
- Robert A. Pape, “Why Economic Sanctions Still Do Not Work,” *IS* 23/1 (Summer 1998): 66-77.
- Kimberly Ann Elliott, “The Sanctions Glass: Half Full or Completely Empty?” *IS* 23/1 (Summer 1998): 50-65.
- ❖ Robert A. Pape, “Why Economic Sanctions Do Not Work,” *IS* 22/2 (Fall 1997): 90-137.
- T. Clifton Morgan and Valerie L. Schwebach, “Fools Suffer Gladly: The Use of Economic Sanctions in International Crises,” *ISQ* 41/1 (March 1997): 27-50.
- Gary Clyde Hufbauer, Jeffrey J. Schott, and Kimberly Ann Elliott, *Economic Sanctions Reconsidered*, 2nd ed. (Washington, D.C.: International Institute for Economics, 1990).
- Wallace J. Thies, *When Governments Collide: Coercion and Diplomacy in the Vietnam Conflict, 1964-1968* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980).
- Thomas C. Schelling, *The Strategy of Conflict* (Harvard, 1960).

Reputation and Deterrence

Core Readings:

- Jonathan Mercer, *Reputation and International Politics* (Cornell, 1996), 1-73.
- Daryl G. Press, *Calculating Credibility: How Leaders Assess Military Threats* (Cornell, 2005).
- Todd Sechser, “Goliath’s Curse: Asymmetric Power and the Effectiveness of Coercive Threats” (unpub. ms., University of Virginia; Blackboard).

Reputation:

- Vaughn P. Shannon and Michael Dennis, “Militant Islam and the Futile Fight for Reputation,” *JS* 16/2 (April-June 2007): 287-317.
- Mark J. C. Crescenzi, “Reputation and Interstate Conflict (Friends and Foes),” *AJPS* 51/2 (2007): 382-96.

- Mark J. C. Crescenzi, Jacob Kathman, Stephen Gent, “Reputation, History and War: The Competing Pressures of Escalation and Settlement,” *JPR* 44/6 (2007): 651-68.

Deterrence, General:

- Janice Gross Stein, “Deterrence and Compellence in the Gulf, 1990-1991: A Failed or Impossible Task?” *IS* 17/2 (Fall 1992): 147-79.
- ❖ John J. Mearsheimer, *Conventional Deterrence* (Ithaca, 1983).
- ❖ Patrick M. Morgan, *Deterrence: A Conceptual Analysis* (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage, 1977).
- Alexander George and Richard Smoke, *Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice* (Columbia, 1974).

Nuclear Deterrence:

- Nina Tannenwald, *The Nuclear Taboo: The United States and the Non-Use of Nuclear Weapons Since 1945* (Cambridge, 2008).
- ❖ Keir A. Lieber and Daryl G. Press, “The End of MAD? The Nuclear Dimension of U.S. Primacy,” *IS* 30/4 (Spring 2006): 7-44.
- Lawrence Freedman, *The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy*, 3rd ed. (Palgrave Macmillan, 2003).
- ❖ Nina Tannenwald, “The Nuclear Taboo: The United States and the Normative Basis of Nuclear Non-Use,” *IO* 53/3 (Summer 1999): 433-68.
- Barry R. Posen, “U.S. Security Policy in a Nuclear-Armed World; Or: What if Iraq had had Nuclear Weapons?” *SS* 6/3 (Spring 1997): 1-31.
- ❖ Kenneth N. Waltz, “Nuclear Myths and Political Realities,” *APSR* 84/3 (September 1990): 731-45.
- Charles L. Glaser, *Analyzing Strategic Nuclear Policy* (Princeton, 1990).
- ❖ Robert Jervis, *The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution: Statecraft and the Prospect of Armageddon* (Cornell, 1989).
- ❖ John Mueller, “The Essential Irrelevance of Nuclear Weapons: Stability in the Postwar World,” *IS* 13/2 (Fall 1988): 55-79.
- ❖ Robert Jervis, “The Political Effects of Nuclear Weapons: A Comment,” *IS* 13/2 (Fall 1988): 80-90.
- ❖ John Lewis Gaddis, “The Long Peace: Elements of Stability in the Postwar International System,” *IS* 10/4 (Spring 1986): 99-142.
- Robert Jervis, *The Illogic of American Nuclear Strategy* (Cornell, 1984).
- Colin S. Gray, “Victory is Possible,” *FP* 39 (Summer 1980): 14-27.
- Robert Jervis, “Why Nuclear Superiority Doesn’t Matter,” *PSQ* 94/4 (Winter 1979/80): 617-33.
- Paul H. Nitze, “Deterring Our Deterrent,” *FP* 25 (Winter 1976/77): 195-210.
- ❖ Albert Wohlstetter, “The Delicate Balance of Terror,” *FA* 37 (January 1959): 209-34.

Nuclear Proliferation, Causes and Consequences:

- ❖ Matthew Kroenig, “Exporting the Bomb: Why States Provide Sensitive Nuclear Assistance,” *APSR* 103/1 (February 2009).

- Dong-Joon Jo and Erik Gartzke, “Determinants of Nuclear Weapons Proliferation,” *JCR* 51/1 (February 2007): 167-94.
- ❖ Etel Solingen, *Nuclear Logics: Contrasting Paths in East Asia and the Middle East* (Princeton, 2007).
- ❖ Sonali Singh and Christopher R. Way, “The Correlates of Nuclear Proliferation: A Quantitative Test,” *JCR* 48/6 (December 2004): 859-85.
- John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt, “An Unnecessary War,” *FP* (January/February 2003): 50-59.
- ❖ Scott D. Sagan and Kenneth N. Waltz, *The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate Renewed*, 2nd ed. (New York: Norton, 2003).
- Victor A. Utgoff, ed., *The Coming Crisis: Nuclear Proliferation, U.S. Interests, and World Order* (MIT, 2000).
- Jordan Seng, “Command and Control Advantages of Minor Nuclear States,” *SS* 6/4 (Summer 1997): 50-92.
- Peter D. Feaver, “Neoptimists and the Enduring Problem of Proliferation,” *SS* 6/4 (Summer 1997): 93-125.
- ❖ Scott D. Sagan, “Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons? Three Models in Search of a Bomb,” *IS* 21/3 (Winter 1996/97): 54-86.
- David J. Karl, “Proliferation Pessimism and Emerging Nuclear Powers,” *IS* 21/3 (Winter 1996/97): 87-119.
- ❖ Scott D. Sagan, “The Perils of Proliferation: Organization Theory, Deterrence Theory, and the Spread of Nuclear Weapons,” *IS* 18/4 (Spring 1994): 66-107.
- ❖ Scott D. Sagan, *The Limits of Safety: Organizations, Accidents, and Nuclear Weapons* (Princeton, 1993).
- Peter D. Feaver, “Command and Control in Emerging Nuclear Nations,” *IS* 17/3 (Winter 1992/93): 160-87.

Deterrence Debates:

- Paul K. Huth and Bruce Russett, “Testing Deterrence Theory: Rigor Makes a Difference,” *WP* 42/4 (July 1990): 466-501.
- Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein, “Deterrence: The Elusive Dependent Variable,” *WP* 42/3 (April 1990): 336-69.
- “The Rational Deterrence Debate: A Symposium,” *WP* 41/2 (January 1989): 143-237.
- Paul K. Huth, *Extended Deterrence and the Prevention of War* (Yale, 1988).
- ❖ Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein, “Beyond Deterrence,” *Journal of Social Issues* 43/4 (1987): 5-71.
- ❖ Paul K. Huth and Bruce Russett, “What Makes Deterrence Work? Cases from 1900 to 1980,” *WP* 36/4 (July 1984): 496-526.

Military Effectiveness I: Democracy and Victory

Core Readings:

- Dan Reiter and Allan C. Stam, *Democracies at War* (Princeton, 2002).

- David A. Lake, "Powerful Pacifists: Democratic States and War," *APSR* 86/1 (March 1992): 24-37.
- Michael C. Desch, "Democracy and Victory: Why Regime Type Hardly Matters," *IS* 27/2 (Fall 2002): 5-47.
- Responses to Desch by Choi, Lake, and Reiter and Stam; and Desch's reply, *IS* 28/1 (Summer 2003): 142-94.
- Alexander B. Downes, "How Smart (and Tough) Are Democracies Anyway? Reassessing Theories of Democratic Victory in War," *IS* (forthcoming; Blackboard).

Recommended:

- ❖ Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, Alastair Smith, Randolph M. Siverson, and James D. Morrow, *The Logic of Political Survival* (MIT, 2003).
- Kenneth A. Schultz and Barry R. Weingast, "The Democratic Advantage: Institutional Foundations of Financial Power in International Competition," *IO* 57/1 (Winter 2003): 3-42.
- Christopher F. Gelpi and Michael Griesdorf, "Winners or Losers? Democracies in International Crisis, 1918-94," *APSR* 95/3 (September 2001): 633-47.
- ❖ Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, et.al., "An Institutional Explanation of the Democratic Peace," *APSR* 94/4 (December 1999): 791-807.

Recommended Critiques:

- ❖ Michael C. Desch, *Power and Military Effectiveness: The Fallacy of Democratic Triumphalism* (Johns Hopkins, 2008).
- Ronald R. Krebs and Jennifer Lobasz, "Fixing the Meaning of 9/11: Hegemony, Coercion, and the Road to War in Iraq," *SS* 16/3 (July-September 2007): 409-451.
- Jane Kelleth Cramer, "Militarized Patriotism: Why the U.S. Marketplace of Ideas Failed before the Iraq War," *SS* 16/3 (July-September 2007): 489-524.
- Jon Western, "The War over Iraq: Selling War to the American Public," *SS* 14/1 (January-March 2005): 106-139.
- ❖ Stephen Biddle and Stephen Long, "Democracy and Military Effectiveness: A Deeper Look," *JCR* 48/4 (August 2004): 525-46.
- ❖ Chaim Kaufmann, "Threat Inflation and the Failure of the Marketplace of Ideas: The Selling of the Iraq War," *IS* 29/1 (Summer 2004): 5-48.
- ❖ Giacomo Chiozza and H. E. Goemans, "International Conflict and the Tenure of Leaders: Is War Still Ex Post Inefficient?" *AJPS* 48/3 (July 2004): 604-19.
- ❖ Risa Brooks, "Making Military Might: Why Do States Fail and Succeed? A Review Essay," *IS* 28/2 (Fall 2003): 149-91.

Military Effectiveness II: Force Employment and Other Explanations

Core Readings:

- Stephen Biddle, *Military Power: Explaining Victory and Defeat in Modern Battle* (Princeton, 2004).
- Edward A. Shils and Morris Janowitz, "Cohesion and Disintegration in the Wehrmacht in World War II," *Public Opinion Quarterly* 12/2 (Summer 1948): 280-315.
- Stephen Biddle and Robert Zirkle, "Technology, Civil-Military Relations, and Warfare in the Developing World," *JSS* 19/2 (June 1996): 171-212 (e-res).
- Risa Brooks, "An Autocracy at War: Explaining Egypt's Military Effectiveness, 1967 and 1973," *SS* 15/3 (July-September 2006): 396-430.

Recommended:

- ❖ Risa Brooks, *Shaping Strategy: The Civil-Military Politics of Strategic Assessment* (Princeton, 2008).
- Jasen J. Castillo, "The Will to Fight: Explaining the Staying Power of German and French Armies in World War II" (unpub. ms., Texas A&M).
- Richard B. Andres, Craig Wills, and Thomas Griffith, Jr., "Winning with Allies: The Strategic Value of the Afghan Model," *IS* 30/3 (Winter 2005/06): 47-86.
- "Military Power: A Roundtable Review," *JSS* 28/3 (June 2005): 413-69 (reviews of Biddle 2004).
- ❖ Stephen Biddle, "The New Way of War? Debating the Kosovo Model," *FA* 81/3 (May/June 2002): 138-44; or *Afghanistan and the Future of Warfare: Implications for Army and Defense Policy* (Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, November 2002); or "Afghanistan and the Future of Warfare," *FA* 82/2 (March/April 2003): 31-46; or "Allies, Airpower, and Modern Warfare: The Afghan Model in Afghanistan and Iraq," *IS* 30/3 (Winter 2005/06): 161-76.
- Kenneth M. Pollack, *Arabs at War: Military Effectiveness, 1948-1991* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2002).
- ❖ Stephen Biddle, "Assessing Theories of Future Warfare," *SS* 8/1 (Autumn 1998): 1-74.
- Responses to Biddle by Daryl G. Press, Thomas A. Keaney, and Thomas A. Mahnken and Barry D. Watts, and Biddle's rejoinder, in *IS* 22/2 (Fall 1997): 137-74.
- ❖ Stephen Biddle, "Victory Misunderstood: What the Gulf War Tells Us about Future Conflict," *IS* 21/2 (Fall 1996): 139-79.
- Eliot Cohen, "A Revolution in Warfare," *FA* 75 (March/April 1996): 37-54.
- Stephen Peter Rosen, *Societies and Military Power: India and its Armies* (Cornell, 1996).
- Stephen Rosen, "Military Effectiveness: Why Society Matters," *IS* 19/4 (Spring 1995): 5-31.
- ❖ Andrew Krepinevich, "Cavalry to Computer: The Pattern of Military Revolutions," *The National Interest* 37 (Fall 1994): 30-42.
- ❖ Allen R. Millett and Williamson Murray, *Military Effectiveness*, 3 vols. (Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1988).
- ❖ John J. Mearsheimer, *Conventional Deterrence* (Cornell, 1983).

War Termination

Core Readings:

- H. E. Goemans, *War and Punishment: The Fate of Leaders and the First World War* (Princeton, 2000).
- George W. Downs and David M. Roake, "Conflict, Agency, and Gambling for Resurrection: The Principal-Agent Problem Goes to War," *AJPS* 38/2 (May 1994): 362-80.

Recommended:

- ❖ Virginia Page Fortna, *Peace Time: Cease-Fire Agreements and the Durability of Peace* (Princeton, 2004).
- Virginia Page Fortna, "Scraps of Paper? Agreements and the Durability of Peace," *IO* 57/2 (Spring 2003): 337-72.
- ❖ Fred C. Iklé, *Every War Must End*, revised ed. (Columbia, 1991).
- ❖ Leon V. Sigal, *Fighting to a Finish: The Politics of War Termination in the United States and Japan, 1945* (Cornell, 1988).
- ❖ Paul R. Pillar, *Negotiating Peace: War Termination as a Bargaining Process* (Princeton, 1983).
- Donald Wittman, "How War Ends: A Rational Model Approach," *JCR* 23/4 (December 1979): 743-63.
- Paul Kescskemeti, *Strategic Surrender: The Politics of Victory and Defeat* (Stanford, 1958).

War Termination, The Cold War:

- Nina Tannenwald and William Curti Wohlforth, "Special Issue: Ideas, International Relations, and the End of the Cold War," *Journal of Cold War Studies* 7/2 (Spring 2005).
- Robert D. English, "Power, Ideas, and New Evidence on the Cold War's End: A Reply to Brooks and Wohlforth," *IS* 26/4 (Spring 2002): 70-92, and Brooks and Wohlforth's response, *Ibid.*, 93-111.
- ❖ Stephen G. Brooks and William Wohlforth, "Power, Globalization, and the End of the Cold War: Reevaluating a Landmark Case for Ideas," *IS* 25/3 (Winter 2000/01): 5-53.
- Randall L. Schweller and William Wohlforth, "Power Test: Evaluating Realism in Response to the End of the Cold War," *SS* 9/3 (Spring 2000): 60-107.
- Robert G. Herman, "Identity, Norms, and National Security: The Soviet Foreign Policy Revolution and the End of the Cold War," in *The Culture of National Security*, ed. Peter J. Katzenstein (Columbia, 1996), 271-316.
- Rey Koslowski and Friedrich V. Kratochwil, "Understanding Change in International Politics: The Soviet Empire's Demise and the International System," *IO* 48/2 (Spring 1994): 215-47.
- ❖ Alexander Wendt, "Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics," *IO* 46/2 (Spring 1992): 391-425.

FURTHER TOPICS AND DEBATES IN INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

Balancing After the Cold War/Soft Balancing

What is the structure of the international system? Is it stable? Is “soft” balancing against the U.S. emerging? If so, how can the U.S. avoid it?

- ❖ Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth, *World Out of Balance: International Relations and the Challenge of American Primacy* (Princeton, 2008).
- Christopher Layne, “The Unipolar Illusion Revisited: The Coming End of the United States’s ‘Unipolar Moment,’” *IS* 31/2 (Fall 2006): 7-41.
- Robert J. Art et al., “Correspondence: Striking the Balance,” *IS* 30/3 (Winter 2005/06): 177-85.
- Stephen M. Walt, *Taming American Power: The Global Response to U.S. Primacy* (Norton, 2005).
- Stephen G. Brooks and William Wohlforth, “International Relations Theory and the Case against Unilateralism,” *POP* 3/3 (September 2005): 509-24.
- ❖ Robert A. Pape, “Soft Balancing Against the United States,” *IS* 30/1 (Summer 2005): 7-45.
- T.V. Paul, “Soft Balancing in the Age of U.S. Primacy,” *ibid.*, 46-71.
- ❖ Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth, “Hard Times for Soft Balancing,” *ibid.*, 72-108.
- Keir A. Lieber and Gerard Alexander, “Waiting for Balancing: Why the World is Not Pushing Back,” *ibid.*, 109-39.
- Kenneth N. Waltz, “Structural Realism after the Cold War,” *IS* 25/1 (Summer 2000): 5-41.
- ❖ William C. Wohlforth, “The Stability of a Unipolar World,” *IS* 24/1 (Summer 1999): 5-41.
- Kenneth N. Waltz, “The Emerging Structure of International Politics,” *IS* 18/2 (Fall 1993): 44-79.
- ❖ Christopher Layne, “The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers Will Rise,” *IS* 17/4 (Spring 1993): 5-51.

Terrorism

This previously neglected field has moved into the mainstream since 9/11. This is an introduction to some of the academic literature.

- ❖ Max Abrahms, “What Terrorists Really Want,” *IS* 32/4 (Spring 2008): 78-105.
- Marc Sageman, *Leaderless Jihad: Terror Networks in the Twenty-First Century* (UPenn, 2008).
- Martha Crenshaw, “Explaining Suicide Terrorism: A Review Essay,” *SS* 16/1 (January 2007): 133-62.
- ❖ Max Abrahms, “Why Terrorism Does Not Work,” *IS* 31/2 (Fall 2006): 42-78.

- ❖ Assaf Moghadam, "Suicide Terrorism, Occupation, and the Globalization of Martyrdom: A Critique of Dying to Win," *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 29/8 (December 2006): 707-29.
- Scott Atran, "The Moral Logic and Growth of Suicide Terrorism," *Washington Quarterly* 29/2 (Spring 2006): 127-47.
- Audrey Kurth Cronin, "How al-Qaida Ends: The Decline and Demise of Terrorist Groups," *IS* 31/1 (Spring 2006): 7-48.
- Bruce Hoffmann, *Inside Terrorism*, rev. and expanded ed. (Columbia, 2006).
- Robert Trager and Dessislava Zagorcheva, "Deterring Terrorism: It Can Be Done," *IS* 30/3 (Winter 2005/06): 87-123.
- ❖ Robert A. Pape, *Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism* (Random House, 2005).
- ❖ Mia Bloom, *Dying to Kill: The Allure of Suicide Terror* (Columbia, 2004).
- ❖ Marc Sageman, *Understanding Terror Networks* (UPenn, 2004).
- Daniel L. Byman, "Al-Qaeda as an Adversary: Do We Understand Our Enemy?" *WP* 56/1 (October 2003): 139-63.
- Robert A. Pape, "The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism," *APSR* 97/3 (August 2003): 343-61.
- Audrey Kurth Cronin, "Rethinking Sovereignty: American Strategy in the Age of Terrorism," *Survival* 44/2 (Summer 2002): 119-139, or Cronin, "Behind the Curve: Globalization and International Terrorism," *IS* 27/3 (Winter 2002/03): 30-58.
- Paul Pillar, *Terrorism and U.S. Foreign Policy* (Brookings, 2001).
- Richard A. Falkenrath, Robert D. Newman, and Bradley A. Thayer, *America's Achilles' Heel: Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Terrorism and Covert Attack* (MIT, 1998).

Grand Strategy

There was a big debate in the 1990s over what grand strategy the U.S. should adopt in the wake of the Soviet Union's collapse. The Brown (1997) volume contains many of the important contributions. Art (2003) is a book-length statement of "selective engagement," and Layne (2006) is the same for "offshore balancing." This debate fell by the wayside to some degree after 9/11, as it became the conventional wisdom that the U.S. had to take the fight to the terrorists abroad.

- Ian Shapiro, *Containment: Rebuilding a Strategy against Global Terror* (Princeton, 2007).
- ❖ Christopher Layne, *The Peace of Illusions: American Grand Strategy from 1940 to the Present* (Cornell, 2006).
- Colin Dueck, *Reluctant Crusaders: Power, Culture, and Change in American Grand Strategy* (Princeton, 2006).
- Charles Krauthammer, "Democratic Realism: An American Foreign Policy for a Unipolar World," 2004 Irving Kristol Lecture, American Enterprise Institute.
- George W. Bush, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America* (Washington, D.C.: The White House, 2006) (<http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss/2006>).
- Colin Dueck, "New Perspectives on American Grand Strategy: A Review Essay," *IS* 28/4 (Spring 2004): 197-216.

- ❖ John Lewis Gaddis, *Surprise, Security, and the American Experience* (Harvard, 2004).
- Robert J. Art, *A Grand Strategy for America* (Cornell, 2003).
- Charles Krauthammer, "The Unipolar Moment Revisited," *The National Interest* 70 (Winter 2002/03): 5-17.
- John Lewis Gaddis, "A Grand Strategy of Transformation," *FP* 133 (November/December 2002): 50-57.
- ❖ George W. Bush, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America* (Washington, D.C.: The White House, 2002) (<http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.html>).
- Aaron L. Friedberg, *In the Shadow of the Garrison State: America's Anti-Statism and its Cold War Grand Strategy* (Princeton, 2000).
- ❖ Michael E. Brown, et al., eds., *America's Strategic Choices* (MIT, 1997).
- Robert Jervis, "International Primacy: Is the Game Worth the Candle?" *IS* 17/3 (Spring 1993): 52-67.
- Samuel P. Huntington, "Why International Primacy Matters," *IS* 17/3 (Spring 1993): 68-83.
- ❖ Charles Krauthammer, "The Unipolar Moment," *FA* 70/1 (1990/1991): 23-33.

IR Perspectives on Ethnic Conflict, Civil War, Intervention, Occupation, and Peacekeeping

This is by no means intended to be a comprehensive guide to the literature on these subjects, especially ethnic conflict and civil war. It is merely an introduction to some of the IR-influenced literature.

- Carter Johnson, "Partitioning to Peace: Sovereignty, Demography, and Ethnic Civil Wars," *IS* 32/4 (Spring 2008): 140-70.
- ❖ David M. Edelstein, *Occupational Hazards: Success and Failure in Military Occupation* (Cornell, 2008).
- Virginia Page Fortna, *Does Peacekeeping Work? Shaping Belligerents' Choices after Civil War* (Princeton, 2008).
- "What to do in Iraq: A Roundtable," *FA* 85/4 (July/August 2006): 150-69.
- Stephen Biddle, "Seeing Baghdad, Thinking Saigon," *FA* 85/2 (March/April 2006): 2-14.
- Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr., "How to Win in Iraq," *FA* 84/5 (September/October 2005): 87-104.
- Larry Diamond, "What Went Wrong in Iraq," *FA* 83/5 (September/October 2004): 34-56.
- ❖ Suzanne Werner and Amy Yuen, "Making and Keeping Peace," *IO* 59/2 (Spring 2005): 261-92.
- ❖ Page Fortna, "Interstate Peacekeeping: Causal Mechanisms and Empirical Effects," *WP* 50/4 (July 2004): 481-519.
- ❖ Virginia Page Fortna, *Peace Time: Cease-Fire Agreements and the Durability of Peace* (Princeton, 2004).
- ❖ David Edelstein, "Occupational Hazards: Why Military Occupations Succeed or Fail," *IS* 29/1 (Summer 2004): 49-91.

- ❖ Martha Finnemore, *The Purpose of Intervention: Changing Beliefs About the Use of Force* (Cornell, 2003).
- Monica Duffy Toft, "Indivisible Territory, Geographic Concentration, and Ethnic War," *JS* 12/2 (Winter 2002/2003): 81-118.
- Alexander B. Downes, "The Holy Land Divided? Defending Partition as a Solution to Ethnic Wars," *JS* 10/4 (Summer 2001): 58-116, or "The Problem with Negotiated Settlements to Ethnic Civil Wars," *JS* 13/4 (Summer 2004): 230-79.
- Barbara F. Walter, *Committing to Peace: The Successful Settlement of Civil Wars* (Princeton, 2001).
- Barbara F. Walter and Jack Snyder, eds., *Civil Wars, Insecurity, and Intervention* (Columbia, 1999).
- ❖ James D. Fearon, "Commitment Problems and the Spread of Ethnic Conflict," in *The International Spread of Ethnic Conflict: Fear, Diffusion, and Escalation*, ed. David A. Lake and Donald Rothchild (Princeton, 1998), 107-26.
- ❖ Barbara F. Walter, "The Critical Barrier to Civil War Settlement," *IO* 51/3 (Summer 1997): 335-64.
- ❖ Chaim D. Kaufmann, "Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Civil Wars," *IS* 20/4 (Spring 1996): 136-75.
- Michael E. Brown, "The Causes and Regional Dimensions of Internal Conflict," in *The International Dimensions of Internal Conflict*, ed. Michael E. Brown (MIT, 1996), 571-601.
- ❖ Barry R. Posen, "The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict," *Survival* 35/1 (Spring 1993): 27-47.

The First Image and War

- Rose McDermott, *Presidential Leadership, Illness, and Decision-Making* (Cambridge, 2008).
- Michael Horowitz, Rose McDermott, and Allan C. Stam, "Leader Age, Regime Type, and Violent International Relations," *JCR* 49/5 (October 2005): 661-85.
- Stephen Peter Rosen, *War and Human Nature* (Princeton, 2005).
- ❖ Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, *Balancing Risks: Great Power Intervention in the Periphery* (Cornell, 2004).
- Rose McDermott, *Political Psychology and International Relations* (Michigan, 2004).
- Dominic D. P. Johnson, *Overconfidence and War: The Havoc and Glory of Positive Illusions* (Harvard, 2004).
- Kenneth M. Pollack, *The Threatening Storm: The Case for Invading Iraq* (New York: Random House, 2002), 243-80.
- ❖ Daniel L. Byman and Kenneth M. Pollack, "Let Us Now Praise Great Men: Bringing the Statesman Back In," *International Security* 25, no. 4 (Spring 2001): 107-46.
- Bradley A. Thayer, "Bringing in Darwin: Evolutionary Theory, Realism, and International Politics," *IS* 25/2 (Fall 2000): 124-51.
- Rose McDermott, *Risk-Taking in International Politics: Prospect Theory in American Foreign Policy* (Michigan, 1998).

- Barbara Farnham, *Roosevelt and the Munich Crisis: A Study of Political Decision-Making* (Princeton, 1997).
- ❖ Jack S. Levy, "Loss Aversion, Framing Effects, and International Conflict: Perspectives from Prospect Theory," in *Handbook of War Studies II*, ed. Manus I. Midlarsky (Michigan, 2000), 193-221, or Jack S. Levy, "Prospect Theory, Rational Choice, and International Relations," *ISQ* 41 (March 1997): 87-112.
- Yuen Foong Khong, *Analogies at War: Korea, Munich, Dien Bien Phu, and the Vietnam Decisions of 1965* (Princeton, 1992).
- Jack S. Levy, "Misperception and the Causes of War: Theoretical Linkages and Analytical Problems," *WP* 36/1 (October 1983): 76-99.
- Richard Ned Lebow, *Between Peace and War: The Nature of International Crisis* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981).
- ❖ Robert Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics* (Princeton, 1976).

Domestic Politics and War

Core Readings:

- ❖ Chaim Kaufmann, "Threat Inflation and the Failure of the Marketplace of Ideas: The Selling of the Iraq War," *IS* 29/1 (Summer 2004): 5-48.
- Kevin Narizny, "Both Guns and Butter, or Neither: Class Interests in the Political Economy of Rearmament," *APSR* 97/2 (May 2003): 203-220, or "The Political Economy of Alignment: Great Britain's Commitments to Europe, 1905-1939," *IS* 27/4 (Spring 2003): 184-219.
- Fareed Zakaria, "Realism and Domestic Politics: A Review Essay," *IS* 17/1 (Summer 1992): 177-98.
- ❖ Jack Snyder, *Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition* (Cornell, 1991).
- Jack S. Levy, "Domestic Politics and War," in *The Origin and Prevention of Major Wars*, ed. Robert I. Rotberg and Theodore K. Rabb (Cambridge, 1989), 79-99.
- Eckart Kehr, *Economic Interest, Militarism, and Foreign Policy: Essays on German History* (Berkeley: University of California Press), Chapter 2: "Anglophobia and Weltpolitik," pp. 22-49.

Recommended, Diversionary War:

- Amy Oakes, "Diversionary War and Argentina's Invasion of the Falkland Islands," *Security Studies* 15, no. 3 (July-September 2006): 431-463 (online).
- Christopher Gelpi, "Democratic Diversions: Governmental Structure and the Externalization of Domestic Conflict," *JCR* 41/2 (April 1997): 255-82.
- Jack S. Levy and Lily I. Vakili, "Diversionary Action by Authoritarian Regimes: Argentina in the Falklands/Malvinas Case," in *The Internationalization of Communal Strife*, ed. Manus I. Midlarsky (London: Routledge, 1992), 118-146.
- Jack S. Levy, "Diversionary War Theory: A Critique," in *Handbook of War Studies*, ed. Manus I. Midlarsky (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1989), 259-288.

Recommended, Bureaucratic Politics and Organization Theory:

- Graham T. Allison and Philip Zelikow, *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis*, 2nd ed. (London: Longman, 1999).

- Jeffrey W. Legro, *Cooperation Under Fire: Anglo-German Restraint During World War II* (Cornell, 1995).
- Jonathan Bendor and Thomas H. Hammond, "Rethinking Allison's Models," *APSR* 86/2 (June 1992): 301-22.
- ❖ Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr., *The Army and Vietnam* (Johns Hopkins, 1986).
- Jack S. Levy, "Organizational Routines and the Causes of War," *ISQ* 30/2 (June 1986): 193-222.
- ❖ Jack Snyder, "Civil-Military Relations and the Cult of the Offensive, 1914 and 1984," *IS* 9/1 (Summer 1984): 108-46. Reprinted in *Military Strategy and the Origins of the First World War*, ed. Steven E. Miller, Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Stephen Van Evera (Princeton, 1991), 20-58.
- ❖ Barry R. Posen, *The Sources of Military Doctrine* (Cornell, 1984).
- ❖ Jack Snyder, *The Ideology of the Offensive: Military Decision Making and the Disasters of 1914* (Cornell, 1984).
- Morton H. Halperin, *Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy* (Brookings, 1974).
- Robert J. Art, "Bureaucratic Politics and American Foreign Policy: A Critique," *Policy Sciences* 4/4 (December 1973): 467-90.
- Stephen Krasner, "Are Bureaucracies Important? (Or Allison Wonderland)," *FP* 7 (Summer 1972): 159-79.

Civil-Military Relations

- Peter D. Feaver, *Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight, and Civil-Military Relations* (Harvard, 2003).
- Eliot A. Cohen, *Supreme Command: Soldiers, Statesmen, and Leadership in Wartime* (Free Press, 2002).
- Peter D. Feaver and Richard H. Kohn, eds., *Soldiers and Civilians: The Civil-Military Gap and American National Security* (MIT, 2001).
- Michael C. Desch, *Civilian Control of the Military: The Changing Security Environment* (Johns Hopkins, 1999).
- Richard K. Betts, *Soldiers, Statesmen, and Cold War Crises* (Harvard, 1977).
- Morris Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier* (Free Press, 1960).
- ❖ Samuel Huntington, *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations* (Harvard, 1957).

Public Opinion, Casualties, and the Use of Force

- ❖ Christopher Gelpi, Peter D. Feaver, and Jason Reifler, *Paying the Human Costs of War: American Public Opinion and Casualties in Military Conflicts* (Princeton, 2008).
- ❖ Adam J. Berinsky, "Assuming the Costs of War: Events, Elites, and American Public Support for Military Conflict," *JOP* 69/4 (November 2007): 975-97.
- Christopher Gelpi, Jason Reifler, and Peter D. Feaver, "Iraq the Vote: Retrospective and Prospective Foreign Policy Judgments, Candidate Choice, and Casualty Tolerance," *Political Behavior* 29/2 (June 2007): 151-74.
- ❖ William A. Boettcher III and Michael D. Cobb, "Echoes of Vietnam? Casualty Framing and Public Perceptions of Success and Failure in Iraq," *JCR* 50/6 (December 2006): 831-54.

- ❖ Christopher Gelpi, Peter Feaver, and Jason Reifler, “Success Matters: Casualty Sensitivity and the War in Iraq,” *IS* 30/3 (Winter 2005/06): 7-46.
- Richard Eichenberg, “Victory Has Many Friends: U.S. Public Opinion and the Use of Military Force, 1981-2005,” *IS* 30/1 (Summer 2005): 140-77.
- Eric V. Larson, *American Public Support for U.S. Military Operations from Mogadishu to Baghdad* (Santa Monica: RAND, 2005).
- Peter D. Feaver and Christopher Gelpi, *Choosing Your Battles: American Civil-Military Relations and the Use of Force* (Princeton, 2004).
- James Burk, “Public Support for Peacekeeping in Lebanon and Somalia: Assessing the Casualties Hypothesis,” *PSQ* 114/1 (Spring 1999): 53-78.
- Steven Kull and I.M. Destler, *Misreading the Public: The Myth of a New Isolationism* (Brookings, 1999).
- Bruce W. Jentleson and Rebecca L. Britton, “Still Pretty Prudent: Post-Cold War U.S. Public Opinion on the Use of Force,” *JCR* 42/4 (August 1998): 395-417.
- Scott Sigmund Gartner and Gary M. Segura, “War, Casualties, and Public Opinion,” *JCR* 42/3 (June 1998): 278-300.
- Edward N. Luttwak, “A Post-Heroic Military Policy,” *FA* 75/4 (July/August 1996): 33-44.
- Harvey M. Sapolsky and Jeremy Shapiro, “Casualties, Technology, and America’s Future Wars,” *Parameters* 26/2 (Summer 1996): 119-27.
- ❖ Eric V. Larson, *Casualties and Consensus: The Historical Role of Casualties in Domestic Support for U.S. Military Operations* (Santa Monica: RAND, 1996).
- ❖ Bruce Jentleson, “The Pretty Prudent Public: Post-Vietnam American Opinion on the Use of Military Force,” *ISQ* 36/1 (March 1992): 49-73.
- John E. Mueller, *War, Presidents, and Public Opinion* (New York: Wiley, 1973).
- ❖ John E. Mueller, “Trends in Popular Support for the Wars in Korea and Vietnam,” *APSR* 65/2 (June 1971): 358-75.

The Environment and Security

- Daniel Deudney, “The Case Against Linking Environmental Degradation and National Security,” *Millennium* 19 (winter 1990) 461-476.
- Miguel, Edward, Shanker Satyanath and Ernest Sergenti, “Economic Shocks and Civil Conflict: An Instrumental Variables Approach,” *Journal of Political Economy* 112 (2004): 725-753.
- Melissa Dell, Benjamin F. Jones, and Benjamin A. Olken, “Climate Shocks and Economic Growth: Evidence from the Last Half Century,” Working Paper (2009).